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 i 
Abstract 
During 2007-2010 significant dislocation occurred in the financial services sector with 
governments having to come to the aid of a large number of financial institutions.  
Throughout this crisis much political, media and practitioner interest was given to 
reward structures within the industry and, in particular, the proportion, or mix, of 
different rewards provided in overall compensation.   
This thesis examines influences on the determination of reward mix in the UK financial 
services sector.  Three theoretical perspectives are examined – agency, institutional and 
resource dependency – as potential explanations.  Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with reward executives from 30 financial services firms, alongside 
perspectives garnered from ten reward consultants.   
These interviews identify the strength of institutional pressures on firms to conform to 
an agreed reward mix norm, largely driven by historical reward patterns and reinforced 
by strong employee expectations that they will receive this norm.    However, firms are 
still seen to exercise strategic choice, influenced by the extent to which they have the 
desire and capability to resist institutional pressures.  The research also identifies which 
firms are likely to differentiate their reward mix from that established in the sector.   
The findings provide a contribution to an under-researched area in a key sector of the 
economy.  They present both an important account of the pressures facing reward mix 
determination in the financial services sector at this time, and a theoretically informed 
approach to understanding those pressures through the presentation of a unified theory 
of reward mix determination.   
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1 Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1 Preamble – My motives 
From 2002 to 2007 I was responsible for the development, implementation and 
communication of reward policy within a large organisation.  During that time I led the 
implementation of a new reward structure which aimed to shift the reward focus from 
one of base pay management to a wider, more holistic consideration of all types of 
reward.   It was during this time that my interest in the concept of reward mix was 
formed as we aimed for a balanced deal across all reward elements in order to meet the 
organisation’s need to focus employees on their performance objectives and manage 
cost, whilst competing with other  firms for the talent we needed.   
The events in the financial services industry of 2007-2009, described further below, 
have also allowed me to combine my experience and interest in financial services 
acquired in various financial services roles with the main research field of reward 
management.  I have relished the opportunity to bring my experience to this area and 
develop new skills and knowledge through my PhD and have the opportunity to have a 
series of work published (see Appendix 1 for details of published work) . 
1.2 Introduction 
Since 2007, reward mix determination (RMD) in the financial services sector has been 
the subject of significant scrutiny and comment by government, regulators, media and 
the wider public.  This thesis examines what influences reward mix, i.e. the combination 
of elements making up overall reward determination in financial services organisations, 
and why these influences are significant.   
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In this introductory chapter, in section 1.3, I provide an initial outline of how reward 
and reward mix are defined and what academic research tells us about reward mix 
determination.  Next, I outline the specific research question being asked in section 1.4, 
the context in which this question will be asked in section 1.5 and the theoretical 
perspectives adopted to address this question in section 1.6.  Sections 1.7 and 1.8 briefly 
outline the approach to the research with section 1.9 summarising the contribution the 
research makes.  The chapter concludes with section 1.10 – an outline of the structure of 
the thesis. 
1.3 The academic context 
For the purpose of this thesis, reward is defined as "any direct or indirect payments to 
employees, such as wages, bonuses, stock and benefits" (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992: 
484).   From this we can see that employee reward can come in a variety of forms 
(Dreher et al., 1988).  However, the focus of the reward literature has largely been on 
pay, both fixed, in the form of salaries and wages, or variable through a range of 
schemes such as incentives, bonuses and stock related schemes (Gerhart and Rynes, 
2003).  The interest in pay is unsurprising given the amount that organisations spend on 
pay as a proportion of their overall costs (Lawler, 1971) and its importance to 
individuals (Milkovich and Newman, 2008), but it does neglect the wider approach to 
reward management choices that practitioners are increasingly taking in the area of total 
reward (Milkovich and Newman, 2008; Armstrong and Murlis, 2007).  This has led to a 
call for academic research to incorporate non-wage compensation elements and look at 
the determinants of aspects other than pay, such as reward mix (Gomez-Mejia and 
Welbourne, 1988; Heneman et al., 2000; Milkovich, 1988).   
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For the purpose of this thesis reward mix is defined as "the combination of the elements 
making up overall reward" (Balkin and Bannister, 1993).  Gerhart and Rynes (2003) 
suggest that there is potential for variance in how organisations allocate compensation 
across the various forms of reward and therefore construct their reward mix.  This is in 
contrast to what (i.e. the amount) they pay, where there appears to be less discretion due 
to the need to stay broadly in line with others for attraction, retention and overall 
economic competitiveness reasons (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990).  Significant 
quantitative research has been carried out analysing the relationships between a range of 
both firm and environmental items to reward decisions including reward mix (e.g.  
Eisenhardt, 1988; Boyd and Salamin, 2001; Tremblay et al., 2003).  However, while the 
statistical nature of this work may have identified causality, it has only been able to 
infer why these items might be showing these statistical relationships.  Whilst helpful, 
these lists of variables and their relationships give no insight into the relative 
importance of factors in the actual organisational reward decisions taken (Perkins and 
White, 2008). 
This presents a potential issue with the research to date, namely that, despite the amount 
of reward research carried out, we know little about how reward mix is actually 
determined as there is no single paradigm emerging from the research which adequately 
explains the process.  This may be an accurate reflection of reality, with this area of 
reward strategy decision making being particularly complex.  Alternatively, perhaps the 
list of factors has muddied the field and after all this research our knowledge remains 
limited.  Convergence around a smaller number of theoretical perspectives might prove 
helpful in directing future research (Pfeffer, 1993).    
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1.4 Research question 
Gerhart and Rynes identified that although reward strategy is a matter of various 
choices, “surprisingly little is known empirically about how such choices are made in 
the first place” (2003: 7).   In this context the research question is explored: 
What influences reward mix determination in financial services organisations? 
This question is intended to explore the elements influencing reward mix determination 
and deepen our understanding of those elements – the what and the why.  This differs 
from the approach to reward research to date which has been largely explanatory.  This 
difference is articulated by Blaikie when he states that “whereas explanation is 
concerned with abstract patterns of relationships in deductive arguments or causal 
sequences, understanding is concerned with the reasons social actors give for their 
actions.” (2000: 77).  Answering this question is important as it allows academics and 
practitioners to think more consciously about the influences on reward mix, and 
therefore assess if those influences are genuinely in line with business need, however 
this may be defined.   
The application of the question is not limited to Executives, but extends to all 
employees.  This focus has been selected in the context of criticism of the concentration 
of research at the reward level of the top executives and in particular the CEO (Gerhart 
and Rynes, 2003).  Hambrick and Mason (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 
2007) showed that the success of an organisation depends on all contributions.   This led 
them to state that reward research should extend its reach to ever-lower levels of the 
organisation so that reward structures, through better understanding, could be developed 
and improved.   
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1.5 Research context 
1.5.1 Financial services - defined 
The context for the research is the financial services sector.  Section K of the Standard 
Industrial Classification (Office For National Statistics, 2010b)  defines „Financial and 
Insurance activities‟ as: 
 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding; 
 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security; 
and, 
 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities. 
HM Treasury assists further in defining this group of firms (HM Treasury, 2005), by 
breaking the sector‟s role down into three main functions, with firms operating in this 
sector carrying out one or more of these functions: 
 Matching savers, borrowers and investors through the investment chain – and in 
doing so, allocating capital to the most efficient investments within the economy 
and providing mechanisms for saving; 
 Risk pooling and management – transferring risk to those better able to absorb 
it, helping businesses plan and cope with change and facilitating higher levels of 
economic activity; and, 
 Facilitating payments – enabling swift and efficient transactions in the domestic 
and global economy and reducing the costs of doing business. 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA), the UK authority responsible for the 
authorisation of firms within the sector and their ongoing regulation, defines financial 
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services firms in relation to the legal definition presented in the Financial Services & 
Markets Act 2000 (HM Treasury, 2000a) which defines a range of financial services as 
„regulated activities‟.  Any firm conducting any of these defined activities is deemed to 
be operating a financial services business and therefore requires authorisation and will 
be subject to ongoing regulation by the FSA.  The activities are detailed in The 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (RAO) 
(HM Treasury, 2000b).  Specified activities are defined in part II of the RAO and are 
shown in Appendix 2.  This definition, i.e. firms carrying out an activity detailed in the 
RAO, is the one used in this research due to its ease of application, as all financial 
services firms are required to include their regulatory status in their publications. 
1.5.2 Financial services – significance of the sector 
The financial services context was selected for various reasons.  Although the sector has 
been identified as strategically important, with its contribution to GDP of around 8.5%, 
it is considered to be under-researched and therefore warrants further attention (Adams 
et al., 2008).  Specifically, the ESRC identifies issues with regard to regulation and 
policy formulation for the industry, management of human capital, and ensuring that 
HR approaches are robust enough to deliver the talent that the sector is perceived to 
require, with remuneration practice a particular concern (Adams et al., 2008).   
In addition, during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 a number of commentators, 
politicians and regulators identified the way reward was structured, and specifically the 
reward mix within the banking sector of the financial services sector as a contributory 
factor in what was perceived as excessive risk taking behaviour (McCarthy, 2008; 
Darling, 2008; Financial Times, 2008; Institute of International Finance, 2009; FSA, 
2009b).   For example, Callum McCarthy (2008) the Chairman of the FSA stated: 
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I think it entirely appropriate for supervisors, as part of our general assessment of 
systems and controls, to be interested in compensation and incentive structures, and 
– just as we take other aspects of a bank’s control philosophy and practice into 
account – to adjust our assessment of prudential requirements, including capital, for 
a bank accordingly.  Please note that I am referring to incentive structures.  We 
have no part to play in assessing or influencing individual bonuses or individual 
remuneration.   
This led to changes in the way remuneration risk was considered by financial services 
regulators across the world as they looked to influence reward mix within financial 
services firms.  This manifested itself in pressure for a reduction in the variable element 
of the mix, relative to the fixed component and, where large bonuses remain, deferral of 
those over a period of at least three years (FSA, 2009a, 2009b).  The focus of regulatory 
attention was not limited to the banking sector.  Regulatory requirements were extended 
in 2011 to encompass all banks, building societies and asset managers, plus some firms 
which engage in corporate finance, venture capital and financial services broking 
activities, capturing over 2,700 UK financial services firms within the regulatory 
requirements (FSA, 2010b). 
Over the same period, regulatory pressure was also building on the financial advisory 
sector to reform how it managed its reward mix.  In 2006 the FSA announced that it was 
undertaking a review of the provision of financial advice including how remuneration 
structures may influence the advice that financial advisors provide to their clients.  This 
came to be known as the Retail Distribution Review (RDR).  The aim of the RDR was 
to identify and address the causes of problems that were perceived in the retail 
investment market, including the role remuneration structures and reward mix played in 
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those problems.  The FSA proposed that financial advice should only be provided on the 
basis of fixed charges, not based on commission from product providers for sales as is 
largely current practice.  However, the FSA does not mandate what this means for how 
firms reward their employees, leaving firms to determine the changes they need to make 
(FSA, 2010a).  Further detail on the sectoral context is provided in Appendix 3. 
1.5.3 Financial services – employment and reward context 
Over 34,000 firms employing over 900,000 people operate within the financial services 
sector (FSSC, 2010).  Whilst 97% of these firms are small (employing fewer than 250 
people), the vast majority of employment comes from a relatively small number of large 
organisations (FSSC, 2010).  The workforce is typically made up of four groupings of 
employees:  first, around 15% of employees carry out managerial duties, which is 
typically higher than other sectors of the economy;  second, professional staff i.e. those 
holding professional and other qualifications; third, administrative employees who form 
the largest proportion of the workforce given the large amount of administrative and 
data handling work that is required;  finally, sales and customer service staff which, 
although a decreasing proportion due to internet use as a distribution channel, still form 
an important group of the workforce. 
Reward mix within the sector is distinctive when compared with other industry sectors 
(PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2010).  The key components typically making up 
compensation packages within the sector are shown in Table 1-1 below. 
Reward component Current practice 
Fixed pay Tends to be low in wholesale financial services. 
Retail business typically 30% of overall package. 
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Reward component Current practice 
Benefits Pensions an important component of the benefits package. 
Typically a wide range of financial benefits (e.g. life insurance, 
critical illness, medical cover at higher grades) provided. 
Bonus Majority of package in wholesale financial services business. 
Retail businesses around 30% of reward mix. 
Typically paid out of profit pools (although commission 
structures are common where sales roles are in place) with 
allocation allowing for both financial and non financial factors 
in distribution decisions. 
Long term incentives Limited application in investment banking. 
Widespread in retail financial services businesses. 
Table 1-1 – Key components of compensation in financial services – Adapted from PwC 2010 
As Table 1-1 shows, the reward mix is typically weighted towards variable reward with 
employee benefits also playing a significant role.  Whilst there are notable differences in 
the reward mix between the retail and wholesale businesses that make up the financial 
services sector, both sub-sectors are characterised by relatively high levels of variable 
pay and benefits in the reward mix compared to other sectors of the economy 
(PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2010). 
It is within the context of the significance of the sector to the UK economy, the 
employment and reward characteristics highlighted above, and the ongoing scrutiny of 
reward practices across the sector that this research is framed. 
1.6 Theoretical perspectives 
A range of theoretical frameworks have been applied to develop understanding of 
reward determination (Perkins and White, 2008).  Review of the literature has led to the 
use of three for this research – resource dependency (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987), 
 10 
neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) .   
Each of these theoretical perspectives offers a different explanation about how reward 
mix is determined.   Agency theory gives us insight into how to align the organisation‟s 
objectives to those of the individual and specifically what reward mix will best achieve 
this alignment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Neo-institutional theory helps us to 
understand the pressures organisations are under to conform and, specifically, to mimic 
the reward mix of other firms (Eisenhardt, 1988; Conlon and Parks, 1990; Crystal, 
1991).  Resource dependency theory helps predict who may have most power in 
influencing the reward mix decision.  The theory contends that some jobs in 
organisations control resources critical to the success of the organisation.  Individuals or 
groups holding those jobs are consequently able to exercise higher levels of power and 
therefore can use this to influence both the level and mix of the overall reward package 
(Tremblay et al., 2003; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987; Balkin and Bannister, 1993).   
1.7 Research approach 
Review of the literature shows that positivist approaches have directed reward research, 
with quantitative methods dominating both experimental and field-based work.  For 
example, Werner and Ward‟s (2004) review of the compensation literature from 1996 to 
2002 showed that of the 396 studies identified 1.8% were meta-analytic and 4.5% 
theoretical, the rest being quantitative analysis of data.  This is unsurprising given that 
pay is monetised. 
Whilst the statistical analysis may have established (or falsified) relationships between 
the variables being examined, the authors could then only speculate on potential reasons 
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for these relationships (Yanadori and Marler, 2006).  Taras concluded that “it is perhaps 
troubling that while scholars clearly are able to develop strong rational models of wage 
determination based on inferences derived from large data sets of wage outcomes, they 
are caught short when exposed to the often intuitive or baffling decisions of actual 
compensation managers” (1997: 181).  Consequently, she proposed that “it is 
appropriate now to simply ask compensation managers about their decisions, if for 
nothing else than to posit some plausible explanations for further testing” (1997: 181).  
In addition, Heneman and Judge noted that “we must enter the field, rather than merely 
survey it, if we are to fully understand and appreciate its context and changes” (2000: 
369).  Bloom and Milkovich add to this that “ours is a field of inquiry irrevocably 
intertwined with the decisions of practical people” (1996: 40).  However, reward 
research remains largely quantitative archival and survey research, rather than field-
based, engaging with and interpreting the actions of these “practical people”. 
Despite this, an emerging body of work is developing, taking a more constructionist 
approach, engaging in the field with practising managers.  This qualitative research 
approach, through conversations between an informed researcher and reward 
professionals from the field, can assist in establishing not only what is influencing 
reward mix determination in this sector at this time, but also why those influences are 
significant. 
1.8 The research process 
As a guide to the research process Figure 1-1 shows the three stages that the research 




Initial interest:  Reward mix determination 
Initial literature review:  Reward 
theoretical perspectives 
Exploratory interviews (13):  With academics 
practitioners, policy makers.  Understand issues, 
identify key concepts and interest in research. 
Deeper literature review:  Develop a more complete understanding of 
our knowledge on the conceptualisation and determinants of reward mix 
and identify the specific research gap for the empirical work 
Developed a conceptual framework.  Built on 
premises of agency, institutional and resource 
dependency theories 
Interviews with Reward Consultants (10):  Test initial 
findings from the literature review and develop a fuller 
conceptual model.  Improve richness of coding structure for 
later study. 
Exploratory interviews with Reward Executives (6):  
Test initial findings from revised conceptual model.  
Identify potential areas where lay and technical terms 
are inconsistent.  Examine various potential interview 
techniques to inform the development of the final 
interview protocol for the pilot interviews. 
Pilot interviews with Reward Executives (4): To test 
the robustness of the interview protocol developed, and  
my approach and style of  interviewing 
Interviews with Reward 
Executives (30): Semi-structured 
interviews 
Data analysis: Transcribed interviews 
analysed against coding structure 
developed using NVIVO, seeking patterns 
Iterative analysis:  Iterating between 
data, literature and findings from 
Reward Consultants interviews 
Initial reward mix determination model: Initial 
model of reward mix determination developed  
Model, typology and contribution: Model of reward 
mix determination and typology of firms developed.  








Sense checking (8 meetings): With trade 
associations, regulators, leadership teams, reward 
teams, reward networking groups to test and 
challenge findings and conclusions 
Figure 1-1 - Research stages 
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As indicated in Figure 1-1, at the beginning of the research I developed a preliminary 
map of the reward research field and conducted 13 exploratory interviews with 
academics, practitioners and policy makers to help identify a research gap that existed in 
the literature that was also relevant to those in the field.  This led to a deeper literature 
review examining what we know about reward mix determination and how we come to 
know this.  From this a conceptual framework was developed which was used as the 
basic structure for interviews with ten reward consultants (RCs), as acknowledged 
experts in their field, playing a significant role in reward determination and therefore 
able to provide a valid insight into the reward mix determination process (Bender, 2011; 
Clark and Fincham, 2002).   Following further exploratory and pilot interviews, 30 
interviews with reward executives
1
 (REs) were carried out.  These were analysed 
iteratively between the literature and interview data, but also returning to the earlier 
interviews with the RCs as ideas emerged.  Finally, this led to the development of a 
detailed descriptive model of reward mix determination in the financial services sector 
and a typology of firms dependent on their propensity to adopt a reward mix position 
away from the industry norm.  This was then tested via various sense-making sessions 
with a large range of practitioners and representatives from their trade bodies.   
1.9 Contribution 
The research makes a theoretical, empirical and methodological contribution.  
Theoretically, the research provides an important contribution by providing an 
important account of the pressures facing reward mix determination in the financial 
                                                          
1
 The term Reward Executive (RE) will be used throughout this document to represent the individual with 
overall responsibility for reward strategy and reward mix decisions.  This may be the HR Director or 
Chief Operating Office in smaller firms or Head of Reward, Head of Compensation and Benefits, Reward 
Vice President and Compensation and Benefits Vice President in larger organisations. 
14 
 
services sector at this time, and a theoretically informed approach to understanding 
those pressures.  It takes a step towards providing us with greater understanding of the 
strength of reward mix inertia in this sector with its conclusion that adopting 
institutionally legitimate positions is often, contrary to some other earlier research 
findings, a rational activity due to the additional, often viewed as unacceptable, risk that 
moving away from the perceived „safe harbour‟ of the market benchmark implies.  In 
addition it provides useful support, refinement and addition to the premises and 
assumptions of agency, institutional and resource dependency theories in this context, 
and from this presents a unified theory of reward mix determination.   
Empirically, we have developed an understanding of the complexity of RMD in the 
sector.   We have evidence on the practices and responses of financial services firms in 
the post crises environment and how they are reacting to regulatory and market based 
pressures at this time.  Specifically we now have empirical evidence of how the 
combination of both a firm‟s desire and capability to differentiate their reward mix 
informs their judgement of whether to „break free‟ from the established institutional 
norms.   
Methodologically the research adopts a qualitative approach in a largely quantitative 
field and draws on two pivotal groups in developing understanding – RCs and REs (the 
former selected due to their access and integration into the process of reward mix 
determination through their work with clients in this area, the latter able to talk directly 
about the influences on reward mix determination). 
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1.10 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis comprises seven chapters.  After this introductory chapter, chapter two 
reviews the reward mix determination literature in order, through examining the issue of 
reward mix determination from multiple perspectives, to develop a series of research 
questions to be explored in the research.  Chapter three provides the link between the 
research gap identified and resulting research questions, and the empirical work in later 
chapters.  It begins with an outline of the philosophical base for the research.  A 
constructionist approach to the research is presented, given the belief that reward mix 
decisions are a social activity and that meaning can best be derived on reward mix 
determination through dialogue with those closely involved in the decision making 
process.  The chapter then outlines the specific research strategy decisions taken to 
operationalise the research.  Specifically, semi-structured interviews are carried out with 
REs, and those who work closely with them providing reward strategy advice – RCs.  
The methodology chapter ends with a discussion on how the approach meets established 
qualitative standards of quality, reliability and validity. 
Chapter four presents the findings of the ten interviews with the RCs who provide data 
on both industry practice in reward mix determination as well as firm-specific practice 
through discussion of specific consulting assignments they have conducted.  Patterns 
are identified that lead to the development of a model of reward mix determination, 
which is then built on and refined, in the context of the financial services sector, through 
the interviews with REs presented in the next chapter.  
Chapter five presents the findings of the interviews with REs working in 30 different 
financial services firms.  Personal and purposeful recruitment of the interviewees leads 
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to their being able to speak of, rather than for, their organisation.  The findings are 
presented in four sections:  the determination process with respect to the formality of 
the reward mix decision and the extent to which the process is a coherent one;  reward 
mix conceptualisation and the factors that are found to be an influence on this:  the 
factors determining reward mix and the extent to which they are consistent with the 
findings of the literature review;  the review of the dimensions identified as catalysts for 
change in reward mix.   
Chapter six presents a discussion of the findings through the development of a reward 
mix determination model in the financial services sector.  The findings are then 
discussed in the context of the literature and considerations of agency, institutional and 
resource dependency theories and what they say about reward mix determination.  A 
revised integrated theory of reward mix determination is then presented, drawing on the 
range of perspectives discussed in the literature and the empirical data gathered in this 
research. 
Finally, in chapter seven I review the analysis discussed in chapter six and provide a 
summary of my answers to the research questions established in chapter two.  The 
chapter then goes on to summarise the contribution of this thesis to knowledge, practice 
and policy makers.  The limitations of the research are then acknowledged before 
avenues for further research are suggested.  The thesis concludes with some reflective 
remarks on the research process and its findings. 
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2 Chapter two: Review of the literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of a review of the literature relating 
to reward mix determination (RMD). This review has two objectives.  First, it will 
examine the issue of RMD from multiple perspectives, in order to develop a more 
complete understanding of both our current knowledge on the determinants of RMD 
and how we acquire this.  Second, building on this understanding, it will clarify the 
specific research gap in the context of the research question introduced in chapter one – 
What influences reward mix determination in financial services organisations? –  and 
develop supplementary research questions to be examined through further empirical 
work.  
This chapter has seven sections.  After outlining the method used to conduct the 
literature review, section 2.2 defines key reward mix terms and examines how reward 
mix has been conceptualised in the literature to date.  Following this, section 2.3 
presents three explanations of RMD.  First, agency theory is discussed as the base for 
understanding what is driving reward mix decisions in organisations.  This base view is 
then critiqued and accompanied by alternative explanations of reward mix decisions.  
Resource dependency and institutional theory2 are offered as both competing and 
complementary explanations for RMD.  Section 2.4 draws these three explanations 
together in a review of research which has combined their insights to examine RMD.  
                                                          
2
 Although the term institutional theory is used in this review, the literature is based on neo-institutional 
theory which took initial theorising on the influence external factors have on organisations and extended 





Section 2.5 examines separately the role of benefits in reward mix, given that this is an 
area often excluded from reward research.   Section 2.6 examines and critiques the 
epistemological positions taken by researchers into RMD.  In section 2.7, the gaps in 
our knowledge that emerge from the review of the literature are summarised, and the 
conceptual framework and research questions for the empirical work to follow are 
presented.  Finally section 2.8 summarises the chapter. 
2.2 Conceptualising reward mix 
2.2.1 Reward defined 
Milkovich and Newman (2008) draw together much of the thinking on reward 
definition.  They outline the various returns that could be said to accrue to employees in 
exchange for their labour and therefore the range of choices employers have about the 
mix between these returns that they look to provide.  These returns cover three main 
areas – cash compensation, benefits and relational returns.   
Cash compensation is made up of base pay and incentives.  Base pay is the fixed cash 
element of overall reward and generally reflects either the value the employer puts on 
the role being performed or the skills the employee brings to the role.  Changes to base 
pay are made due to a change in the wider market valuation for the role, employers‟ 
perception that employee skills have improved, or a more general shift to reflect 
changes in inflation.  Incentives, which can be long- or short-term, are elements of the 
overall mix that change with respect to either individual or organisational performance, 
but are not consolidated into base pay.  Generally, they take two forms –cash, for 
example bonuses and profit sharing, or equity through either direct equity grants or 
equity options.   
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Benefits are non cash elements of reward and take a number of forms.  Income 
protection benefits are designed to “help protect employees from the financial risks 
inherent in daily life” (Milkovich and Newman, 2008: 12).  Pensions, health insurance 
and life insurance are examples of benefits that are common in the UK (CIPD, 2008c).  
Work-life benefits are those “which help employees better integrate their work and life 
responsibilities” (Milkovich and Newman, 2008: p12).  Examples include flexible 
working arrangements and child care provision (CIPD, 2008c).  Finally, allowances are 
extras that enhance the attractiveness of the package.  These are more common in areas 
where certain goods are in short supply or the employer can provide them at a lower 
cost than the employee would be able to obtain them for themselves, e.g. the provision 
of employee housing.   
Relational returns explain wider reasons why employees are felt to work for a particular 
employer.  Milkovich and Newman (2008) categorised these as recognition and status, 
job security, the challenge of the work and the learning experience it brings.  Although 
some of these may not be fully within the organisation‟s control, such as employment 
security which will be influenced by wider economic trends, these are still considered to 
be an important part of the overall reward mix (Gélinas, 2005).  Further, the importance 
of relational returns can be seen through the increasing focus that organisations are 
placing, at least in their rhetoric, on them as part of their overall total reward packages 
(Armstrong and Murlis, 2007). 
Whilst a helpful categorisation of the elements making up overall reward, the definition 
outlined above does not capture the interplay between the elements making up total 
return, nor even the interplay in the sub-categorisation of total compensation. For 
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example how, if at all, is cash compensation related to benefits or within benefits what 
determines whether firms provide, say, income protection type benefits, and if so how 
does this influence other elements of the total compensation mix?  This interplay is an 
area where the review of the reward mix literature will provide further insight through 
exploring the theoretical drivers of choices organisations make with respect to the 
combination, or mix, of all the elements discussed. 
2.2.2 Reward mix defined 
Whilst there is a general consensus around the definition of reward (Milkovich and 
Newman, 2008), there is no such consensus around how reward mix should be 
conceptualised (Yanadori et al., 2002).  Definitions are both broad, covering a wide 
range of the reward elements discussed, and narrow, focussing on the mix of just two, 
typically base salary and incentives.  Measures vary across different studies.  A narrow 
definition of reward mix has been conceptualised through the use of the ratio of base 
salary to short-term bonus payments as this was perceived as the most common form of 
incentive pay (e.g. Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1988; Boyd and Salamin, 
2001; Werner and Tosi, 1995; Gerhart and Trevor, 1996; Bloom and Milkovich, 1998).  
Alternatively, others have widened this simple ratio to examine the proportion of base 
pay to cash compensation, i.e. including both short- and long-term incentives (e.g. 
Tremblay et al., 2003; Roth and O'Donnell, 1996; Tremblay and Chenevert, 2005; 
Burke and Hsieh, 2006) or the closely related area of bonus to cash compensation (e.g. 
Pappas and Flaherty, 2006; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004; Anderson et al., 2000; Elvira, 
2001; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987).  A number of studies have also used multiple 
measures, arguing that this best captures the range of variability which has generally 
21 
 
been the area of study (e.g. Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 
1989).   
A summary of measures used in employee level (as opposed to solely executive level) 
reward research is given in Table 2-1 alongside my interpretation of the theoretical 
perspective that each study has taken
3
. 
                                                          
3
 A number of the studies explicitly state the theoretical perspective.  Where this is not the case I have 




Study Reward mix conceptualisation Theoretical perspective  
Darmon 1982 Relative proportion of salary, commission and bonus n/a  
Ippolito 1987 Proportion of reward in pension as measured by capital loss n/a  
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1987 Relative importance of fixed (salary and fringe benefits) and variable 
(incentive) components of reward. 
Contingency  
Eisenhardt 1988 Proportion of salary relative to sales commission payments Agency, institutional  
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1989 Merit pay as a percentage of base salary.  Bonus as a percentage of base 
salary.  Aggregate incentive pay as a percentage of base salary. 
Strategic compensation  
Gerhart and Milkovich 1990 Extent of variable pay, in terms of relative amounts of short-term bonuses, 
long-term incentives and base salary in individuals‟ pay 
Agency, expectancy  
Conlon and Parks 1990 Proportion of contingent versus non contingent pay Agency, institutional  
Gomez-Mejia 1992 Proportion of incentives relative to fixed pay Strategic compensation  
Balkin and Bannister 1993 Proportion of earnings coming from each pay form Resource dependency  
Werner and Tosi 1995 Bonus to bonus and base ratio Agency  
Umanath et al. 1996 Proportion of salary in total compensation Agency  
Gerhart and Trevor 1996  Average ratio of bonus pay to base pay Agency  
Roth and O’Donnell 1996 Proportion of compensation as incentives (short-term bonus, long-term 
bonus, short-term equity plan, long-term equity plan) 
Agency  
Stroh et al. 1996 Bonus divided by total cash Agency  
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Study Reward mix conceptualisation Theoretical perspective  
Bloom and Milkovich 1998 Ratio of base pay to bonus Agency  
Demougin and Fluet 2001 Strength of incentives in mix relative Agency  
Boyd and Salamin 2001 Ratio of bonus to base pay Strategic compensation  
Miller et al. 2001 Weighted mean of productivity bonus National culture  
Tremblay et al. 2003 Proportion of salary component as a percentage of total average sales 
compensation 
Agency, resource 
dependency, transaction cost 
 
Kuhn and Yockey 2003 Salary component relative to bonus   
Van der Stede 2003 Percentage of compensation that is performance dependent Institutional, Hofstede, 
contingency 
 
Datta et al. 2004 Mix of wage payment between cash and kind payments   
Yanadori and Marler 2006 Ratio of long-term pay to short-term pay Strategic compensation, 
agency, resource dependency 
 
Burke and Hseih 2006  Balance of fixed and variable compensation n/a  
Pappas and Flaherty 2006 Percentage of total pay in incentives Expectancy  
Segalla et al. 2006 Fixed versus incentive compensation Agency, expectancy, Hofstede  
Ittner et al. 2007 Salary to cash bonus ratio Agency  
Festing et al. 2007 Fixed pay compared to variable pay Resource dependency, 
institutional, Hofstede. 
 
Abbot and De Cieri 2008 Extent to which work-life benefits are included in reward mix Strategic choice, stakeholder, 
resource based view 
 
Table 2-1 - Summary of reward mix measures used in employee reward mix research 
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This shows that the dominant area of interest for employee level research on reward mix 
is the relationship between fixed and variable elements in the mix, generally defined 
with regard to base salary and incentive payments both short- and long-term.  Festing et 
al. justified this focus as “the decision about variable and/or fixed pay is the starting 
point which guides all the other decisions” (2007: 122).    Further examination shows 
that conceptualisation of reward mix is dominated by an examination of cash 
compensation not total compensation, nor wider total reward.  Benefits and relational 
returns are generally excluded.  Some studies have extended the definition to include 
some benefits and even relational elements in theoretical discussions of reward mix, but 
the use of these definitions in empirical research designs is limited.  For example, 
Werner and Tosi defined reward mix as “the way that firms orchestrate different 
components of pay, such as base pay, bonuses and incentives, and benefits, so that they 
are effective, motivational and control mechanisms with which to achieve different 
organisational performance objectives” (1995: 1672).  However, they then measured 
mix as the ratio of bonus to total cash compensation in their empirical research on the 
effects of ownership on reward mix.  Balkin and Bannister, in their examination of how 
pay mix is influenced by different employee groups who are deemed to hold critical 
positions, defined mix as “the various forms an employee‟s earnings may take as well as 
the proportion of earnings that come from each pay form” (1993: 139).  They went on to 
define pay in three ways.  First, salary or payment for time spent working, second, pay 
incentives or pay contingent on performance, and finally benefits, defined as rewards 
pertaining to membership of the organisational group.  Despite this more holistic 
definition encapsulating more elements of reward, their work only goes on to examine 
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the cash-based elements of compensation, i.e. salary and pay incentives, thus missing 
out a significant element of their definition. 
Others note the weakness of excluding benefits from research on reward mix.  For 
example, Ittner et al. (2007), in their study of agency influences on the base salary to 
cash bonus mix in member-owned medical practices, noted how their exclusion of other 
direct and indirect rewards such as pensions and insurances limited the usefulness of 
their results.  Miller et al. (2001) did examine fixed, variable and benefit components of 
reward mix, but the focus of this work was on one specific outcome (turnover) of the 
levels of each of these reward components, not determinants of their mix, and was also 
set in a very specific situation – the study of American-owned manufacturing plants 
operating in Mexico. 
Studies of the cash compensation to benefits mix in the form of „kind‟ payments have 
been carried out in the agrarian sector.  Kind payments are in line with Milkovich and 
Newman‟s (2008) definition of allowances, as they include the provision of goods in 
return for labour as opposed to cash payment and include shelter, insurance, water, 
meals and outputs of whatever is being produced, such as food (Datta et al., 2004).  
However, given the specificity of the research scenario, subsistence reward and 
developing economies, the wider applicability of their results to developed economies 
could be questioned.  Ippolito (1987) also examined a wider definition – the proportion 
of pensions in the overall mix measured through assessment of the capital loss that 
would occur if an employee quit an organisation – in his investigation of why US 
federal workers‟ turnover was lower than in other sectors.  However, this study is also 
focused on the very specific element of cash compensation to benefits mix in the form 
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of defined benefit pensions, rather than the overall reward mix decision and the range of 
components that we have defined in this mix, so again its wider applicability may be 
limited. 
Others have called for reward mix to be defined even more widely to encompass  more 
relational elements of reward (Milkovich and Newman, 2008).  Gerhart and Milkovich, 
in their review of the state of employee compensation research, stated that  
In structuring monetary compensation, decisions concerning the mix between 
direct pay and benefits are important.  But, at an even more general level, 
organizations face a choice between allocating resources to pay versus other 
potential rewards / returns, such as improved supervision, participation, 
working conditions, advancement opportunities, job design, training and so 
forth (1992: 551).   
They add that, given the increase in the proportion of compensation provided through 
benefits, “it is less and less correct to equate direct pay with total monetary 
compensation” (1992: 484).   Further, Bloom and Milkovich (1996) suggest that 
research needs to shift its focus away from examination of the single one-for-one 
exchange, to examination of the wider return as a whole, given that meaning is derived 
from the whole and interactions with it.  With respect to benefits, even the terminology 
often used by researchers gives us some perspective on the significance they give to 
benefits in total compensation constructs, often referring to them as „fringe benefits‟  
(e.g. Tremblay et al., 2003).  Given the proportion of overall reward coming from 
benefit items and the significant interest practitioners have in this area (Deadrick and 
Gibson, 2007) defining benefits as „fringe‟ appears inappropriate. 
27 
 
The wider definition of reward, although not really applied in academic research, is in 
line with recent practitioner interest in an extended reward definition often termed „total 
reward‟ (Perkins and White, 2008; Medcof and Rumpel, 2007; World at Work, 2007; 
Gross and Friedman, 2004; Poster and Scannella, 2001).   
The need to shift research from solely focussing on pay to other components making up 
the overall reward mix led Gerhart and Rynes to conclude that  
Simultaneous consideration of direct pay, benefits, non monetary rewards and 
sanctions was required when considering reward rather than the focus on the 
much tighter area of pay or the single program approach (e.g. review of 
employee share ownership) which had been adopted to date. (2003: 259).    
The way in which the phenomenon under study is conceptualised will influence the 
overall results and any conclusions that are drawn as a result (Kuhn, 1962).  It is 
therefore important in using the results in practice that the definition applied reflects 
reality and practitioner understanding of the term. 
Table 2-1 also shows that a consensus on definition is not present even when the studies 
are using the same theoretical perspective.  This is most apparent for agency theory, the 
most prevalent perspective for examining reward mix (Eisenhardt, 1988; Shaw et al., 
2000; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992), which has seen mix conceptualised in relation 
to short- and long-term bonuses, base pay, total cash and total compensation.  None of 
the employee agency theory studies record in their papers having spent significant time 
with practitioners to understand what reward mix means to them and how this translates 
into RMD ahead of their generally quantitative assessment of the relationships between 
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elements of the mix and other variables.  One notable exception to this was Eisenhardt‟s 
(1988) study of retail sales operations which included some interviews of store owners, 
albeit the focus being on RMD rather than conceptualisation.  It may be that there is a 
range of classifications used by practitioners and examination of a range of 
conceptualisations is therefore appropriate, or it may be that there is a dominant 
paradigm and future studies should focus on that definition.  
To conclude, there is limited agreement between studies as to a single definition of 
reward mix, even when using the same theoretical perspective to examine the issue.  
Research on reward focuses largely on monetary rewards, particularly the cash 
compensation elements and, with respect to reward mix, has a significant emphasis on 
base pay and incentives.   Few studies combine all elements of reward mix, despite calls 
for compensation researchers to look at reward more holistically and human resource 
management research stressing the importance of grouping HR practices to reflect the 
organisation‟s overall employment philosophy (Storey, 2007).   
2.3 Theoretical perspectives 
Whetten (2002) identified that scholarly theory (as opposed to ordinary explanatory 
theory) should be developed to improve enquiry.  In relation to compensation theory, 
Gerhart and Rynes supported this when they concluded that there was the need for a 
“broader process of developing careful and well-reasoned theory” (2003: 263).  A wide 
range of theoretical frameworks has been applied to gain understanding of various 
aspects of reward management (Perkins and White, 2008).  Given this, understanding 
which theories are relevant to actual practice is important from the perspective of both 
academics and practitioners in directing organisational policy and future research.   
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Kessler (2001) noted that reward research has been influenced by theoretical 
development from a range of disciplines.  However, over 30 years ago Mahoney stated 
that no “comprehensive theory of employee compensation exists at present.  Rather, 
there exists a number of segmented theories or models of compensation” (1979).  In the 
last 30 years, we have added further to this collection of „segmented‟ theories.  Bloom 
and Milkovich (1996) identified 14 different theoretical perspectives that had been used 
to assess reward determination, with a further eleven theories focussing on the effects of 
compensation on outcomes.  A more recent review of the theoretical foundations of 
studies of executive compensation identified an additional nine theoretical approaches 
taking the total to 34 (Baeten, 2008).  Therefore, although significant reward 
determination research has been carried out, we know little about why reward strategy 
decisions are taken as there is no consensus emerging from all the work (Gerhart and 
Rynes, 2003).  This may be an accurate reflection of reality with the area of reward mix 
decision making being particularly complex, and as a result each theory adding insight 
to this complex issue.  Alternatively, it may be that after all this research, we actually 
know very little.  Convergence around a smaller number of theoretical perspectives 
might therefore prove helpful in directing future research (Pfeffer, 1993).    Gerhart and 
Milkovich (1992)  noted that we should be looking to adapt the range of theories that 
have emerged to improve our knowledge of reward systems.   Clearly, some 
simplification is required and categorising reward theories may help. 
Bloom and Milkovich (1996) identified that there are two types of reward theories.  
First, those that treat reward as the dependent variable.  These studies aim to help us 
understand the determinants of reward.  For example, studies applying institutional 
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theory are looking at the influence isomorphic pressures have on the final reward 
approach that organisations adopt.  Second, those that are interested in the effect that 
different reward policies have on individual and organisational outcomes.  These treat 
reward as the independent variable.  For example, theories that would fall into this area 
include the range of motivation theories (e.g. expectancy, goal setting, equity), pay 
satisfaction theory and contingency theory, all of which examine the transmission 
mechanism between elements of reward strategies and specific outcomes (Bloom and 
Milkovich, 1996).   
Reward theories can be categorised further into those that are looking at organisational 
policy level decisions on reward that apply across the whole organisation and those that 
consider the individual level reward decision
4
 (Werner and Ward, 2004).  Given that 
reward policy decisions are organisational processes, the correct unit of analysis for this 
review would appear to be the organisation (Barringer and Milkovich, 1996), excluding 
any theoretical perspectives where the unit of analysis is not organisational.  Therefore, 
theories focussing on individual level reward determination can be excluded from this 
review.  Within these bounds, a review of the literature indicates four theoretical 
perspectives have been used to understand RMD at an organisational level – agency 
theory, transaction cost theory, institutional theory and resource dependency theory
5
.     
However, evidence for the transaction cost perspective is relatively weak (John and 
Weitz, 1989).   Anderson (1985) applied a transaction cost approach to gain insight into 
                                                          
4
 Individual level theories include human capital theory and justice based theories.  
5
 A number of other theoretical perspectives have been used to examine reward policy decisions, e.g. 
efficiency wage theory or labour market theories.  However, these other perspectives were not selected 
for review as they typically focus on what level to reward employees rather than RMD. 
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when salary or incentives might be optimal in the reward package.  The research 
concluded that there was limited explanatory power in the framework for explaining 
mix decisions (with the results replicated by John and Weitz (1989)).  Tremblay et al. 
(2003) in their investigation of sales reward strategy, used agency, resource dependency 
and transaction cost theories to examine the proportion of salary in sales compensation.  
They also found that the transaction cost approach provided little explanatory power.  
For example, they discovered that the relationship between career planning, level of 
education and training, and compensation strategy was very weak.  All the authors 
suggested agency theory as a more effective explanatory framework, with its emphasis 
on matters of both control and motivation.  Therefore the transaction cost approach is 
not adopted in this review. 
A range of motivation theories have also been used to provide insights into what 
elements of reward cause changes in the behaviour of individuals and, from this, the 
effect different elements of the mix choice may have.  Although motivation theories are 
not the focus of the literature review, due to their emphasis on both compensation as the 
independent variable and the individual, they will be discussed in the context of the 
other theoretical perspectives examined and the influence beliefs about motivation may 
have on organisational policy making. 
What follows is an outline and assessment of the three theoretical perspectives chosen.  
In outlining each theoretical perspective, a review is carried out of the basic theory and 
the key assumptions which underlie it.  Following this, empirical research is examined 
to identify what this tells us about its explanatory power in the area of RMD and any 
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criticisms that can be made.  This then leads to conclusions on the theoretical 
perspectives usefulness in understanding how reward mix decisions are taken. 
2.3.1 Agency theory 
2.3.1.1 Introduction 
Agency theory examines the relationship between owners of businesses, or principals, 
and employees, or agents.  It proposes that both parties to the employment exchange 
look to achieve the most favourable exchange possible for their interests and will act 
accordingly.  According to the theory reward mix, the form of the extent to which 
reward is variable and therefore at risk, is a significant control mechanism used by 
principals to ensure that agents act in the owners‟ best interests.  Agency theory has 
been used to explain phenomena across a wide range of disciplines such as accounting, 
economics, sociology, organisation behaviour, marketing and political science 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a).  A significant part of this work has been focused on the 
employment context including the reward mix relationship between fixed and variable 
pay (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Segalla et al., 2006; 
Fernandez-Alles et al., 2006). 
Underpinning much of the agency theory research is the assumption that work is 
delegated within organisations from one party, the principal, to another, the agent  
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   This led Jensen and Meckling to define the agency 
relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (1976: 308).   The issue is not 
solely about owners of organisations and executives who run organisations, but applies 
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throughout organisations as management delegates to subordinates.  This separation of 
work and the resulting delegation continues throughout the hierarchy of the 
organisation.  Despite this, most of the reward research, using agency theory as its 
theoretical base, has been done on the compensation of top executives in organisations, 
usually the CEO, with employee reward mix less well studied (Bloom and Milkovich, 
1998; Stroh et al., 1996; Trevor, 2008).  Fama and Jensen (1983) and Stiglitz (1975) 
outlined how the agency approach can be applied below the top level of management.   
However, Baker et al. (1988) and Tosi and Werner (1995) showed that this was not a 
straightforward relationship down the hierarchy.  They concluded that when agency 
theory prescriptions around alignment of reward were strong at the top of the 
organisation, it weakened at each level of hierarchy examined.  However, despite this 
concern, studies where the extension of agency theory beyond executive reward have 
been made include sales clerks (Eisenhardt, 1988), gain sharing (Welbourne and Meija, 
1995), national culture (Segalla et al., 2006) and faculty pay (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 
1992).   
2.3.1.2 Agency problem 
At the heart of agency theory is the core assumption that the parties to the employment 
exchange, employees or agents, and owners or principals, have different goals and that 
these goals conflict with each other (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Owners are assumed 
to be looking to maximise profit through their investment in the organisation, whilst 
employees are assumed to wish to minimise their effort for a given return.  Therefore, it 
is proposed that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal and 
vice versa (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).     
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Alongside these different interests, the theory assumes that the principal and agent will 
have different risk preferences reflecting their particular circumstances.  The overall 
level of risk aversion of the agent will be higher than that of the principal.  By the nature 
of the employment they have with the organisation, agents are not able to diversify their 
risk as either all or a significant part of their income comes from this employment.  This 
directly contrasts with the principals‟ position and the ability this gives them to 
diversify their investments across a range of assets and thus manage risk more 
effectively.  These differences in risk preference influence both the principal‟s and 
agent‟s behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Finally, principals are also assumed to face the problem of information asymmetry.  As 
they are inevitably removed from the day-to-day operation and knowledge of the 
business operation, it is difficult and expensive for them to gain complete knowledge of 
what the agent is doing.  They will have limited information about the ability of, and 
decisions made by, the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  This presents the problem of 
ensuring, from the principals‟ perspective, that employees are aligned with the 
principals‟ interests.   The principals can manage this through two means: through 
developing appropriate incentives for the employee to act in the principals‟ interests and 
by incurring monitoring costs designed to manage the shirking and self-interested 
behaviour of the employee (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
2.3.1.3 Managing the agency problem - incentives and monitoring 
Agency theory provides significant insight into how goal incongruence, differing risk 
preferences and information asymmetry can be managed.  At the centre of managing 
these issues is the organisation‟s reward mix, particularly around the balance of fixed 
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and variable reward making up total compensation, laid out in the contract between the 
principal and employee.  Wiseman et al. outlined the importance of aligning agents‟ 
reward to outcomes that the principal values to “create a common fate” (2000: 312).  A 
higher proportion of variable pay in the overall reward mix is intended to achieve this 
common fate by tying employees‟ interests more tightly to that of the firm (Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Delvey, 1999). 
How organisations achieve the „common fate‟ will depend on the type of contracting 
arrangement they put in place and the reward mix arrangements that flow from this.  
There are outcome based contracts, linking agents‟ reward to an outcome desired by the 
owner of the organisation, e.g. profits or total shareholder return.  This is clearly 
desirable from the principal‟s point of view as it aligns reward between principal and 
agent.  Burke and Hseih (2006) noted the importance, from a financial management 
point of view, of reward costs varying with revenues which outcome-based contracts 
supported.  Burke and Terry (2004) illustrated conceptually how outcome-based 
contracts, with their emphasis on variable reward, reduce fixed costs and therefore the 
firm‟s breakeven point which, in turn, they argued translated into increased profit.   
However, the use of outcome-based contracts may be less appealing to the agent as 
outcome measures of this type are not fully in the agent‟s control (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
For example, an organisation‟s share price, a key component of total shareholder return, 
will move, not only due to the individual performance of the organisation, but also due 
to wider general market risk arising from moves in the whole market independent of the 
individual organisation‟s performance (Hull, 2009).  This broader, general market risk 
can come from numerous sources, such as changes in government policy and wider 
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economic conditions influencing general investor sentiment (Hull, 2009).  Burke and 
Hsieh (2006) also note that this approach to determining the reward mix does not 
account for attraction and retention issues which are likely to occur with a shift to a 
more outcome-based and variable-orientated reward contract.  The transferring of risk, 
through outcome-based contracts to agents, has a cost as it is likely that the agent will 
require some form of risk premium, such as a higher level of total reward, to 
compensate for the increased risk that they are bearing (Eisenhardt, 1989a).   The level 
of risk premium will reflect the increased uncertainty of result which comes from 
outcome-based contracts, given that the agent cannot solely influence the outcome 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a).   
This risk premium was examined by Tremblay et al. (2003) who showed, in the context 
of sales commission policies, that the level of business uncertainty which an 
organisation faces, and therefore the extent to which the ultimate outcome is outside the 
direct control of the agent, will influence the level of risk premium required to 
compensate the agent.  Where there is high business uncertainty, and therefore a higher 
risk of agent effort not translating to sales, then higher commissions when sales do 
result will be required to compensate the agent.   
The level of uncertainty has also been theorised as being related to not only reward level 
(Tremblay et al., 2003), but also reward mix (Gerhart and Trevor, 1996; Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1987; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  Agency theory predicts that 
high levels of business uncertainty lead to higher proportions of fixed pay.  This is 
attributed to the fact that the risk premium, required to compensate employees for 
uncertainty about future compensation flows and lowered employment security, 
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becomes prohibitively expensive (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998).  However, empirical 
research has not shown this to be the case, with organisations in fast-paced uncertain 
markets looking for and adopting more flexible approaches to compensation to manage 
cash flow and attract required skills (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987; Stroh et al., 1996; 
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990).  For example, Gomez Mejia carried out a series of 
studies (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987; Gomez-Mejia, 1992; Balkin and Gomez-
Mejia, 1990) and concluded that reward mix was weighted more towards variable 
elements in industries with high levels of technology intensity and where there were 
higher levels of environmental uncertainty as firms look to „share‟ the risk with 
employees by aligning payouts to firm profitability, i.e. the propensity of a firm to risk 
share is contingent on certain contextual factors such as technological intensity and 
economic uncertainty. 
Another form of contract that is available to organisations is a behaviour-based contract 
which links agent‟s reward to specific behaviours or actions delivered by the agent 
regardless of their ultimate effect on the return accruing to the principal.  This may be 
more appealing to the agent as it is solely within his/her control, but may have less 
appeal to the principal given the monitoring costs associated with the more subjective-
based measurement and the fact that these behaviours are not guaranteed to deliver the 
principals‟ goal – profit maximisation and total shareholder return (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
The decision around which form of contract to adopt is a key one for an organisation, 
given the implications that it appears to have for how reward is distributed between 
fixed and variable reward elements.   
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The extent to which outcome-based contracts are used and the implications this has for 
the decision on fixed versus variable reward, may also be related to how easily 
employees can be monitored in their roles.  In environments where monitoring is 
relatively low cost, behaviourally-based contracts would be applied, as they eliminate 
the need for risk premium payments (Conlon and Parks, 1990).  Consequently, 
compensation can be delivered in the form of fixed rewards, such as salary, and also 
other forms of fixed reward such as those contained in the benefits package.   Moreover, 
employees have been shown to prefer fixed returns, given the certainty and security 
these bring; this will generally increase overall employee satisfaction with their reward 
mix (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Baiman, 1990).  However, where there are relatively high costs 
associated with monitoring employee behaviour, due say to remote working or the 
relative complexity of the role, an outcome-based contract is more likely to be 
employed.  Incentive payments would then tend to form a higher proportion of the 
overall reward mix (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989a).  The cost of 
monitoring employees will be a function of the complexity of the activity being 
performed and the resulting span of control that management require to monitor the 
behaviour.  Where larger spans of control are possible, whilst still allowing appropriate 
monitoring of behaviour, costs will be lower.    
Where the task is highly programmable, monitoring costs will be lower as larger spans 
of control will be manageable and therefore higher proportions of fixed reward can be 
offered.  However, where significant amount of initiative and discretion are employed 
then behaviour monitoring will be more problematic and it is likely that outcome-based 
contracts will be more dominant to manage this (Tremblay et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 
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1989a; Stroh et al., 1996; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990).   For example, Eisenhardt 
(1988) showed that the relationship between span of control and the proportion of fixed 
pay in the overall reward mix was related.  The higher the span of control and therefore, 
by inference, the harder it is for the manager to monitor behaviour, then the larger the 
variable outcome-based component of the mix.  Examination of sales teams has shown 
that, given that they operate autonomously in the field away from direct management 
observation, direct monitoring of their performance can be problematic (Tremblay et al., 
2003; John and Weitz, 1989).  This is often cited as the reason why outcome-based 
contracts are more suitable for this group and reward mix proportions tend to be 
weighted towards a higher percentage of variable pay.   
Consequently, when assessing which type of contract to use, the principal will need to 
weigh up the cost of acquiring more information on the agent‟s action which would 
allow a more behaviour-based approach at lower cost (given it eliminates the need for a 
risk premium to be paid) and compare this to the lower information costs built into an 
outcome-based contract approach, but the higher employment cost due to the risk 
premium.   Conlon and Parks (1990) found, in their experiment on the effects of reward 
traditions and employee monitoring on reward mix, that  “when the costs of directly 
monitoring an individual‟s actions exceed the costs of administering incentives based on 
performance outcomes, performance contingent incentives are a preferred method of 
control” (1990: 604).  They added that “the trend towards contingent pay suggests that 
some organizations are discovering that incentives may be more efficient than 
hierarchy” (1990: 604).  
40 
 
In summary, under agency theory, incentives are provided to try and align employee 
and employers interests.  “Paying individuals to do X causes them to do X.” 
(Prendergast, 1999: 11).  The main barrier to establishing contracts in this way is the 
additional cost employers will incur as employees require compensating for the higher 
risk that contracts of this type imply.  The extent to which it is rational to pay this 
premium will depend on the ease with which the roles can be monitored by 
management and how the cost of monitoring compares with the risk premium that will 
be payable. 
2.3.1.4 Agency research 
Reviews by Eisenhardt (1989a), Zajac and Westphal (1995), Prendergast (1999) and 
Miller and Whitford (2007) have indicated that the large body of research on agency 
theory generally supports its predictions that organisations should use both incentives 
and monitoring activity to control managers and employees, and that incentives and 
monitoring are considered as substitutes under various scenarios. 
A range of studies has examined whether higher proportions of incentives in the reward 
mix improve performance.  Lazear (1986) showed a 36% increase in worker 
productivity in the auto windshield installation sector when they shifted from fixed 
reward to piece rates. Reflecting agency theory prediction that a risk premium would 
also have to be paid, overall wages increased by 12%.  In the same study he showed that 
payment can have both incentive and attraction effects, with better workers attracted to 
contracts that have higher levels of pay for performance.  Consequently, from this 
economic perspective, contracts should be designed not just to induce increased effort, 
as agency theory contends, but also to attract a higher quality of worker to the 
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organisation.  Paarsch and Shearer (2000) carried out a similar study in the British 
Columbian tree planting industry.  They found increases in productivity of up to 22%.  
Both studies collected individual, as opposed to organisational, performance data, which 
are more likely to be influenced by other uncontrollable factors, and therefore make 
their results more convincing.  Other studies have examined aggregate performance 
effects arising from the introduction of variable reward schemes. For example, in the 
retail sales sector, Banker et al. (1996) examined piece rate effects and found store 
changes in productivity of 9-14%.  Clearly, a number of studies have found evidence of 
incentive effects.  
2.3.1.5 Criticisms 
Agency research offers only a partial insight and can be criticised on a number of fronts.  
Studies have typically focused on sectors and roles where measurement of performance 
is relatively straightforward on an outcome-based basis (e.g. piece rates, sales 
performance and overall profitability when using CEOs as the target role). That limits 
the usefulness of the approach in understanding roles and sectors where behavioural 
contracts are much more common due to outcome measurement difficulties.  
Prendergast (1999) notes that a cautious interpretation of the results would also take into 
account whether the activities performed in their own right carry any intrinsic 
motivation which, according to Deci and Ryan (1985) would be diminished by explicit 
monetary payment.  Tosi et al. (1997) criticised the firm-level econometric approach to 
testing agency theory which required proxy variables to be developed based on the 
availability of data.  They contended that the usefulness of these studies is limited by 
concerns over construct validity, i.e. Does the variable actually measure what it claims 
to measure?, and the correlation techniques applied could result in reverse causality.  
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Prendergast also notes the problem with “identification difficulties” (1999: 11), i.e. 
although the theory often provides a good explanation, the outcomes observed could 
also be explained by other theories.  Given a number of these concerns, Tosi et al. 
(1997) applied a laboratory approach in their research.  They found that incentive 
alignment was more effective than increased monitoring in aligning the agents‟ 
behaviour to that of the principal, i.e. substituting monitoring for incentives could lead 
to a less optimal position from the principals‟ perspective. 
Miller and Whitford asked the question that in the light of this support for the use of 
incentives to align outcomes “Why are incentives not used more often than they are?”, 
noting that “even in those cases where the agent‟s performance can be directly linked to 
compensation, corporations often still choose to use contingency-free compensation 
schemes” (2007: 214).  They concluded, through theoretical review, that this is driven 
by self-interested principals accepting lower efficiency “out of a concern for the 
principal‟s own profit” (2007: 215).  They outline that there are a number of theoretical 
cases where the incentive levels required to induce effort are more costly due to the risk 
premium required being significantly higher than the resulting increase in profitability.  
A degree of inefficiency is profit maximising.  Consequently, “most organisations, and 
in particular public agencies, rely very little on pure incentive contracts and instead use 
coercive mechanisms of monitoring and sanctioning” (Miller and Whitford, 2007: 213). 
Alternative views have been offered to explain the reward mix relationship based on 
perceived problems with a number of the assumptions underpinning agency theory.  The 
agency model has been criticised for its focus on the contract as the pivotal mechanism 
for control which ignores political and environmental elements of the agency 
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relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Fernandez-Alles et al., 2006).  The contract 
specification cannot capture all relevant dimensions such as uncertainty, information 
shortages, and the dynamic and political nature of the relationship (Tosi et al., 1997).  
Also, the balance of relationships may not be as assumed in agency theory.  O‟Reilly et 
al. (1988) contend that contracts are influenced more by the manager-subordinate 
relationship than by an overarching and dominant responsibility to the organisation‟s 
owners.  The information asymmetry may also influence the contract, with employees 
able to use their information advantage to negotiate a contractual position that better 
manages risk from their personal perspective. 
These problems have led scholars to suggest that research should look to extend its 
investigation of reward mix beyond an agency perspective.  For example, strategic 
compensation research has shown that organisational strategies around how to reward 
employees have revolved around two areas: first, industry characteristics such as 
product demand and technological focus (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; Baker et al., 
1988) and second the characteristics of the specific organisation, in particular the 
business strategy (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Rajagopalan, 1996), such as 
diversification (Gomez-Mejia, 1992; Kerr, 1985) and life cycle stage (Chen and Hsieh, 
2005).  However, Stroh et al. (1996), in their application of agency theory, noted that 
middle managers were removed from these industry and organisational factors and 
therefore those factors may not be relevant.  They concluded that the level of turbulence 
an organisation is facing, perhaps brought about by restructuring or downsizing, would 
also influence reward mix.  Turbulent environments require dynamism and flexibility in 
employees.  Consequently, it is more difficult to lay down the exact behaviours required 
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of employees, leading to more outcome-orientated contracts and therefore higher 
proportions of variable pay in the mix (Stroh et al., 1996).  Further, they speculate that 
this transfer of risk was also due to organisations using variable reward strategies to 
manage the additional variability in revenue and profitability that they are facing at this 
point in their history.   
Eisenhardt (1988) also showed that organisational tenure was related to the proportion 
of reward which was variable, with longer tenure leading to lower proportions of 
variable reward.  This was inferred to be down to the socialisation that occurs in longer 
term relationships and the resulting tendency for the basis of a contract between 
employee and manager to be behavioural.  This socialisation view was supported by 
O‟Reilly et al. (1988), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Bruce et al. (2005) and  Aguilera and 
Jackson (2003), albeit through executive level research, who identified that the weak 
relationship between CEO pay and organisational performance was attributable to 
norms in place created by external groups, e.g. regulators, consumer groups and unions.   
Eisenhardt (1988) therefore concludes that agency theory, with its basis in operational 
efficiency, suggests a range of possible efficient positions around combinations of job 
programmability, managerial spans of control and fixed to variable rewards, e.g. high 
programmed jobs leading to a higher proportion of fixed reward and less programmed 
jobs with higher spans of control leading to a higher proportion of commission payment 
in the overall mix.  All outcomes are efficient according to theory.  She then notes that 
which choice an organisation will make could be influenced by strategic considerations 
or by dominant institutional factors, as suggested by institutional theory.  Her research 
leads her to conclude that an institutional determination of final reward mix choice was 
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most prominent (Eisenhardt, 1988).  This was supported by Roth and O‟Donnell (1996) 
who, in the context of foreign subsidiaries reward mix, found that agency theory could 
not explain all reward mix elements.  They noted that the interactions between home 
country or firm-specific practices and host and local market norms were complex, and 
could perhaps be better explained by introducing an institutional theory perspective to 
the problem.  Werner and Tosi (1995) found that manager-controlled firms put more 
employees‟ pay at risk than owner-controlled firms.  This was contrary to their 
hypothesis which, they argued, was possibly down to political processes in play in these 
firms with manager-controlled firms having bonus schemes with terms more 
advantageous to internal managers with respect to performance targets set.  However, 
they noted that their use of one consulting firm‟s data set may have led to conformity in 
the data around the consulting practices of that particular firm. 
One weakness with agency theory is its inability to take into account political forces 
both within and outside the organisation.  These forces are not responsive to evaluation 
by the economic methodology underpinning agency theory and the statistical testing 
that has been used to assess its applicability (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Barringer and 
Milkovich, 1998).  
A further criticism questions the agency theory assumption of a conflict of interest 
between principal and agent and consequently whether there is a need for the control 
mechanism of incentive pay (Deckop et al., 1999).  Whilst widely adopted, not 
everyone subscribes to this assumption.   For example Ouchi (1980) contended that goal 
incongruence actually varied across the workforce.  Where alignment was strong, 
Deckop et al. (1999) believed there was little need for incentive pay as the “clan-form” 
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(1999: 421) would ensure behaviour consistent with organisational goals.  They showed 
how employees with low organisational commitment were even less likely to carry out 
extra-role activities when the performance-related pay link was significant.  However, 
they also found in employees where commitment was higher, the extent of 
performance-related pay was not an influence on their likelihood to carry out 
organisational citizenship behaviour.  Blau (1964) also argued that the social exchange 
as well as the economic exchange was significant, with trust allowing temporary 
misalignments of pure self-interest between the parties to be accommodated.  
A final criticism comes from the fact that agency theory has generally been applied 
solely to consideration of elements of cash compensation (Barringer and Milkovich, 
1998).  However, it could be extended to include other elements of reward with benefits 
considered as a fixed element.  This approach has its drawbacks, given the deferred 
nature of certain benefits such as defined benefit pension payments and the rising value 
(i.e. variability) of this benefit as retirement approaches.  Shepard et al. (1996) also 
showed the incentive effects that flexible work has where workers would work hard 
enough not to lose this valued part of the mix for fear of losing it through being 
dismissed.   
2.3.1.6 Agency and the role of motivation theory 
Underpinning agency theory is the premise that financially-based rewards in different 
forms and combinations will influence employee behaviour.    Research suggests that 
how firms choose to reward their employees may influence performance in two 
distinctive ways – sorting effects (Schneider, 1987) and incentive effects (Lazear, 1986; 
1999).  Sorting effects work through the influence the reward mix has on those that join 
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(Cable and Judge, 1994) and stay (Harrison et al., 1996; Trevor et al., 1997) with the 
organisation, through a relationship between the attributes of those that apply and stay 
and work in an organisation, and the reward system and mix in place.  Whereas 
incentive effects work solely on those that are currently employed by the organisation 
and are felt to influence how hard someone works towards achieving the rewards based 
on the attractiveness of the reward and the likelihood of this reward being achieved 
(Vroom, 1964).   
Looking through the two different perspectives of psychology and economics, we can 
see that economists generally tend to assume that pay has stronger motivational effects 
than psychologists (hence the importance of incentives in agency theory).  Rottenberg 
(1956) outlines that the main reasons for this are largely pragmatic, involving the fact 
that money is much more easily quantifiable than other less tangible elements which 
have been claimed to be motivating, such as security and management.  Rottenberg also 
contends that people will always prefer more money to less, which is not the case for 
other job attributes such as, say, responsibility or travel.  Finally, although economists 
do not strictly believe that money is the only motivator (Lazear, 1999), models based on 
money continue to dominate because they give “tolerably good results.....Everywhere 
there is massive aggregate evidence that people move from low income areas to high.... 
not in the opposite direction” (Rottenberg, 1956: 188).  
Psychologists are less clear.  Lawler (1971) concludes that as money plays such a 
significant role in meeting a large number of other needs such as security and status 
type needs, then it must be significant.  Three traditional, and often quoted, 
psychological theories question the dominance of money as a motivator: Maslow‟s 
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hierarchy of needs theory (Maslow, 1943), Herzberg‟s hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1968) 
and Deci and Ryan‟s cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985).  These 
theories, despite gaining widespread acceptance in practitioner textbooks, have been 
criticised by other academics.   They contend that, although intuitively appealing, the 
findings have not been backed up by sufficiently robust research findings with the 
original experiments not being designed for the wider significance for which they have 
been taken and as a result were methodologically flawed (Lawler, 1971; Bowey and 
Thorpe, 2000).  Given this debate, the effect the use of variable pay in the reward mix 
has on agent behaviour, a key tenet of agency theory, may be questioned. 
2.3.1.7 Conclusions 
Agency theory has emerged as an important theoretical explanation of RMD.  The 
theory aims to “explain the choices principals make about the form and structure of 
compensation systems and how those choices are related to the principal‟s outcomes” 
(Bloom and Milkovich, 1998).  The theory tells us about the fixed to variable reward 
relationship, but does not tell us about wider total compensation, or total reward.  For 
this we need to look at other theories for insight.  It has also been suggested that the 
approach overemphasises the efficiency and rational drivers of decision making in 
reward mix choice and underestimates the institutional and political power-related 
pressures that may be relevant to organisations (Barringer and Milkovich, 1998; Bartol 
and Locke, 2000).  Eisenhardt concluded that agency theory “is an empirically valid 
perspective, particularly when coupled with complementary perspectives” (1989a: 57), 
and Barringer and Milkovich  stated that  “agency theory presents a partial view of the 
world that .......ignores a good bit of complexity of organizations” (1998: 71).  Further 
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examination of these “complementary perspectives” is important to understand the role 
they may play in RMD. 
2.3.2 Institutional theory 
2.3.2.1 Introduction 
The management literature has recognised the significance of institutional factors on 
reward strategy decision making and specifically the decision of reward mix (Gerhart 
and Rynes, 2003).  This theoretical perspective proposes that coercive, mimetic and 
normative institutional forces create significant pressures on firms to be similar in how 
they operate in their search for legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  The extent to 
which these constraints operate for each firm will influence how much freedom of 
choice the firm actually has in its operation (Carpenter and Wade, 2002). 
Institutional theory helps us to understand the constraints organisations are under to 
conform and specifically to mimic the reward mix of other firms (Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Conlon and Parks, 1990; Crystal, 1991).  This theoretical approach explicitly recognises 
the importance of context and external environment and their role in shaping this 
behaviour (Marsden and Belfield, 2010).  These isomorphic pressures will now be 
examined and empirical evidence of their existence in the reward mix area discussed. 
2.3.2.2 Isomorphic constraints 
Isomorphism is the constraining pressure that forces one element in the population 
facing similar environmental characteristics to behave like the others.  In their seminal 
work on institutional pressures, which they proposed acted like an “Iron Cage” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 64) on organisations, Di Maggio and Powell note that the 
traditional strategic view of organisations competing for resources and customers is 
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incomplete.  They are also competing for both social and economic legitimacy in the 
activities they perform.  Suchman defined legitimacy as “a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (1995: 574).  
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) identify three mechanisms by which the isomorphism 
pervades organisational decisions – coercive, mimetic and normative pressures – each 
of which will be discussed, in turn, in the context of reward mix decisions. 
2.3.2.3 Coercive isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism “results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991: 67).  These coercive pressures can take a number of forms.  The pressure 
could be legal, through laws and regulations set by government or bodies acting on their 
behalf, such as tax authorities.  The volume of employment legislation in the UK has 
significantly increased since 1970 with, for example, equal pay rights between men and 
women, compensation for loss of job, minimum wage rights, maternity and paternity 
rights, hours of work and holiday entitlements, share ownership and pension legislation 
having been introduced (Perkins and White, 2008).  Given that a number of these are 
components of our wider definition of reward mix, then constraints on how they are 
managed are likely to influence the overall mix provided to employees.  Perkins and 
White felt that the legal context was so significant that “while employers may wish as 
far as possible to create reward strategies for their own particular circumstances, the 
starting point will always be what the law allows or requires.” (2008: 67), and given this 
“a major skill for reward specialists is being able to implement strategy within the 
constraints of the law” (2008: 94). 
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Social goals of government, e.g. the family and retirement, may be an institutional 
influence, shifting the balance to higher proportions of benefits in the overall reward 
mix if organisations look to hold costs stable while meeting these social pressures.  
Smith (2000) noted that two government policy changes were the big drivers of benefit 
provision in the UK.  First, was the change in pension legislation in 1975, which 
allowed employers and employees to contract out of certain elements of the State 
pension and establish work-based pensions on more favourable terms than had 
historically been the case.  Second, was the repeal of the Truck Act in 1986 which 
removed the requirement to pay manual workers in cash, paving the way for 
harmonisation of their packages with that of non-manual staff.  More recently, the 
introduction of pension reforms has looked to influence organisations‟ behaviour 
towards employee pension provision through tax breaks which reward the company for 
providing this element of the reward mix.  Politically driven influences on reward mix, 
through the effect on benefit provision, may mean specific benefits are provided even 
though they are considered expensive (Festing et al., 2007).   
A major role for reward managers during the 1980s and 1990s, as the tax system 
regarding pay and benefits changed, was the goal of tax efficiency in their reward 
design, especially benefits scheme choices and the balance between benefits and cash 
wage payments (Perkins and White, 2008).  The significance of tax was emphasised by 
Long and Scott who concluded that “taxation is a major determinant of the 
compensation mix” (1982: 218). 
Abbot and De Cieri (2008) note a political agenda driving the introduction of work-life 
provision benefits into the reward mix, operating alongside the business rationale of 
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improving organisational performance.  However, studies have shown significant 
variation in work-life provision, which may point to a lack of robust social and political 
institutional pressure in this area (Hyman and Summers, 2004; De Cieri et al., 2005).  
Abbot and De Cieri (2008), in their examination of the influences on work-life benefit 
provision, conclude that work-life balance provision is attributable to conscious 
managerial decision taking.  However, they add that this decision is made more difficult 
by the complex interaction of stakeholders, including government, and the pressure they 
put on firms. 
Oliver (1991) identifies that organisations will look to actively manage these regulatory 
and government pressures.  This will mean organisations may take a conscious decision 
to ignore the requirement through a rational assessment of the consequences of such 
action.  However, this is a relatively extreme position.  The extent of the coercive power 
that organisations face is likely to depend on the power they have over others by the 
nature of their control of critical resources.  For example, in a financial services context, 
any requirements laid down by the FSA on how firms should manage their 
compensation structures, such as that laid out in their „Dear CEO‟ letter (Sants, 2008), is 
likely to coerce change across the sector as the FSA controls a critical resource to all 
financial services organisations – their authorisation to transact in that market.   
In the context of their work on resource dependency, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) noted 
how typically politically driven coercive forces will be applied across the board and 
consequently are likely to restrict adaptability and flexibility, as is the case with the 
introduction of personal accounts in the UK which applies to all organisations equally.  
This will automatically influence reward mix in those institutions where pensions are 
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not currently provided, or more significantly, there is concern that organisations 
currently offering more than the minimum contribution level will lower their 
contribution to this coerced level (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006).  This 
change will occur irrespective of other characteristics of these organisations which is 
inconsistent with the contentions of strategic compensation research that organisations 
should align the overall reward approach to organisational strategic drivers such as 
organisation life stage, ability to pay and desired workforce characteristics. 
However, coercion is not just politically driven (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  With the 
increase in the global operation of large conglomerates, it may also come from head 
office operations setting out restrictive requirements for their subsidiary and branch 
operations (Van der Stede, 2003).  Whilst these policies, HR and otherwise, may be 
compatible with the parent group‟s needs and their operation in the home market, they 
may not be „efficient‟ for the subsidiary, given local market conditions, and specifically 
in relation to reward mix, local labour market conditions.  These restrictions could take 
many forms (Van der Stede, 2003).  They may be requirements on budgets available for 
distribution to employees or restrictions on how payment should be made, i.e. the 
overall reward mix.  For example, group benefit plans are commonplace, given that they 
are often seen as an element of the reward mix supplied for organisational membership 
rather than performance related reasons (Perkins and White, 2008). 
One such source that may have significant coercive strength is trade unions.   
Organisations often have no choice over whether to participate in collective bargaining 
with unions as this is predetermined by a number of factors.  Unions (and by default 
their members) have certain rights in the UK under the Employment Relations Act 1999 
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to represent the workforce when 40% of employees are union members in the area 
under consideration (Crown, 1999).  Almost two thirds of workforces of more than 500 
employees set some pay through collective bargaining (Kersley et al., 2006).  However, 
in the full workforce the number is on the decline down from 70% of workforces 
employing 25 workers or more in 1984 to 40% in 2004 (Kersley et al., 2006).  This 
masks an increasing trend in the public sector and a significant decline in private sector 
employees (significantly financial services is down from 49% in 1998 to 35% in 2004 
(Kersley et al., 2006)). 
With respect to the wider reward mix, unions appear to have a particularly strong effect 
on certain elements of the reward mix such as holiday entitlement, pensions and sick 
pay (Forth and Millward, 2000).  Budd and Mumford (2004) showed how union 
representation was related to the extent to which family-friendly policies were in place, 
such as paid parental leave, job-sharing and childcare provision.    Whilst Arrowsmith 
and Marginson (2011) identified how within the retail banking sector at least the 
strength of collective bargaining had had some success in limiting variations in base pay 
and created greater standardisation of variable pay than would have been the case had 
the union influence not been present.  However Arrowsmith et al. (2010) also note in a 
further paper that bonuses (as opposed to merit pay) are increasingly significant in 
employee pay and these are beyond the reach of collective bargaining. 
Alongside this, the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 put in 
place the requirement for employee consultative bodies to be established when 
organisations have more than 50 employees (Crown, 2004).    The regulations do not 
give formal rights to employees to be consulted on reward and reward mix, rather a 
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more general requirement to keep employees informed about the company's activities 
and decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in employees‟ contractual relations 
which could include changes to reward mix.  In practice, employers are often willing to 
allow input on the mix rather than the level of the pay package (Perkins and White, 
2008).     
As institutional theory has developed, a definition for what constitutes an institution has 
developed.  This has meant institutions being taken as not just explicit and direct 
pressures such as the coercive constraints just discussed, but less direct pressures on 
organisations from their surroundings (Marsden and Belfield, 2010; Scott, 2008).  This 
has led to the evolution of theory and research around mimetic and normative 
isomorphic pressures organisations face.  These are now discussed. 
2.3.2.4 Mimetic isomorphism 
Mimetic behaviour takes the form of organisations adopting approaches and policies 
that others have adopted (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  Mimetic behaviour is largely 
caused by the security that conformity brings – that your policies are at least in line with 
others (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  Organisations look to avoid uncertainty and 
diverging from standard practice introduces a level of uncertainty in comparison to 
other organisations (Norman et al., 2007).  Where there is no clarity around the process 
by which goals will be achieved and/or goals are ambitious, then it is more likely that 
organisations will mimic the behaviour of other organisations they perceive to be 
successful (Norman et al., 2007).  The legitimacy this conformity bestows can enhance 
survival chances in contrast to ecologists‟ views that mimetic behaviour gives no 
competitive advantage (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
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Arrowsmith and Sisson (1999) showed that sectoral mimetic effects were present.  They 
examined reward decision taking following the decline in numbers of collective 
agreements in the UK in the 1980s.  In this context their research investigated whether 
this decentralisation had led to changes in reward practices in specific sectors, or 
whether sector influences were still strong and influencing decisions.  They showed 
across the four sectors studied (engineering, printing, health, retail) that differences in 
institutional arrangements for pay setting (i.e. different degrees of collective versus 
independent pay setting) did not lead to significantly different outcomes.  Where 
centralised arrangements were no longer in place (engineering and retail) there were still 
strong sector effects, even after coercive restrictions had been removed.  They attributed 
this to the widespread availability of benchmarking data and its influence on the 
practices of organisations, which meant the tie provided by centralised collective 
sectoral bargaining was unnecessary as organisations effectively, through their 
benchmarking activities, carried out this process of their own free will.  This led them to 
conclude that “employers ............. continue to move like ships in a convoy..... There is 
an apparent reluctance to embark upon more radical change initiatives which might 
break the pattern.” (1999: 63).  So, although collective bargaining remains significant, 
with around one third of employees still covered by collective bargaining arrangements, 
its effect may be less pronounced than might be expected given that, when it is 
removed, organisational behaviour appears to continue to operate in a collective way.  
This suggests that organisations may, under certain conditions and without coercive 
pressure, mimic each other‟s approach to RMD leading to similar outcomes.  DiMaggio 
and Powell concluded that “organizations tend to model themselves after similar 
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organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful” 
(1991: 70), but it may also be behaviour that has become habitual.   
Mimetic pressures would appear to be commonplace in the reward field.  The diffusion 
of policies and approaches may come from a number of sources (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991).  First, organisational knowledge may be held by particular individuals and, 
through turnover, this knowledge may be spread across other organisations.  
Specifically, employees may be hired because they are valued for this knowledge of 
wider practice.  Reward knowledge is likely to be held by REs.  Specific reward 
specialist recruitment agencies are established (such as TotalRewardCareers and 
Portfolio CBR) potentially indicating a specialist market in REs and a flow of their 
expertise across organisations. 
Diffusion of standard practice may also occur through the activities of consulting firms 
and trade associations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  Both of these routes for spreading 
practice would appear likely in the reward field.  The use of consultants has been shown 
to have a legitimising effect (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Main et al., 2008).  The 
reward consulting profession is well established in the UK.  Reward consultancy firms 
(e.g. Towers Watson, Hay Group, Mercer) offer specific reward services including 
benchmark data provision and reward strategy advice built on their current view of best 
practice in the profession drawn from their exposure to practice across the organisations 
which they serve.  In their 2008 reward survey, the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
Development (2008c) found that of those surveyed 32% had used a consultancy service 
to provide benchmarking data, 47% were supported in job evaluation work and 26% 
received advice on reward structures.  Benchmarking support of this type has been 
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identified as a key factor assisting the spread of isomorphism (Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Crystal, 1991). 
Specific reward trade and professional bodies are also in place. In the UK, the largest is 
the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development (CIPD) which operates as the HR 
profession‟s overarching professional body.  In 2008 the CIPD‟s annual report indicated 
that it had 133,000 individual members (CIPD, 2008a).  Within its operation it has a 
specific reward forum for reward professionals.  The forum‟s role is to “engage HR 
professionals in discussion on recent reward management and planning issues” (CIPD, 
2008b).  It carries out this role by holding dedicated reward meetings to discuss current 
issues, facilitating networking among reward professionals, and publishing factsheets 
and newsletters raising issues of best practice.  Alongside this formal professional 
association other bodies also exist, such as E-Reward
6
 in the UK, or internationally 
WorldatWork
7
.   These have as their remit the provision of information and guidance, 
training and conferences to spread best practice.   Practitioners have also taken it upon 
themselves to develop semi formal gatherings of those from similar sectors through the 
establishment of groups, such as the Financial Services Reward Networking Group, 
with the intention of sharing examples of their practice and benchmarking data
8
.   
                                                          
6 
E-Reward aims to deliver reward advice and support through its website, electronic newsletters, journals 
and reports, and conferences.   
7
 Formerly known as the American Compensation Association, WorldatWork is a global human resources 
association focused on compensation, benefits, work-life and integrated total rewards.  It was established 
in 1955 and now provides a network of more than 30,000 members and professionals in 75 countries. 
8
 The author became of aware of such a group when various interviewees in the research indicated that 
they were members, and subsequently presented the findings of this research to that group. 
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In the context of these mimetic influences DiMaggio and Powell concluded that “the 
ubiquity of certain kinds of structural arrangements can more likely be credited to the 
universality of mimetic processes than to any concrete evidence that the adopted models 
enhance efficiency” (1991: 70).   
2.3.2.5 Normative isomorphism 
Finally DiMaggio and Powell raised the existence of normative pressures stemming 
from “the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and 
methods of their work...........and legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (1991: 
70).  
The reward profession, like any organisation, is subject to the coercive and mimetic 
pressures already discussed.  Di Maggio and Powell (1991) note isomorphism being 
driven in professions through the arrangement of practice into codified principles and 
accepted standards, e.g. the „New Pay‟ prescriptions that pay should be linked to 
performance (Lawler, 1995; Schuster and Zingheim, 1996) which have been widely 
adopted and promoted by the professional bodies, despite concern that they may not be 
appropriate prescriptions for all types of organisation (White, 1996).   
Barringer and Milkovich, through their research into the adoption of flexible benefit 
systems in the US, noted the significance of “diffused” (1998: 312), practice which 
becomes seen as best practice and thus increases the pressure on those not following 
this practice to conform.  They outlined how the proportion of competitors which are 
following certain practices, in their case the operation of flexible benefits, will increase 
the pressure on others to conform.    This conclusion is supported by Eisenhardt (1988).  
Eisenhardt found, in her study of retail stores and the extent to which they use salary or 
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performance related bonuses in rewarding sales staff, that the key driver in determining 
the salary and commission mix was acceptance of the practice within the retail stores 
sector, rather than alignment with strategic goals.   Significantly, Eisenhardt identified 
that the age of the department store influenced the choice of whether to use 
commission-based reward structures, with accepted practice at the time of opening 
driving the decision.  This result was in line with earlier theoretical work by Wright and 
McMahan, in the context of all HR practices, which noted the possible influence of 
history, suggesting that “organisation practices can be institutionalised through an 
imprinting process whereby the practices adopted at the beginning of the organisation‟s 
history remain embedded in an organisation” (1992: 314).  
Tolbert and Zucker (1983) note that the influence of institutional pressures will be much 
lower, and other elements will drive decisions (i.e. efficiency/strategic considerations), 
in what they described as the pre-institutionalised phase, i.e. early in the institution‟s 
life, where institutional norms have not been established.  Thus decisions could be 
proposed as being more strategic in this early stage.  Hence, reward decisions including 
mix decisions will be based on reward goals which in turn will be based on strategic 
organisational goals.   
Support is also evident from research on executive reward.  Bender, in her research on 
why companies use performance-related pay for executive directors, concluded that 
“companies used performance-related pay because their peers did, and because that 
legitimised them in the eyes of the establishment” (2004: 521).  Ogden and Watson  
(2004; 2007; 2008), in their interviews with remuneration committees of water 
companies, found that the committees felt under significant political pressure, which has 
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led to policies shaped by comparisons with other companies rather than analysis of the 
performance consequences of reward decisions.  This conclusion was supported by 
Main et al. (2008) who noted the significance remuneration committees place on the 
market in determining which measure of performance was used in long-term incentive 
schemes.  Perkins and Hendry also concluded that “what matters is how rewards 
appear” (2005: 1464).   Jensen and Murphy supported this finding noting how 
“uninvited but influential guests at the managerial bargaining table (the business press, 
labour unions, political figures) intimidate board members and constrain the types of 
contracts that are written between managers and shareholders” (1990: 139).  This is 
unsurprising given that executive pay decisions are a matter of public record through 
annual reports and have come under significant public and institutional investor scrutiny 
(Main et al., 2008).  However, as lower level reward structures are not generally public 
then perhaps the institutional pressure to conform may be lower at this level. 
Normative practice may also be established through the programmes in place to educate 
reward practitioners.  Formal reward qualifications are well established in the UK.  
CIPD offers direct postgraduate training in reward management leading to a recognised 
qualification – Advanced Certificate in Reward Management.  Alongside this formal 
codification, reward consultancies also offer training programmes, and although not 
leading to recognised qualifications it could be argued still offer some normative status.   
Social networks have also been highlighted as a potential route to spreading practices 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Palmer et al., 1993).  Reward practitioner networks are in 
place, through the range of conferences arranged by CIPD, other professional bodies 
and the reward consultancies.   
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DiMaggio and Powell (1991) believed that these normative pressures led to what they 
termed „the creation of an organisation field‟.  Has such a field emerged in the reward 
arena?  To ascertain this, they felt four conditions needed to be met.  First, a trend of 
increasing interaction.  In reward, the proliferation of written materials, conferences, 
professional groups and forums discussed above would tend to indicate high levels of 
interaction between REs.  Second, the emergence of dominant paradigms.  Best practice 
guides are provided through CIPD „reward factsheets‟, and practitioner textbooks and 
often extol the virtues of certain reward mix approaches such as the „New Pay‟ call for 
higher proportions of performance-related pay (Lawler, 1995).  Third, an increase in the 
information load which must be dealt with in the field.  The aforementioned 
development and circulation of literature through professional bodies and conferences 
may provide some indication of this occurring.  Finally, they noted how “mutual 
awareness”, among participants in the field, that they are involved in a “common 
enterprise” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 65) was required.  The willingness of 
practitioners, despite coming from often competing organisations, to share examples of 
practice at conferences, through practitioner literature and in case studies prepared by 
reward groups (e.g. Information Data Services and E-Reward) may be an indication of 
this commonality in action. 
The consequence of the existence of organisational fields, such as appears to exist in the 
reward area, creates “a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar 
positions across a range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and 
disposition that may override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise 
shape organizational behaviour” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 71).  The consequence 
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of this is that it provides “a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with 
uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, 
culture and output” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 71). 
2.3.2.6 Institutionally contested practices 
A key element of institutional theory is the legitimacy that isomorphic behaviour is 
expected to provide.  Scott (2008) identified that the legitimacy of organisations‟ 
practices is determined by three areas.   Normative legitimacy comes when the practice 
is consistent with current values in society.  Legitimacy can also be conferred when the 
activity is compatible with regulatory principles and more detailed rules.  Finally, 
legitimacy can also be gained when the practice is in line with institutional culture, and 
the members‟ of the organisations understanding and knowledge of this culture.  
Consequently, when practices, such as specific reward mix combinations, are in line 
with these three elements it will be deemed legitimate and may further legitimise the 
activities of the organisation adopting the practice.  These legitimising pressures are 
strong and, therefore, adoption of practices that break one or more of the three elements 
can reduce legitimacy (Sanders and Tuschke, 2007).   
Scott (2008) identified that the adoption of „non-legitimate‟ practices required 
organisational courage which, if successful, begins a process of legitimisation for the 
new practice.  Sanders and Tuschke termed these “institutionally contested practices”, 
and defined them specifically as “new organizational practices that face stiff opposition 
from key constituents in potential adopters primary institutional environment” (2007: 
34).  They identified four processes that facilitate the spread of institutionally contested 
practices: exposure to other institutional contexts where the practice is considered 
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legitimate, CEO education, organisational learning and regulatory/legislative change.  
Each of these processes will now be considered.   
First, is organisational exposure to other institutional contexts, for which the 
organisation has a high regard, where the disputed practice is considered legitimate, i.e. 
learning from other respected institutional contexts.  This could be, for example, 
practices of a different sector or country setting.  Sanders and Tuschke‟s (2007) research 
into the reward mix, and specifically the role of stock options in this mix, in German 
executives found that those adopting a form of mix with a higher proportion of stock 
options are likely to have exposure to both perceived high status institutional 
environments in which the practices are legitimate (e.g. UK or US markets) and 
experience introducing other contested practices, not necessarily from the reward area.  
Second, organisational learning can be significant in influencing the propensity to adopt 
institutionally contested practices.  Previous success in adopting contested practices 
increases the probability of adoption of further such practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991; Hambrick et al., 2005).  Related to this, the educational breadth of the CEO has 
also been shown to influence the extent to which learning from wider environments was 
encouraged and acceptable.  Scott (2008) noted how much institutional theory 
application had neglected the significance of key organisational actors, such as the 
CEO, in bringing about change in institutionalised practices.  This is consistent with 
upper echelon theory outlined by Hambrick and Mason (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Hambrick, 2007) and the significance this perspective puts on executive values and 
beliefs, and how these are shaped by their experience and education.  For example, 
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CEOs with a formal business education are more likely to scan the environment and 
adopt practices from other institutional settings (Sanders and Tuschke, 2007).  
Third, the degree of cohesion and networks between organisations in an institutional 
setting will influence information exchange and practice adoption (Scott, 2008).  Where 
cohesion is strong, practice is more likely to spread, with particular significance on the 
extent to which board membership interlocks organisations and brings different 
institutional experiences (Sanders and Tuschke, 2007).  Alongside these network ties 
comes the extent to which others in the industry have adopted the contested practice and 
thus begun to provide some form of safety in numbers (Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991).   
Finally, regulatory legitimisation influences the adoption of contested practices.  As 
discussed above, legal barriers can be significant, with organisations, short of doing 
something illegal, having to find suitable interpretations of legislation or regulatory 
rules in order to proceed.  However, when regulatory and legal change occurs it can 
“open the floodgates” (Sanders and Tuschke, 2007: 207) to what were previously seen 
as contested practices. 
Whilst the four factors identified will facilitate the spread of practice, and through this 
potentially increase the level of adoption of contested practices, final decisions about 
whether to adopt practices that are institutionally contested will need to be weighed 
between the benefits expected to accrue from the adoption of the practices (e.g. 
productivity increases or attraction benefits from a new reward mix) against the cost 
accruing from the potential accompanying loss of legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1991).  
A sustained competitive advantage by differentiation of this nature will be dependent on 
this ratio of benefit to cost (Sanders and Tuschke, 2007). 
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Strategy researches have for a long period proposed that benefits can accrue to 
organisations through differentiation relative to their rivals (Johnson et al., 2008).   
According to the resource-based view of strategy, differentiation can come through 
specific people policies where people resources are a key resource in business success 
(Barney, 1986; Barney and Wright, 1998).  In the context of reward strategy decision 
taking, Lawler  noted that  organisational reward strategy should be built with regard to 
specific organisational circumstances not a “vanilla, me too flavour that provides no 
competitive advantage” (1990: 5).  The extent to which the reward mix is aligned to the 
organisational strategy, and through this differentiated from the competition, will dictate 
its effectiveness in supporting the delivery of this strategy.  However, institutional 
theory warns that extreme divergences from established norms can cause a deterioration 
in firm performance (Norman et al., 2007; Miller and Chen, 1994; Chen and Hambrick, 
1995). 
A number of studies have examined, in a non reward context, the costs and benefits of 
non-conformity (Miller and Chen, 1994; Chen and Hambrick, 1995).  Deephouse 
(1999), in research on airline deregulation, showed performance falling when deviation 
from norms occurred.  A more refined analysis, considering the conformity/non 
conformity choice as a continuum of options rather than a conform/do not conform 
choice, came from Norman et al. (2007).  They showed, again in the context of the 
airline industry, that small levels of divergence from the institutionally established norm 
would actually increase organisational performance as this allowed some differentiation 
whilst maintaining legitimacy.  However, larger deviations from established norms had 
negative performance consequences as the cost of loss of legitimacy outweighed any 
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differentiation benefits.  This may indicate that although organisations may have some 
flexibility and therefore be able to differentiate their overall reward package this choice 
will at some point be constrained by the institutional pressures that have been discussed.   
2.3.2.7 Institutionally driven behaviour – empirical evidence 
The main application of institutional theory has been the examination of the legitimising 
effect of different organisational structures (Barringer and Milkovich, 1998).  Relatively 
little has been done to examine institutional pressures on reward decision taking 
(Kessler, 2001).  However, drawing from wider studies of institutional theory, it seems 
reasonable, given the effects on organisational form that institutional pressures appear to 
exert, that they might influence reward strategy (Kessler, 2001).  We have seen that 
these pressures can come from both within and outside an organisation.  The former 
occurs as the practice becomes so embedded within the organisation over time that it 
becomes difficult to change, and the latter through the pressure to mimic other 
organisations to lower risk to the organisation and establish legitimacy.  
Institutional theory suggests that the adoption of a new reward practice, driven by a 
desire to improve performance in some way will, if successful, soon spread to other 
organisations through normative pressure.  This momentum will take the innovation to a 
point where introducing the practice provides legitimacy, but does not necessarily 
improve organisational performance, as was originally the case (Meyer and Rowan, 
1991).   This led DiMaggio and Powell to conclude that “strategies that are rational for 
individual organizations may not be rational if adopted by large numbers.  Yet the very 
fact that they are normatively sanctioned increases the likelihood of their adoption” 
(1991: 65).  Conlon and Parks  add “that the existence of a pay tradition can inhibit the 
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economically rational thinking agency theorists assume” (1990: 619).  This will have 
implications for the effectiveness of the reward mix strategy, as it will not be in line 
with organisational goals, but rather wider environmental trends (Gomez-Mejia, 1992). 
This passive description of institutionally motivated behaviour has been challenged 
(Suchman, 1995; Oliver, 1991; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996).  For an organisation‟s 
action to be considered strategic, as opposed to simply a passive reaction to its 
environment, it needs to be managed through “a pattern of planned action” (Wright and 
McMahan, 1992: 298).  Strategic action implies a rational, proactive decision making 
process.  Although mimicking other organisations may not be wholly rational from a 
purely economic assessment of the efficiency of a certain action it may, through the 
legitimacy it is perceived to confer, increase organisation effectiveness in other ways.  
For example, Hillebrink et al. (2008) found no evidence of either efficiency or cost 
being a driver of the introduction of flexible benefits.  However, this may have been due 
to the way they operationalised the reasons for introducing a flexible approach to 
benefit management, which did not include any labour market factors.  They concluded 
that institutional factors were significant but added that "there is no reason to believe 
that the way these factors are responded to is not rational or economic." (2008: 320).  
What evidence do we have of this type of behaviour in reward mix situations?  Table 
2-2 summarises a number of studies that have used institutional theory to specifically 
examine reward mix decisions for employees
9
 of different types. 
                                                          
9
 A number of studies have been carried out on the executive reward mix and the influence of institutional 
factors on the determination of this mix.  However, whilst this literature review has drawn on insights 
from these studies in the main discussion of institutional theory, this section on empirical studies will 
focus solely on levels of employees below the executive.  
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Retail sales  The store age is negatively related to the 
use of salaries and positively related to the 
use of commissions.  Commissions are 
more common in shoe sales than in other 
types of retailing 
Conlon and 
Parks 1990  
How behaviour monitoring, and the 
presence of tradition of non 
contingent pay, interact to affect 
compensation arrangements 
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Pay traditions can inhibit the economically 
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Managerial Objectives - in particular, a 
tendency toward imitative behaviour and a 
strategy of union avoidance - influence 
wage mix. 
Milne 2001 Investigation of the pattern of 
adoption of an HMO option as a 
component of a multiple choice 









US Several factors both internal and external 





Examining the influence of variations 














Corporate effects are dominant over 
national cultural effects with respect to 
incentive pay systems.  Incentive systems 




Alles et al. 
2006 
Analysis of whether compensation 
design is an economically rational 
incentive to increase performance or 
whether it responds to other factors 










Compensation design considers the 
company's adoption of popular 
management practices that increase its 
legitimacy but not its performance.   
Table 2-2 - Studies adopting institutional theory to examine employee reward mix determination
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As can be seen in table 2-2, institutional theory has been used to understand 
organisations‟ approach to RMD in a variety of ways.  The first significant application 
of an institutional theory perspective to RMD for employees was by Eisenhardt (1988).  
Her study evaluated when organisations use salary compensation, as opposed to 
compensation based on performance, for US retail sales staff.  The work concluded that 
contextual conditions at the time of the organisation being established were particularly 
significant on reward mix choice and, once chosen, the reward mix had longevity. 
Van der Stede identified the presence of “intracorporate isomorphism” (2003: 268), 
reflecting the strong influence of parent companies on business unit policies including 
reward (in this case incentive) design.  In line with DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1991) 
framework this pressure may be coercive: with head office dictating policy, mimetic: 
with the business unit mimicking a successful business unit or head office practice, or 
normative: adoption of a corporate template already available in the organisation.  
These isomorphic pressures are in direct contrast to “business-unit idiosyncrasy” (Van 
der Stede, 2003: 268), which pressures business unit subsidiaries to diverge from the 
remainder of the organisation. 
Whilst relatively little is known about cross-national reward mix practices (Werner and 
Ward, 2004), Segalla et al.‟s (2006) examination of cross-national sales compensation 
practices concluded that culture influences reward mix decisions through the effect it 
has on managers.  They showed that Germanic managers were less likely than Anglo-
Saxon managers to favour incentive-heavy reward mixes.   This led them to question the 
applicability of institutional theories prescriptions for effective reward mix decisions in 
all scenarios, particularly where national and cultural boundaries are concerned.   
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Fernandez-Alles et al. (2006) found, in their research on variable compensation for 
middle managers in the Spanish banking industry, that reward strategy formation 
incorporates popular reward trends and practices that will not necessarily increase 
organisational performance but will increase legitimacy.  Social objectives are as 
important as financial and efficiency objectives. “[V]ariable compensation is sometimes 
designed to reward not those particular practices and procedures that rationally should 
enhance the performance of the company but those that enhance its social standing and 
reputation in its institutional context” (Fernandez-Alles et al., 2006: 963).  
This perspective was contested by Milne (2001) in his investigation into the 
introduction of health care programmes into the overall reward mix in the US.  He 
found that organisational behaviour varied, being neither always passive nor uniform, 
with employers seen to be acting differently when presented with the same pressure.  
Organisations varied in their choices, despite pressures to conform to one approach, 
often due to their assessment of the power of the bodies imposing the pressure, which 
was driven by the organisations‟ own unique and specific resource dependence.  This 
was in line with Tremblay et al.‟s (2003) warning of the dangers of determining reward 
mix strategy simply by mimicking other organisations.  Their research into sales teams 
in French-Canada found that organisations led by institutional factors are likely to have 
a less effective salary and variable reward mix and, because of this, may be at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
2.3.2.8 Conclusions 
The review of empirical research appears to show that institutional pressures do exist, 
and that they are often influential.  However, the research is not categoric with a number 
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of studies showing that the pressure is not automatically and uniformly followed.  
Whilst insightful, the theory does not appear to fully explain behaviour and differences 
in practices between organisations.  For example Gerhart and Rynes (2003) note 
significant differences in reward mix policy in Microsoft and SAS when both are 
operating in the same industry and competing for the same talent. As differences do 
exist, critics argue that institutional theory fails to fully incorporate individual 
organisational strategic and leadership goals (Hambrick, 2007; Oliver, 1991).   
Examples of changes in reward mix policies are occurring, such as the introduction of 
different types of performance-related pay, closing of defined benefit pension schemes 
and introduction of work-life balance initiatives (Armstrong and Brown, 2005).  
Innovation is occurring but does, as predicted by institutional theory, also tend to spread 
across the field. 
This has led to calls from researchers to integrate the exploratory appeal of the 
institutional theory approach with other relevant theoretical perspectives.  This 
combination of approaches is discussed further below. 
2.3.3 Resource dependency theory 
2.3.3.1 Introduction 
Resource dependency theory came to the fore with the publication of „The External 
Control of Organizations‟ by Pfeffer and Salancik  (2003).  In developing resource 
dependency theory they drew heavily on exchange theory  (Jacobs, 1974) and power 
dependency theory (Emerson, 1962).  Broadly speaking these approaches propose that 
individuals and organisations have an innate desire to reduce their dependency on others 
in order to increase the power they have over their own future.   The central theme of 
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resource dependency theory is that to “understand the behaviour of an organisation you 
must understand the context of that behaviour – that is, the ecology of the organisation” 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003: 1).   
2.3.3.2 Critical resources 
Whether an organisation is dependent on particular resources will depend on the extent 
to which the resource is deemed critical to its operation and the availability of 
substitutes for the critical resource.  All decisions that organisations take are heavily 
influenced by both external and internal agents who have control over what are termed 
„critical resources‟ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  The agents may be organisations, 
government or government agencies, or individuals.  Resources are critical if their 
removal from the organisation would cause the organisation to cease operation or, at the 
very least, materially disrupt this operation to the point where it threatens the 
organisation‟s survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  Criticality does not necessarily 
come from the level of resource that is controlled by the agents (although it may do if 
control over the scale of resource would allow significant business disruption) but the 
overall impact its withdrawal or rationing would have on business operation.  
Consequently employee positions in organisations are likely to be more critical when 
other organisational functions are highly dependent on them to carry out their own 
activities (Balkin and Bannister, 1993).   
The extent to which a resource is deemed critical is also influenced by the availability of 
substitutes for the resource, should it be withdrawn.  A position or resource will be more 
difficult to replace where substitutes are not easily available (Nienhüser, 2008).  Low 
numbers of available substitutes, say of a particular skill that an individual or group of 
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individuals bring to the organisation, increases the dependence the organisation will 
have on the individuals‟ possessing the critical skill (Balkin and Bannister, 1993). 
The existence of critical resources, and the power that these provide to those who 
control them, can present a number of problems for organisations.   The very existence 
of critical resource dependencies creates uncertainty for organisations, defined as “the 
degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately 
predicted” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003: 67).  Organisations will look to try and reduce 
these uncertainties through planned action.  The extent to which the uncertainty will 
materially influence organisation behaviour will be dependent on how the critical 
resources are distributed within the environment.  It is the concentration of these critical 
resources that leads to concentration of power and associated influence on 
organisational decisions (Nienhűser, 2008).   Individuals who control critical resources, 
but do not call on any resources from the organisation or are not dependent on the 
organisation, have high power which in turn gives them the ability to make demands, 
e.g. their preferred reward mix, and expect them to be fulfilled.  This may suggest, with 
regard to reward decisions for individuals or groups of individuals that are deemed to be 
critical, that the organisation should aim to create a situation whereby the individual is 
also dependent on the organisation for something which they value, e.g. a particularly 
satisfying reward mix that is unavailable elsewhere.  
Decisions on how dependent an organisation is on an individual or group of individuals 
are likely to influence reward mix decisions for this individual or group (Tremblay et 
al., 2003; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987).  Talent shortages and the resulting 
dependency this can create for organisations that need certain skills to be successful are 
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widely reported (e.g. Michaels et al., 2001).    To assess these shortages REs are 
provided with a range of information which they need to interpret to form a view about 
the appropriate reward mix decision given these dependencies.  The information 
includes RCs‟ reports, both with respect to reward levels in the market through 
benchmarking and recruitment data on hard-to-fill posts.  The RE may also be involved 
in networking groups and be part of professional associations which will also provide 
intelligence on skill issues and potential dependency building as a result of these skill 
shortages.   
If, as resource dependency theory suggests, organisations are influenced by those who 
control critical resources, particularly when substitutes for these resources are not 
readily available, then the extent to which managers control outcomes may also be 
limited.  This may mean we assume generally that managers have more influence on 
decisions than they have in reality and can, as a result, be made scapegoats when 
organisational outcomes are not as intended when the critical resources for success were 
not under their control (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  Any individual or organisation 
controlling critical resources can exert pressure (Balkin and Bannister, 1993), e.g. 
investors who control capital, particularly if capital is scarce, or suppliers where 
suppliers are critical, or unions who may control the supply of a particular type of 
labour.  Where these individuals or organisations have a personal interest in reward 
design, as is likely when employees or unions control critical resources, then we may 
expect them to exert influence on this design. There are clear parallels with the external 
forces of institutional theory and the effect they have on management choice (Barringer 
and Milkovich, 1998).  A number of scholars have noted this similarity.  Tolbert and 
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Zucker (1996) criticised this as evidence that resource dependence was in fact one 
element of institutional theory rather than a new theory in its own right.  However, 
Oliver (1991) noted that the crucial difference between the theories was in how 
organisations respond to the coercive pressures with a resource dependency perspective 
being seen as a more autonomous or strategically conscious response compared to the 
more automatic and unconscious response of institutional theory.  Organisational 
characteristics will, under resource dependency, determine the reaction to the pressure.  
For example, the proportion of variable reward available to sales teams (a potentially 
critical internal resource) will vary according to their autonomy and complexity of sales 
process rather than simply getting a high proportion of reward in an incentive purely 
because that is the industry convention (Eisenhardt, 1988). 
2.3.3.3 Employee perspective 
Bartol and Martin (1988) raise seven factors that influence the level of dependence an 
organisation has on an employee, or a group of employees, and consequently the power 
those employees may have over the reward mix design.  First, task uncertainty around 
the input/output process carried out by the employee where, due to the complexity of 
the task, the manager is unable to direct the activity.  This is often the case for specialist 
research jobs (Balkin and Bannister, 1993).  Second, the extent to which the manager 
can monitor performance or alternatively, as outlined in agency theory, is reliant on 
outcome-based monitoring.  Next, performance visibility, defined as whether failures 
and successes are visible to both management and significant external parties to the 
organisation.  Specialised skills are also felt to increase dependency.  Management is 
more dependent when employees have skills that are difficult to replicate in the short 
run.  Replicability is also related to the fifth of Bartol and Martin‟s factors – replace 
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ability.  Where skills are difficult to replace then organisations will be more dependent 
on those performing those skills.  Next, task centrality will have a dependency effect.  
The more important the task is to the organisation‟s success, the more likely the 
organisation is to be dependent on the individual‟s performing the task.  Finally, 
organisational connections are significant.  Individuals with connections with powerful 
others outside the immediate work group, such as internal senior level sponsors or 
others who are powerful within the organisation due to the dependency they have 
created, potentially provide increased power for those individuals. 
2.3.3.4 Empirical evidence – non reward mix related 
The theory has been well tested, both by Pfeffer and Salancik and those who have 
worked closely with them, and others who have applied the approach to different 
organisational issues e.g. Festing et al. (2007); Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987); 
Carpenter and Wade (2002).  A number of the studies have been performed in the area 
of reward decision making and, to a more limited extent, reward mix decisions.  The 
results, which are not clear-cut, will now be discussed.  
Morgan and Milliken (1992) aimed to show how the proportion of women in an 
organisation, through resource dependency, influenced the extent to which the 
organisation applied family-friendly policies as part of the overall reward mix.  They 
found a positive relationship.  However, the work can be criticised on two fronts.  First, 
the statistical correlation was weak and did not meet tests of statistical significance.  
Second, there was no indication as to whether the proportion of women controlled what 
were deemed to be critical resources for organisational success, and therefore had power 
to dictate terms more aggressively.  Therefore, it would be difficult to conclude from 
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this work that it was dependency on these women that caused family-friendly elements 
to be a greater proportion of the mix, as opposed to other factors such as organisational 
paternalism, or wider motivational beliefs that this type of policy increased productivity. 
In the context of the pay level decision, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) examined how 
position and the criticality of that position would influence pay level.  They showed that 
differences in wage levels could not solely be explained by “market, economic or 
technical forces” (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987: 452), rather that other firm-specific 
factors, such as criticality of the position to that firm at that time, and wider institutional 
and environmental factors, were significant influences.  The test results were significant.  
It does not appear unreasonable to believe that this result may also apply to reward mix 
decisions, given these wider institutional and environmental factors are also present to 
influence the reward mix decision. 
Resource dependency principles have been applied to the determination of CEO reward 
mix (Elvira, 2001).  Studies in this area include Hambrick and Finkelstein‟s (1995) 
examination of the effect of ownership structure on CEO reward and Crystal‟s (1991) 
work on CEO and compensation consultant‟s roles in executive pay determination.  
Elvira (2001) focused her work on one institution in the financial services sector, given 
the widespread use of incentives in that sector, and noted that most incentives are paid, 
at managerial and professional levels, due to attraction and retention considerations 
driven from higher levels of resource dependence for these types of role.  These studies 
suggest reward determination, including mix, is significantly influenced by relative 
power and through this power the ability to negotiate reward mix in line with personal 
preferences, not organisational alignment.  Fiss (2006) challenged this perspective, at 
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least with regard to executive reward.  In his study of the social influence of the CEO on 
company boards, and through that the remuneration decisions taken, he argued that the 
strength of this social relationship was a significant driver of top management team‟s 
compensation with, as resource dependency predicts, human capital aspects, and in 
particular scarcity of key human resource skills, being less significant.  What seems to 
be agreed is that the CEO has an influence over the overall reward mix he/she receives.  
However, what is in dispute is the relative effects of social interaction and 
organisational resource dependence in influencing this mix.  Better understanding of 
this dynamic is important below executive levels as social interaction is likely to be less 
of a factor on organisational policy decisions of reward mix, given that the decision is at 
an organisation not an individual level.  However, resource dependencies on groups of 
employees may exist, making this factor relevant to RMD. 
Nienhüser (2008) found two reactions to this form of dependency.  First, organisations 
look to the market to recruit others with the required skills and thus reduce their 
dependency on existing staff.  Next, he noted this dependency makes these staff more 
powerful.  Consequently organisations look to tie them into the organisation by making 
them more dependent on the organisation through more attractive benefits and other 
forms of financial tie-ins.  This supports the earlier conclusions of Bannister and Balkin 
(1993), in their study of sales representatives, that organisations will look to reduce 
uncertainty of operation by using means to reduce their dependency, or at least create 




Union representation, and the power that collective organisation may give employees 
over the employer, may create a form of dependency and consequently influence reward 
mix for the workforce (Budd, 2004).  Freeman and Medoff (1981) showed how 
unionised environments typically have a positive effect on benefit provision.  This 
influence is attributed to the monopoly power they have in organisation sectors where 
unions are strong, increasing their bargaining power.  Second, they provide a collective 
voice to employees.  This may mean that benefits are increased as democratic 
preferences of employees (Freeman and Medoff, 1981).  Kaufman (2002) showed how 
the collective voice provided by unions was likely to lead to increased fixed wages and 
lower contingent compensation, even if that was at the expense of a higher overall level 
of unemployment.  Other research has supported these conclusions showing, in 
particular, that declines in benefit provision as part of the overall package have occurred 
when union density has declined (Budd, 2004; Bloom and Freeman, 1992). 
2.3.3.5 Empirical evidence – reward mix 
As the discussion above shows, resource dependency theory has provided insights into a 
number of reward-related areas.  However, only a small number of the empirical 
research papers relate to human resource dependence at an employee level and 
explicitly the effect this may have on reward mix decisions organisations take.   These 
are now discussed. 
Balkin and Bannister (1993) examined how reward mix may be influenced by the 
relative power of certain types of employee groups, namely executives, sales 
representatives, and scientists and engineers.  These groups were deemed to hold critical 
positions by the specialist nature of the roles, the autonomy they have in how they 
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operate and the overall effect they have on organisational performance (Milkovich and 
Newman, 2008; Bartol and Martin, 1988).  They found that the relative power these 
groups have over other employee groups should have an influence on the reward mix 
they receive in respect of the balance between fixed and variable reward.   They 
conclude that the determining factor for the mix for key groups such as these, is the 
relative preference they have for the employees‟ desire to participate personally in 
higher returns relative to their risk tolerance.   Given the risk aversion of agents they 
should generally prefer secure and therefore fixed forms of income (Conlon and Parks, 
1990).   They concluded that the more powerful the individual or group is, the more the 
organisation will do to meet their reward mix preferences.  Managers may also be 
willing to overlook other reward issues, such as equity with other groups of staff on 
whom the organisation is less dependent, due to the specific dependency the 
organisation has on the individual(s).  Consistent with resource dependence theory, this 
suggests that management will have greater control over reward mix for non critical 
groups of employees on whom they are less dependent.  Consequently, for these groups, 
the prescriptions of strategic compensation and agency theory are more likely to apply 
in the determination of reward mix.   However, the power of these strategic groups of 
employees is not unfettered and the degree of dependence will be moderated by a range 
of factors (Balkin and Bannister, 1993), e.g. for executives, the existence of a dominant 
shareholder, for the sales representative the extent to which the representative controls 
the relationship with the customer, and for the scientist and engineer the proportion of 
total revenues which are spent on research and development.     
82 
 
One weakness of the study is the exclusion of the benefit component of the overall 
reward mix. Balkin and Bannister (1993) justify focussing solely on total cash 
compensation as they felt resource dependency has limited exploratory power with 
respect to benefits, as, in their view, benefits are generally group membership rewards.  
They speculate, but provide no theoretical or empirical evidence, that internal pay 
equity and local employment regulations will be the main drivers of benefits in the 
overall mix.  However, like many reward studies, the focus on cash compensation is 
likely to have been driven by more pragmatic considerations of the difficulty in 
measuring benefits and more relational returns in the mix. 
Gomez -Mejia and Balkin also examined what they termed “strategic employee groups” 
(1992: 101).  They also concluded that the reward packages of these critical groups 
should be tailored to better align to their preferences.   They define these groups as 
those contributing more to organisational performance which, although not the same as 
the critical resource definition of resource dependency, has similarities around the 
importance of the individual to the organisation.  For research and development 
employees they found that the firms‟ overall research and development leaning led to 
different designs around compensation time horizons (i.e. vesting period of reward 
elements) and the relative balance of short- to long-term incentives.  In addition, they 
also noted a knock-on effect on the reward mix of other „non strategic groups‟.  They 
speculated, in contrast to Balkin and Bannister‟s (1993) conclusions, that this was down 
to firms not wanting to totally separate reward systems for these critical groups of 
employees from other employee groups for internal equity reasons.   However, as this 
was not tested, it is also possible that this was not a conscious process and different job 
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families simply mirror each other for more passive convenience reasons.   Gustman et 
al. (1994) lent support to this view, finding that pension plans, whilst having a cross-
organisational structure, are sometimes built with particular employee groups in mind, 
consistent with a resource dependency view of critical employee groups shaping the 
reward mix in their favour.  This argument could easily be applied to other benefits that 
are provided collectively. 
Abbott and De Cieri (2008), in their examination of the influences on the provision of 
work-life benefits in organisations, found that different environmental conditions were 
seen to influence the respective power of employee stakeholders and consequently the 
extent of work-life benefits.  In company A, which was growing and therefore had a real 
need to retain current employees and attract more from the market, employees were 
perceived as key stakeholders and this exerted significant influence over the benefits 
provided.  However, in company B, which was contracting, it was noted employee 
influence was much lower and was therefore reported to have resulted in the removal of 
certain work-life benefits.  Overall, they concluded that specific work-life balance 
provision is organisationally context-specific and the effect of employee stakeholder 
power is relevant.  This, although not the focus of the study, provides some support for 
a resource dependency perspective on benefit provision, but, given the communal nature 
of the benefits, one which applies across the workforce when there is a general shortage 
of talent and thus all employees are deemed somewhat critical.  However, we need to 
exercise care in drawing too strong a conclusion from this work as its focus is only on 




From the above discussion, we can see that we have only a limited understanding of the 
influence resource dependence may have on reward mix, and the impact its provisions 
may be having on organisational decision makers, when we may expect the approach to 
have reasonably powerful predictive capabilities.  The literature examined, although 
identifying the link between resource dependency and reward mix decisions, is 
relatively limited in volume and consequently it could be argued that further testing of 
the relationship would be helpful.  Neinhüser (2008) concludes that, although there is 
much confirming empirical evidence for resource dependency theory, it is not always 
strong and does not always explain a high proportion of variance in the situations 
reviewed.  This led him to conclude that it may need combining with other theories to 
improve our understanding of the situation being examined.  This will be examined 
further in the section below on combinations of theories to explain reward mix 
decisions. 
2.3.3.6 Expectancy and resource dependency theory 
Vroom (1964) identified that performance is a joint function of both the ability of an 
individual and the motivational force that drives them.   Motivational force was defined 
as a multiplicative function of expectancy, i.e. the expectation that effort will lead to the 
desired behaviour, instrumentality or the perceived link between exhibiting the 
behaviour and the outcomes received, such as monetary reward and finally the valence 
or the perceived value of the reward to be received to the individual concerned.  This 
theory provides two particularly significant insights when examining reward mix choice 
and the effect that this reward choice may have on overall organisational performance.   
First, in order for an individual to be motivated, and therefore perform effectively, they 
need to see the link between their effort and behaviour and receipt of a reward.  With 
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respect to agency theory this may question the effectiveness of subjective behaviour-
based contracts on the motivation of the employee.  Second, for the individual to be 
willing to expend the effort required they must value the reward on offer.  This is 
clearly relevant for the reward mix in ensuring that the forms of reward offered are to 
the liking of the employee receiving them.  For example, Darmon et al. noted that “sales 
forces are likely to display heterogeneous preference patterns for compensation 
formulae” (2003: 151), and, given this, he called for programmes to be designed by 
seeking and analysing sales force reactions to proposed compensation, and in particular 
incentive mix design.  In addition Medcof and Rumpel (2007) demonstrated that the 
preferences of high technology workers would be different from other employee groups 
and thus if they are considered critical to the organisation the package should be 
designed around their, rather than other employee, preferences.  This is particularly 
significant where group-wide benefits are concerned, as opposed to fixed and variable 
reward where differences may be easier to accommodate. 
Expectancy theory outlines how consideration of employee preferences for different 
types of reward and reward systems should be significant in reward mix determination, 
given the importance that the reward is actually valued by the critical employee group.  
Why extend effort if the payment at the end is not valued?  There is some research on 
what these preferences might be.  In studies of job applicants it was seen that they prefer 
merit-based to tenure-based reward systems (Turban and Keon, 1993), individual-based 
incentives as opposed to group or organisationally determined ones (Bretz and Judge, 
1994), fixed rather than contingent pay (Cable and Judge, 1994) and flexible over fixed 
benefits (Cable and Judge, 1994).  Examination of incumbent employees found similar 
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preferences to those of job applicants, namely individual not team/group reward 
increases in pay to be fixed not variable (LeBlanc and Mulvey, 1998); specifically, 
Slade (2002) showed that high potentials had a preferences for stock options, incentive 
opportunities and sabbaticals.  A resource dependency perspective may lead to reward 
structures being designed around critical employees, or employee groups which may 
include high potentials. 
Where organisations hold a belief that reward mix is key in incentivising employees one 
would expect them to focus on the expectancy, instrumentality and valence of the 
rewards on offer (Pappas and Flaherty, 2006).  Pappas and Flaherty (2006), in their 
research on salespersons, found that this relationship is affected by individual difference 
variables.  They suggest from this, that REs need to see beyond traditional agency-based 
theories when deciding reward mix and consider matching mix with individual 
characteristics.  This clearly presents a problem for organisational level analysis of 
reward mix and perhaps indicates that policy level decisions should be for flexibility at 
local manager level so these different preferences can be taken into account, especially 
for those employees on whom the organisation is particularly dependent.  The risks and 
difficulties of this led Pappas and Flaherty(2006) to suggest that greater effort should be 
made at the recruitment stage to better understand potential employees and the resulting 
fit with the organisation and in this case its reward mix approach.  They also suggest 
that the relationship between reward structure and reward mix needs to be considered as 




Designing reward mix around the preferences of critical employees or employee groups 
may present other difficulties with regard to employee equity which may have to be 
compromised as reward mix is designed to better meet the preferences and needs of 
critical employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  This may have implications for 
wider employee motivation, as research has shown that perceptions of fairness of 
overall reward have an influence on overall levels of motivation (Adams, 1965). 
2.4 Combining theoretical insights 
This literature review has attempted to draw together our current knowledge on reward 
mix determination through examination of three theoretical perspectives – agency, 
institutional and resource dependence.  Whilst most research has adopted agency theory 
through which the mix decision has been explained, the other theoretical viewpoints 
have been shown to potentially have further explanatory power.  Miller et al. (2001) and 
Festing and Sahakiants (2010) noted the weakness of single approaches to examining 
reward mix following an earlier conclusion by Eisenhardt  that “multiple perspectives 
contribute to robustness in exploring a phenomenon by emphasizing complementary 
facets” (1988: 490).  Given this, a range of scholars have suggested that increased 
understanding may result from analysing the reward determination question from more 
than one theoretical perspective (Baker et al., 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Barkema 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009).  The trend appears to be 
towards using complementary theoretical perspectives to deepen our knowledge of 
reward mix, particularly to counter some of the criticisms that have been made of 
agency theory alone in explaining the phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Fernandez-Alles 
et al., 2006; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009).  
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Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests that agency theory should be expanded alongside other 
theories to gain greater insight into organisational behaviour.  She contends that 
although agency theory has a valid view of organisational behaviour it was only a 
partial view supporting Hatch and Cunliffe‟s (2006) view that the use of multiple 
perspectives in organisational theory was one of its many strengths.    
In this context, Fiss identified that “approaches drawing on several theories and 
disciplines offer the greatest promise for future research on compensation” (2006: 
1028).  Barringer and Milkovich added that we could obtain “richer explanations of 
organizational structures by integrating complementary explanations of organizations 
into a single model” (1998: 311).  Whether combining the theoretical perspectives 
reviewed will provide a deeper insight into RMD making will depend first on whether 
they are complementary, and second, whether they can be integrated into one 
framework to explain reward mix decisions.  These two issues will now be discussed. 
The approaches would appear similar in that they all examine managerial decisions 
from a perspective of those decisions being influenced by external factors, i.e. 
ownership structure, critical resource holders, institutional norms.  Each of the 
approaches also operates with similar dependent and independent variables.  Where the 
differences lie is in the assumptions they make and how they are moderated in their 
effect on RMD.  With respect to moderation, agency stresses the ability to monitor 
performance, resource dependency emphasises the importance of relative power on 
decision making, and institutional theory the significance of norms and values as 
moderating influences.  Alongside these moderating influences is the significance of the 
assumptions each theory makes about how organisations react to pressures.  Agency and 
89 
 
resource dependency theories assume that the interests of the organisation will prevail.  
Barringer and Milkovich termed this a “rational response”, noting that underpinning the 
rationality was the assumption “that organizations actively manage environmental 
constraints, adopting structures that ensure the flow of resources, or minimize agency or 
transaction costs.” (1998: 312).  This can be contrasted with an institutional theory 
perspective which they stated “assumes that organizations do not exercise active choice; 
rather they more passively conform to their environments” (1998: 312).  Enhanced 
legitimacy was a separate objective from considerations of efficiency. 
Chizema and Buck, in their study of CEO governance and the use of executive share 
options in German companies, identified that “the pure agency or economics-derived 
views of shareholder-based corporate governance are seen to be under socialised” 
(2006: 489).  They added more generally that “to survive, organizations must 
accommodate institutional expectations, even though these expectations may have little 
to do with short run, technical notions of efficiency or performance accomplishment” 
(2006: 492).    But does this apply to other levels of the hierarchy? 
Table 2-3 summarises a number of research papers that have explicitly adopted 
combinations of agency, institutional and resource dependency theories in their study of 
reward mix strategy for employees. 
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Study Perspectives Purpose 
Eisenhardt 1988 Agency, institutional Evaluation of when organisations use salary 
compensation and when they use compensation 
based on performance 
Barringer and 




Theoretical examination of the adoption and 
design of flexible benefit systems  
Conlon and Parks 
1990 
Agency, institutional How behaviour monitoring and the presence of 
tradition of non contingent pay, interact to affect 
compensation arrangements 
Milne 2001 Institutional, resource 
dependency 
Investigation of the pattern of adoption of an 
HMO Option as a component of a multiple choice 
health insurance plan 
Elvira 2001 Agency, resource 
dependency, power  
Examination of the relationship between bonuses 
and promotions and whether these incentives are 
traded off 





Investigation of the influence of the theoretical 






Examining whether innovation strategy affects 
compensation decisions in the high technology 
sector 
Fernandez-Alles 
et al. 2006 
Agency, institutional Analysis of whether compensation is designed as 
an economically rational incentive to increase 
organisational performance or whether it responds 
to other factors such as the search for legitimacy 
Festing et al. 2007 Resource dependency, 
institutional, cultural 
dimensions 
Analysis of power relations in multinational 
enterprises and their influence on compensation 
strategies 
Trevor 2008 Agency, institutional Exploration of the contemporary realities of 
compensation strategy – what, how and 
significantly why organisations are structuring 
reward as they are 




With the exception of Festing et al. (2007) and Milne (2001), all of the studies 
examined have adopted agency theory as one of the components of their study.  The 
range of studies employing both agency and institutional theory have generally 
concluded the addition of institutional factors have enhanced results given the partial 
understanding that agency research has brought (Eisenhardt, 1988; Conlon and Parks, 
1990; Fernandez-Alles et al., 2006; Trevor, 2008; Barringer and Milkovich, 1998). 
Eisenhardt concluded that agency theory was too narrow a focus, presenting only a 
“partial view of the world” as it “ignores a good bit of the complexity of organizations” 
(1988: 71).  She added that “the institutional emphasis on tradition complements the 
efficiency emphasis of agency theory, and the result is a better understanding of 
compensation” (1988: 72).  Barringer and Milkovich (1998) considered two overarching 
themes in their review of flexible benefits adoption and design.   They grouped resource 
dependency, agency and transaction cost theories into the category of expected 
efficiency gains as they felt each took a different approach to efficiency.  This is in 
contrast to the institutional theory approach which emphasises external pressures 
exerting influence which is conformed to rather than strategically chosen.  Earlier 
Eisenhardt (1989a) had noted how institutional and resource dependency are stronger 
when efficiency is not a pressing concern, citing large public bureaucracies as examples. 
Conlon and Parks (1990) found that the institutionalisation of practices may come due 
to the influence of particularly powerful bodies.  Resource dependency suggests these 
members would be those controlling critical resources.  Their study, which examined 
how a tradition of fixed or non contingent reward interacts with the classic agency area 
of study, or ability to monitor employees‟ behaviour, used a laboratory experiment with 
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MBA and undergraduates carrying out the role of principal and agents respectively.  
Through this work they found support for their hypothesis that the ability to monitor 
employees would reduce the extent to which variable pay is used, but only when 
institutional traditions were not present.  This led them to conclude that pay traditions, 
which may not be economically efficient, play a significant role in influencing reward 
mix.  This effect can overrule the economically rational position assumed by agency 
theory.  Whilst the results appear robust in the laboratory setting, the experimental 
aspect does raise questions about how much confidence we can take from the results in 
a wider organisational setting.  Conlon and Parks (1990)  acknowledge this and other 
limitations arising from the fact that it was experimental.  Their operationalisation of 
pay traditions in the fictional industry, i.e. telling the actors that a certain tradition 
did/did not exist, is also particularly questionable given the complexity with which 
institutional factors are formed and manifested in organisational life (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991).  However, despite these limitations, they conclude that as the results 
support and build on Eisenhardt‟s (1988) work, “efficiency and tradition are both 
critical for understanding control and compensation in organisations” and “the presence 
of traditions may interfere with the careful consideration of economic outcomes the 
agency theory perspective assumes” (Conlon and Parks, 1990: 621). 
Festing et al. (2007) found, in their study of analysis of power relations in multinational 
enterprises and the influence of this power on compensation strategies, that whilst 
institutional theory has given particular insight into reward decisions it does not fully 
explain the pressures REs face.  They added that an understanding of relative power is 
also needed, as discussed in resource dependency theory.  This followed Segalla et al.‟s 
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thoughts that reward strategies are determined by managers using insights from the 
human resource management, general management and marketing literature but 
alongside “idiosyncratic factors related to their personal and cultural characteristics”  
(2006: 420). 
Fernandez-Alles et al. (2006) also discovered that reward mix design is heavily 
influenced by the company‟s adoption of popular practices that increase legitimacy, but 
not necessarily performance.   Financial objectives, as agency theory contends, are not 
always the final goal but other social objectives, such as the search for legitimacy, are 
important. 
Approaches that have combined agency with resource dependency also conclude that 
the explanatory power of the combination is stronger than when agency is applied on its 
own (Tremblay et al., 2003; Yanadori and Marler, 2006; Elvira, 2001; Carpenter and 
Wade, 2002).  Yanadori and Marler (2006) showed that the increased compensation risk 
that comes with longer term incentives, which they show are payable to strategic groups 
of employees, may be counterbalanced by increased job security that these groups enjoy 
due to their criticality. 
The combination of resource dependence with institutional theory has also been shown 
to enhance insight into reward mix decisions, albeit with fewer studies solely taking 
these two perspectives (Festing et al., 2007; Milne, 2001). Both resource dependence 
and institutional theory share the drivers of their actions as internal and external forces, 
with legitimacy as an important factor.  Whilst the reactions to these pressures are often 
deemed strategic (resource dependency) and passive (institutional), based on the extent 
to which legitimacy can be pursued (resource dependency) or the extent to which it is 
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just imposed (institutional).  However, the assumption of passiveness underpinning 
institutional theory has been questioned as conformity of this type may be a conscious 
strategic choice given the significance of legitimacy for the business model (Norman et 
al., 2007).  
In Barringer and Milkovich‟s (1998) model, all three perspectives plus transaction costs 
theory were used to derive pertinent determinants of managerial reward decisions.  This 
integration of theoretical perspectives was a major contribution provided by this work.  
Although others have integrated combinations of the theories, this was the first (and as 
far as I am aware only) detailed explanation of more than two perspectives, which is 
more typical.  Again, they concluded that in this situation the explanatory power of 
flexible benefit system adoption would be improved by this multi-theoretical 
perspective. 
2.5 The role of benefits 
As the benefit component of reward mix is largely excluded from reward mix research 
discussed above, a separate review of what we know about the determinants of benefits 
provision is required to close this gap.  As far back as 1994, Williams and MacDermid 
(1994) note that benefits, although an increasing proportion of the overall compensation 
spend, had been subjected to limited research to understand the drivers of this 
expenditure.  Perkins and White (2008), note that little has since changed, with no clear 
theoretical approach emerging to understand the role of benefits in the overall reward 
mix. 
As discussed above in the context of institutional theory, changes in tax regulations 
have been shown to be influential (Tremblay et al., 2003; Gustman et al., 1994).  
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Gustman et al. (1994), in line with Long and Scott (1982), identify tax savings for both 
the employee and employer as a significant driver to the provision of reward through 
pension contributions rather than cash salaries.  Abbot and De Cieri (2008), in their case 
studies of work-life benefit provision in two companies, found that both companies 
noted the significance of tax legislation on decisions to implement certain benefits and, 
significantly, how the tax regime was leading to lower provision of certain benefits. 
Other influences have been suggested:  First, employers‟ ability to negotiate group 
discounts for certain benefits relative to that which the individual employee would be 
able to get in the market and, consequently, increase the value of the reward mix to the 
employee at no extra cost to the employer (Gustman et al., 1994; Lucero and Allen, 
1994).  Next, scholars have identified that the proportion of benefit to cash 
compensation had increased as demand for this form of reward was influenced by 
demographic factors such as increases in life expectancy, retirement trends and 
changing employee preferences for leisure.  They outline that as life expectancy 
increases employees will want to defer a greater proportion of their lifetime income 
beyond retirement and thus will demand more deferred compensation (Gustman et al., 
1994).  Accompanying this we have seen a shift in employee preference for increased 
leisure (Lucero and Allen, 1994).  Perkins (1998) noted that this was in line with 
expectancy theory predictions, with the provision of benefits only leading to increased 
performance if the workforce actually values them.  This has been given as a significant 
driver for the introduction of flexible benefits schemes that allow employees choice 
over benefits they receive within a defined budget
10
.    
                                                          
10 Flexible benefit plans, which hand control of some of the reward mix decisions to employees, came 
into being in the early 1970s in the US and gained prominence  in the 1980s (Perkins and White, 2008) .   
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The Employee Benefit Research Institute (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1991) 
identified two main drivers for the adoption of flexible benefits schemes.  First, the 
belief that increased employee choice will increase employee benefit satisfaction, and 
second costs will be better controlled by moving from defined benefit provision to 
defined contribution benefit provision.  Limited scholarly work has supported these 
claims (Barringer and Milkovich, 1998; Beam and McFadden, 1996).  Hillebrink et al. 
concluded that “the more diverse an employee population, the more incentive there is 
for an organisation to let employees choose the benefits they prefer, instead of 
attempting to find a standard package that is of greatest value to most employees.” 
(2008: 307).  However, research by Slade et al. (2002) found that employees expressed 
surprisingly similar reward preferences across job groups, salary levels and tenure, 
suggesting that the benefits of employee choice may be overstated.   
Next, union power has been shown to influence the proportion of non-wage 
compensation, through increased understanding of the tax and group saving discounts 
that are generally available in unionised environments due to union communication 
(Medoff, 1979).  Medoff also notes the role of collective bargaining in ensuring 
management is aware of employees‟ preferences for these non-wage components.  In 
addition, and more cynically, Mabry (1973) suggests that unions themselves may prefer 
this form of compensation due to the bureaucracy and increased complexity it brings, 
potentially strengthening the reason for the unions‟ existence.  There is some evidence 
to support the claim that unions are having an effect, e.g. pension benefits have been 
found to be generally higher in unionised firms (Gustman et al., 1994).  Gustman et al. 
(1994) attributed this to the unions‟ desire to meet the preferences of the average 
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worker, who is typically older than newly hired workers and therefore places a higher 
value on pension provision. 
Others have contended that benefits, especially defined benefit pensions, may be 
instituted to develop long-term loyalty as workers are accepting lower wages in return 
for a future return (Long and Scott, 1982; Gustman et al., 1994; Lazear, 1998).   Lazear 
(1998) contends that long-term deferred compensation through defined benefit pension 
provision provides an incentive for workers not to shirk, especially as they approach 
retirement.  Due to difficulties obtaining data, this long-term deferred effect of defined 
benefit pension schemes does not appear to have been tested.  However, we do know 
that turnover is typically lower in organisations that offer pensions compared to 
organisations that do not (Ippolito, 1987) although this may be down to employees 
taking a lifetime view of earnings, as Lazear suggests. 
A further justification for benefit provision has been made on historical and 
philanthropic grounds (Perkins and White, 2008).  The first benefit packages (e.g. 
Rowntree, Lever Brothers and Cadbury) were largely provided on philanthropic 
grounds by these family businesses, but also the belief that the health of the workforce 
would be improved and therefore productivity would increase.  This is in line with 
Flannery et al.‟s (1996) assessment that benefits should be categorised not with respect 
to the objective they are looking to achieve, but contingently on the type of organisation 
that is providing them and the organisational culture they have.   
Finally, the extent to which benefit provision is part of the reward mix has been put 
down to concerns over the burden administering such schemes can present (Conlon and 
Parks, 1990; Barringer and Milkovich, 1998; Beam and McFadden, 1996).  Conlon and 
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Parks conclude that fixed forms of reward were more likely, simply because they are 
easier to implement, “a ready solution” (1990: 606).  Barringer and Milkovich (1998) 
propose that organisational size will impact on the extent to which organisations 
implement flexible benefit plans, given the cost of doing so and the higher cost per 
employee of implementing such schemes.  This conclusion may be extendable to 
standard benefit schemes which will also have administrative running costs (although, 
as discussed, tax savings may distort this).   
The extent to which benefits are provided as part of the reward mix has been 
summarised by various scholars into benefit typologies.  Perkins and White (2008) 
conclude that benefits are given for four different organisational objectives.  First, some 
benefits are required by law, such as minimum holiday entitlement and statutory sick 
pay.  Second, some are to compensate employees for expenses incurred in the normal 
course of their duties, such as travel expenses and company car use.  Third, some are 
„welfare‟ benefits designed to elicit loyalty through the impression of a caring 
employer.  Finally, some are status benefits meant to reflect the level at which someone 
works and reward them for the extra responsibility this entails.  Other typologies have 
been proposed which are similar to this, e.g. Hume (1995) (financial security, financial 
assistance and employee personal needs), Smith (1983) (security, goodwill and 
performance) and Wright (2004) (security and health, job status and seniority, family 
friendly, and social, goodwill or lifestyle benefits), but broadly they agree on the main 
drivers.  However, there is limited empirical testing of these conjectures; what testing 
has been done is dominated by examination of pensions and health care benefits 
(Perkins and White, 2008).   
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2.6 Epistemological approaches 
Having reviewed what we know about RMD we will now examine how we come to 
know it. 
Review of the literature shows that a positivist approach has directed the area of reward 
research, with quantitative methods dominating both experimental and field-based 
work.  For example, Werner and Ward‟s (2004) review of the compensation literature in 
20 top management journals over a seven year period from 1996 to 2002 showed that of 
the 396 studies identified 4.5% were theoretical, with the rest being quantitative (either 
direct or meta analytic) analysis of data. 
Has the dominance of research under one epistemological approach created potential 
shortcomings in our knowledge in reward determination?  The statistical approach has 
led to a large number of determinants being identified but has told us little about why 
the relationships may exist.  Whilst the statistical analysis may have established 
relationships between the variables being examined, authors could then only speculate 
and propose potential reasons why these relationships might be the case (Yanadori and 
Marler, 2006).  This led Taras to conclude that “it is perhaps troubling that while 
scholars clearly are able to develop strong rational models of wage determination based 
on inferences derived from large data sets of wage outcomes, they are caught short 
when exposed to the often intuitive or baffling decisions of actual compensation 
managers” (1997: 181).  Consequently she proposed that “it is appropriate now to 
simply ask compensation managers about their decisions, if for nothing else than to 
posit some plausible explanations for further testing” (1997: 181).  Heneman and Judge, 
albeit in the context of research on employee pay satisfaction, noted that “we must enter 
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the field, rather than merely survey it, if we are to fully understand and appreciate its 
context and changes” (2000: 369).  Bloom and Milkovich add to this that “ours is a field 
of inquiry irrevocably intertwined with the decisions of practical people” (1996: 40).  
However, in the time since that was written reward research remains largely one step 
removed through archival and survey research rather than field-based as suggested. 
In the context of executive pay, Bender and Moir note that the research has been 
overwhelmingly dominated by a positivist approach, stating that “these are to some 
extent static analyses: they use archival data to examine the outcomes of the 
remuneration setting process, but not the processes themselves” (2006: 76).  They 
therefore suggest that a qualitative approach is the most effective way of understanding 
not just what firms are doing, but also how and why they are doing it. 
Work on remuneration committees in the UK has taken a different approach to “look 
inside the black box” (Main et al., 2008: 226), of the decision making process through 
qualitative interviews and analysis rather than using archival or quantitative survey data 
(Bender, 2004; 2004; Ogden and Watson, 2008; Main et al., 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 
2005; Bender and Moir, 2006).  Given this developing qualitative base at executive 
level, it is surprising that little qualitative work has been done below executive level.   
However, although infrequent, interview-based studies of employee organisational 
reward issues have been carried out, despite reservations that the social element of the 
reward decision may influence what is said (Bartol and Martin, 1988).  Eisenhardt 
predominately used survey data in forming her conclusions on agency and institutional 
influences on compensation in the retail industry but did “enrich insights” through 
qualitative questions which she asked of store managers.  She noted that this approach 
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supplemented the quantitative data to “develop a better understanding of how retailers 
think about managing and pay” (1988: 498).    
A similar approach was taken by Elvira (2001) in her case study of a financial services 
firm and how agency theory relates to issues of employee promotion.  Whilst 
predominantly statistically driven, the research did follow up the results with interviews 
with human resource executives and a number of employees.  This was considered 
justifiable to help counter the criticism that economic-based theories do not take into 
account the social structures which will influence behaviour  and through this treat the 
organisation as a „black box‟ not a system of social relations (Elvira, 2001).  This led 
her to conclude that “research progress depends on integrative approaches to how 
economic and social forces interact and the conditions that determine their balance” 
(2001: 367).   
Segalla et al. (2006) also go against the trend for a solely quantitative-based approach, 
sending out a specific scenario to managers to help elicit their objectives, combining the 
scenario with an open-ended question to understand why the choice was made.  They 
justified this choice in two ways.  First, they argued that simply providing managers 
with a list of potential objectives (which, from the review of the literature, are 
numerous) might influence the true reasons.  Second, they note that given they are 
looking to examine why actual choices are taken it supported an open-ended exploratory 
approach.  This approach helped them discover that the espoused rationale for the 
decision to use incentives was to motivate employees and fixed pay to manage equity 
issues.  Taras (1997) takes a more inductive approach, to explore in more depth the 
reward mix issues in the Canadian petroleum industry.  She uses a combination of 
102 
 
qualitative and quantitative methods and, with respect to the interviews she carries out, 
notes that she “found that managers were startlingly open about themes that rarely 
appear in existing wage-determination literature” (1997: 184).  A further exception is 
Fernandez-Alles et al. (2006) who use a case study approach to examine why efficiency 
is not always the driver of reward mix decisions.  The approach was justified as it was 
felt a case study approach was particularly suited to exploratory research in an area that 
lacked clarity or was subject to a number of different explanations (Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
To conclude, much of what we know about RMD is known through a positivist 
epistemology.  An emerging body of work is developing taking a social constructionist 
approach to reward determination.  This has developed in the light of findings that 
institutional pressures exist and influence reward decisions as a potential means to 
establish not only what is driving reward decisions but significantly why those factors 
are driving decisions.  This is an attempt to move beyond deducing reasons why, to 
explore with decision takers the actual situational pressures they are under when they 
determine reward strategy.   
2.7 Gaps in the literature for further examination 
The literature review has examined what is already known about RMD for employees 
and also assessed how we come to know this with a view to determining what gaps 
remain in our knowledge.  A summary of the three theoretical perspectives examined, 
based on the findings of the literature review, is given in Table 2-4. 
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To control and direct behaviour 
towards the objectives of the 
principal especially when 
monitoring is difficult/costly 
 




Conformity with other organisations and 







People are self-interested, risk 
averse 
 
Goal conflict exists between 







Control of critical resources 
leads to power 
 
Organisations seek legitimacy 
 
Organisations conform to norms 
 






Rational active management 
 
Rational active management 
 






Relative weight of incentives 
versus fixed reward will be 
managed to optimise the 




Reward mix will be 
influenced by the relative 
strength of employee groups 
determined by their criticality 
to organisation success 
 
Reward mix will be influenced by institutional 
norms and the extent to which operating within 
them confers legitimacy 
Table 2-4 – Summary of agency, resource dependence and institutional theories 
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Each of the theoretical perspectives has offered a slightly different explanation about 
what factors influence RMD in organisations. 
If agency theory is to be accepted, then we might expect RCs and REs to discuss how 
monitoring of employees, efficiency considerations around this monitoring and the span 
of controls of managers has determined the mix of at least fixed and variable pay.  
However, it has little to say about the benefits or relational elements of the reward mix.   
Resource dependency meanwhile focuses on the relative power between the actors 
involved in the employment exchange.  Organisational success will be controlled by 
those individuals, groups of individuals or influential organisations, who control access 
to critical resources needed for that success.  Consequently, reward mix, including the 
benefit component, will be developed with the acquisition and retention of those critical 
resources in mind.  Institutional theory questions these more economic and resource 
efficiency-based approaches, identifying a societal dimension to RMD as organisations 
seek to gain wider ranging legitimacy.  Reward mix is therefore largely driven by fixed 
constraints, both legal and tax regulations, alongside pressure to conform to the practice 
of other successful organisations or prescribed best practice. 
The factors that have been identified, through the literature review, as potentially having 
an influence in reward mix decisions are summarised in Table 2-5. 
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 Alignment of employee effort 
 Managing monitoring costs (spans of control and contract type) 








 Attraction and retention of critical employees/employee groups 
 Task complexity and the need for specialist skills 
 Ease of employee monitoring and performance visibility 
 Substitutability of skills 
 Task centrality 
 Organisational connections 











 Legal requirements 
 Political and societal pressure 
 Taxation and other regulations  
 For subsidiaries of multinationals, parent group policies 
 Union pressures 
 Historical precedents 
 Benchmarking others‟ practice 
 Consultants‟ advice 
 Professional networks 
 Codification of practice in reward qualifications 
 Organisational exposure to other institutional settings 
 CEO and board members‟ business education and experience 
 Cost of loss of legitimacy against benefit of differentiation 
 
Table 2-5 – Potential reward mix determinants 
With what we know, what must be asked next?  The review has highlighted four areas 
where further investigation is required.   
First, we need to examine RMD for all employees, not just executive management.  
Although a range of studies have examined RMD they have been dominated by research 
at the executive level and in particular the Chief Executive level.  This is unsurprising 
given the significant decision making authority that individual has and also the 
availability of data on executive reward.  However, it may also be misguided, given the 
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significance of employee compensation relative to organisational cost.   Focusing solely 
on the CEO attributes all the success of the organisation on that one compensation 
decision and the effect it has on one individual.  This creates the impression that the 
remainder of employees make little contribution to the organisation‟s success.  
Hambrick and Mason (1984; 2007) showed that the success of an organisation depends 
on all contributions.   This led them to “encourage „pay strategy‟ researchers to extend 
their examination of pay practices to include ever-lower levels of the organization” 
(1984: 375).  Further review of RMD at employee level is needed.   
Second, we need to broaden the conceptualisation of reward mix used in research on 
RMD.  The review highlighted that reward mix has been conceptualised in numerous 
ways in the academic literature.  For example, a narrow definition of reward mix has 
been conceptualised through the use of the ratio of base salary to short-term bonus 
payments as this was perceived to be the most common form of incentive pay (Gerhart 
and Milkovich, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1988; Boyd and Salamin, 2001; Werner and Tosi, 
1995; Gerhart and Trevor, 1996; Bloom and Milkovich, 1998).  Alternatively, others 
have widened this simple ratio to examine the proportion of base pay to cash 
compensation i.e. including both short- and long-term incentives (Tremblay et al., 2003; 
Roth and O'Donnell, 1996; Tremblay and Chenevert, 2005; Burke and Hsieh, 2006).  
This, of course, misses a proportion of reward mix with respect to the benefits that 
employees receive and the relational returns that also accrue from employment around 
the job and the work environment.  Investigations should therefore include all elements 
of reward, not just those that can be easily statistically measured. 
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Next, we need to provide greater order and develop deeper understanding through 
explanation of the influences on RMD.  The literature review established a long list of 
factors that have been shown to have statistical relationships to reward mix – „The 
shopping list‟.  Within this „list‟ agency theory has emerged as the most prevalent 
explanation for the reward mix decision.  However, there is some more limited evidence 
that reward decisions are taken that are not always in line with the expectations of 
agency theory but, additionally, social interactions appear to have an influence.  Further 
examination of RMD is needed to understand and explain these influences and, through 
this, provide greater structure and clarity to our understanding of RMD. 
Finally, we need to examine RMD from an alternative research paradigm in order to 
develop our explanations of the approach firms are taking.  Much of what we know 
about RMD is known through a positivist research approach.  However, an emerging 
body of work has developed taking a more constructionist approach to reward 
determination as a potential means to establish not only what is driving reward 
decisions but significantly why, albeit at executive level  (e.g. Bender, 2004; Ogden and 
Watson, 2008; Main et al., 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; Bender and Moir, 2006).  
Building theory from a different research paradigm will add insight to the area through 
revised theory generation and potentially contribute to simplifying the field. 
2.7.1 Conceptual framework and research questions 
Whilst agency theory has emerged as the most voluminous perspective through which 
reward mix has been examined, the other theoretical viewpoints have been shown to 
potentially have further explanatory power.   A theoretical conceptual framework 













Figure 2-1 - Conceptual framework 
This conceptual framework presents interests, forces, practices and resources as 
theoretical drivers of reward mix decisions.  It forms both the base for the examination 
of RMD and the main research question. 
Research question (RQ) – What influences RMD in financial services organisations? 
Gerhart and Rynes identified that although reward strategy is a matter of various 
choices, “surprisingly little is known empirically about how such choices are made in 
the first place” (2003: 7).  Theory suggests that there is potential for significant variance 
in how organisations design their pay systems including choice over what reward mix to 
offer (Rynes and Bono, 2000).  This is in contrast to the choice over the amount they 
pay where there appears to be less discretion due to the need to stay broadly in line with 
others for attraction, retention and overall economic competitiveness reasons (Gerhart 
and Rynes, 2003).  However, it is not clear from the research what factors reward 
specialists consider when determining reward mix, why these factors are influential and 
how this explanation compares with what theory might suggest.     
Reward mix decision 
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Through the literature review a number of sub questions are also suggested.  Each of 
these questions is now presented and briefly discussed. 
RQ2a To what extent is the alignment of principal and agents‟ interests and the issues 
of monitoring and control an influence in RMD? 
RQ2b Why are they / Why are they not an influence? 
As has been outlined in this chapter, agency theory provides significant insight into how 
goal incongruence, differing risk preferences and information asymmetry can be 
managed.  At the centre of managing these issues is the organisation‟s reward mix 
policy, particularly around the balance of fixed and variable reward.  Wiseman et al. 
outlined the importance of aligning agents‟ reward to outcomes that the principal values 
to “create a common fate” (2000: 312).  A higher proportion of variable pay in the 
overall reward mix is intended to achieve this common fate by tying employees‟ 
interests to those of the firm (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Delvey, 1999). 
Under agency theory, the literature suggests that incentives are provided to try and align 
employee and employers‟ interests.  “Paying individuals to do X causes them to do X.” 
(Prendergast, 1999: 11).  The main barrier to establishing contracts in this way is the 
additional cost employers will incur as employees require compensating for the higher 
risk that contracts of this type imply (Gerhart and Trevor, 1996; Balkin and Gomez-
Mejia, 1987; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  The extent to which it is rational to pay 
this premium will depend on the ease with which the roles can be monitored by 
management and how the cost of monitoring compares with the risk premium that will 
be payable (Conlon and Parks, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
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As shown in the conceptual framework, alternative views have been offered to explain 
the reward mix relationship.  The next two research questions attempt to explore two of 
these perspectives by introducing institutional and resource dependency theories as 
potential complementary explanations. 
RQ3a To what extent are coercive, mimetic and normative institutional pressures an 
influence on RMD? 
RQ3b Why are they / Why are they not an influence? 
We have seen that a range of institutional pressures are likely to exist.  Coercive 
pressures can take a number of forms such as employment legislation, social goals of 
government, taxation policies and restrictive head office controls.  Mimetic pressures 
would appear to be commonplace in the reward field.  The diffusion of policies and 
approaches may come from a number of sources (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) 
including the movement of reward professionals, the activities of reward consultancies, 
and professional trade and professional bodies, and through this the arrangement of 
practice into codified principles and accepted standards.  Normative practice may also 
be established through training and education programmes.    
RQ4a To what extent do the reward mix preferences of critical groups of employees 
influence RMD? 
RQ4b Why are they / Why are they not an influence? 
Decisions on how dependent an organisation is on an individual or group of individuals 
are likely to influence reward mix decisions for this individual or group (Tremblay et 
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al., 2003; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987).  Talent shortages and the resulting 
dependency this can create for organisations are widely reported (Michaels et al., 2001).    
Any individual or organisation controlling critical resources can exert pressure, 
including the design of reward practices and specifically organisational reward mix 
(Balkin and Bannister, 1993).   
Addressing these questions begins to answer the call made by Gerhart and Rynes for 
research to “uncover the mental models used by real executives and compensation 
specialists in designing pay programs” (2003: 78). 
2.8 Conclusion to chapter two 
This chapter has positioned the research question of what influences RMD within the 
reward literature and from this developed a series of supplementary research questions.  
The literature points to a number of influences which I have explored.  However, from 
this it is still not clear what the influences are and how they apply to the financial 
services sector at this time.  This thesis develops and assesses empirically a conceptual 
model in order to better understand those influences.  The framework is built around the 
theoretical explanations of agency, institutional and resource dependency theories.   
Having established the research question to be addressed, the next chapter presents the 




3 Chapter three:  Research design 
3.1 Introduction to the chapter 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the link between the research gap, conceptual 
model and resulting research question identified through the literature review in chapter 
two with the empirical work to follow in the later chapters by setting out and justifying 
the methodology and methods pursued in this research.   
First, in section 3.2, I outline the philosophical position the research takes, the 
assumptions this means have been made about the nature of social reality and, from this, 
the way it is proposed that knowledge can be created.  Section 3.3 outlines the 
qualitative approach taken in the research as the best means of generating theory from 
the accounts of those closely involved in RMD.  Section 3.4 describes the research 
programme.  The methodology chapter ends in section 3.5 with a discussion of how the 
approach meets established qualitative standards of quality, reliability and validity. 
3.2 Research strategy  
3.2.1 An abductive approach 
The choice of research strategy has significant implications for later research choices, 
both philosophical, with respect to ontological and epistemological positions, and 
methodological with regard to the use of concepts and theory, styles of explanation and 
the status of the understanding developed (Blaikie, 2007).  A coherent approach is 
required to ensure that the ontological, epistemological and from this the methodology 
are all consistent (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).   
As outlined in chapter 2 a largely deductive approach has been taken to reward research 
to date.  This research takes an alternative research strategy to the dominant deductive 
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route, abduction, to answer the research questions.  Abduction explores the everyday 
language used by social actors and then seeks to re-describe this language in the form of 
a social scientific account.  It goes beyond observation of actors and explores the 
understanding and meaning put on process and events by the actors themselves.  Blaikie 
summarised this when he stated that “the aim is to discover why people do what they do 
by uncovering the largely tacit, mutual knowledge, the symbolic meanings, intentions 
and rules, which provide the orientations for their actions” (2007: 90).  He added that 
abductive research was “the process of moving from lay descriptions of social life, to 
technical descriptions of that social life” (2007).   
This research strategy does present a range of challenges.  Everyday social activities are 
often carried out without conscious recognition of their motives as much of what we do 
is taken for granted (Blaikie, 2000; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).  Therefore, discovering 
this meaning will take both time and skill.  Blaikie noted that “it is only when enquiries 
are made about their behaviour by others (such as social scientists) or when social life is 
disrupted, and/or ceases to be predictable, that social actors are forced to consciously 
search for or construct meanings and interpretations” (2000: 116).  Eliciting the “taken-
for-granted” (2000: 116) assumptions will require developing understanding of the 
language of those involved in RMD and facilitating their thought processes so that they 
are able to articulate the assumptions that are not openly apparent.  Further, managing 
the relationship with the social actors will be significant.  In the abductive approach, 
researchers need to ensure that they are sufficiently close to the individuals concerned to 
be able to re-describe the phenomenon outlined and, through this, ensure that they stay 
true to the phenomenon being explained.  This is particularly significant as traditional 
methods of triangulation often adopted in research are not appropriate for this approach, 
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given that reality being examined is constructed and consequently does not have an 
independent existence of its own (Blaikie, 2000).  These challenges are addressed in the 
method followed to gather data. 
The overall philosophical paradigm needs to be consistent with the research strategy to 
be pursued (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).   Consistency is required in the choices taken 
throughout (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  A schematic of the choices taken in this 
research is shown in Figure 3-1.  This shows both the more traditional research strategy 
choices deployed in reward research (in red), compared to those utilised in this research 
(in green).  Each of the stages shown in the schematic is discussed in this chapter. 
 
Figure 3-1  - Philosophical route map 
Guba and Lincoln argue that the last 15 years discussion of research paradigms has been 
much less about “irrecoverable conflict” (2005: 192), which had characterised this 
debate previously, and more about research undertaken under different research 
paradigms “informing one another‟s argument” (2005: 192).  This is certainly the 
position this research approach takes with its overall aim of building on the deductive 
research carried out in the reward field to date through adoption of a different research 
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stance.  In turn it is expected that the findings of the research will lead to further 
deductive testing in the future. 
3.2.2 Ontological position 
Blaikie defines ontology as “a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of 
what exists” (2007: 13).  The key choice to be made is between whether social reality is 
believed to be objective or subjective (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008).  The objective or realist position proposes that it is possible for the phenomenon 
of interest to be studied independently of the researcher, given that it is believed to have 
an independent existence from the researcher.  This is largely the approach taken by 
reward scholars (across all areas of reward research not just reward mix) to date through 
the use of statistical analysis of archival remuneration datasets or survey results 
collected by the researcher themselves.  An alternative view is a subjective or idealist 
perspective which Blaikie notes is built on a belief that “social action is not merely 
behaviour but, instead, involves a process of meaning-giving” (2007: 17).  These two 
ontological perspectives lay at the ends of a continuum of potential views on the nature 
of social reality (Blaikie, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Laughlin, 1995). 
An idealist position is taken in this research consistent with the abductive research 
strategy pursued.  There are a number of objective realities present in the reward area, 
such as organisations providing defined levels of monetary return to each employee in 
return for their efforts and that return is provided in some proportion, or mix, between 
base pay, incentives and benefits.  Whilst the realist approach to social enquiry is well 
equipped to examine these objective realities, it appears less equipped to answer why 
organisations adopt the reward position they do.  The reward mix literature review has 
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already identified that RMD is potentially complex with a large number of variables 
having been identified as being statistically related to the final reward mix established.  
However, this realist-based work has not adequately explained why the variables that 
are relevant are chosen over other potential influences.  This research contends that, 
alongside the objective reward realities that do exist, there are also phenomena that are 
constructed such as RMD and the influences on it that varying internal and external 
factors may have.  The literature review findings, and the emerging significance of 
institutional theory as a theoretical explanation of reward determination outside the 
more objective paradigm of agency theory, would appear to be consistent with this 
approach.  Overall, the research aims to understand the different constructions and 
meanings that those interviewed put on their experience (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
3.2.3 Epistemology – How we come to know 
Epistemology is “a theory of knowledge....of how human beings come to have 
knowledge of the world around them (however this is regarded), of how we know what 
we know” (Blaikie, 2007: 18).  Choices need to be made about the epistemological 
position taken for research in line with the perspective the researcher has on what 
knowledge is.  Consistent with the idealist ontological position taken, the research 
adopts a constructionist epistemological approach.  Crotty defined constructionism as 
“the view that all knowledge and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent 
upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human 
beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social 
context” (1998: 42).  Within this position the facts exist and are there to be discovered 




An organisation‟s reward mix is an outcome that will be arrived at within a social 
context.  A range of individuals, through their ongoing interaction, are likely to have an 
influence on this outcome, through both formal and informal involvement  (Perkins and 
Hendry, 2005).  The research will examine this outcome and significantly the influences 
on it, as seen by REs and those who closely advise those individuals - RCs.  The 
literature has shown that a range of institutional factors would appear to have an 
influence on reward mix decisions be they mimetic pressures from other firms, coercive 
pressures from government and regulatory bodies, or normative pressures through the 
conventions that have established themselves across the reward profession and been 
codified as best practice and spread through qualification, conferences and networking.  
Given this, exploring, describing and understanding this interaction will need to be 
carried out through social engagement to understand the process of meaning that they 
bring to all these factors. 
3.2.4 A constructed research approach 
The literature review shows that despite strong theoretical reasoning, in the form of 
agency theory, for how reward mix should be determined related to individual firm 
circumstances, many firms appear to be operating iso-morphically.  The research 
questions focus on trying to establish empirically the influences on RMD and, once the 
drivers have been established, why these influences are significant.  So, for example, if 
the research supports the findings of Eisenhardt (1988) and others, that isomorphic 
influences are strong in RMD, I will be looking to understand what the specific 




Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify that philosophical decisions need to encompass the 
extent to which the world being examined is objective or subjective, i.e. are there hard 
facts that can be examined and established?  Does the reality exist independently of me 
as researcher and is just waiting for me to go out there to discover it, or do I as 
researcher through my interaction with those being researched have a role to play in 
constructing the reality? 
This research adopts an epistemological position that does not believe that knowledge 
can only be formed from the study of causal relationships and examinations looking for 
regularities.  These do exist, as acknowledged above with reference to money as a 
measurable unit of value that is given to employees in different tangible (base salary and 
bonuses) and less tangible (benefits) forms.  However, the research question examines 
influences on RMD and the understanding individuals have as to why those influences 
are meaningful to them.  Therefore the knowledge to be generated is developed 
subjectively and with sensitivity to the context in which it is being discovered.  
Significant in this approach is the interpretation I make of what I am hearing and seeing 
from the interaction with REs and RCs and the dialogue we have in developing the 
accounts on RMD.  In doing this reflection will be key in my interpretation in 
“appreciate(ing) the different constructions and meanings that people place upon their 
experience” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008: 59). 
3.2.5 Recognising the role of the researcher 
Vinnicombe and Turnbull (2002) note the importance of understanding your own 
experiences and personal preferences when determining a research strategy.  They argue 
that researchers should explore their preferences and use them within the research 
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design, but with full awareness of their existence and how they might influence research 
outcomes.  I outline in the preamble the influence my experience both in financial 
services and HR and reward management have had on the motivation for carrying out 
this research.  I also believe this experience has influenced the philosophical position I 
am proposing to adopt.  On joining academia I, like many other PhD students before 
me, threw myself into the literature.  The reward literature is extensive and heavily 
dominated by a positivist research approach.  Whilst finding the statistical relationships 
shown to exist between a range of factors related to reward strategy and more 
specifically reward mix interesting, I also, drawing on my own previous personal 
experience as an HR professional, felt this approach was missing significant elements 
that influenced RMD.  My experience of reward determination had been much less 
clear-cut than I felt was suggested by the positivist research that I read.  Decisions were 
rarely taken with reference to very specific hard data and clear strategic direction as 
often suggested in the research, as strategic direction was seldom clear-cut in what was 
a fast moving environment.  Rather, my experience was one of reward strategy 
emerging through iterative dialogue drawing on my own and my team‟s interpretation 
of elements, such as the beliefs of our leadership team, the historical experiences of the 
organisation, practice elsewhere in the market and large amounts of benchmarking data 
provided by reward consultancies.  We had to make sense of this data in the context of 
our organisation and the internal and external environment we faced.  This all occurred 
before I even knew what ontology and epistemology were, or the role that they play in 
influencing research designs.  From this it would appear that my chosen philosophical 
perspective is influenced by my interpretation of the world that I am looking to examine 
and how I have found, through my experience, that sense is made in that environment. 
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3.2.5.1 Behavioural preferences  
Vinnicombe and Turnbull (2002) suggest the use of Myers-Briggs Type Indicators11
 
as a 
useful tool when assessing personal preferences as a starting point for exploring how the 
researcher may prefer to collect data and make decisions, where the energy to complete 
the work will come from, and how priorities and planning will be carried out.  The 
implications of my Myers-Briggs type for this research are summarised in Table 3-1. 
Preference Definition Potential research implications 
Extraversion Where we source our energy from.  
Sources energy from being with 
people, focusing on the outside 
world and understanding what is 
happening, variety and action. 
Well suited to iterative approach to theory 
building, i.e. developing ideas and 
exposing them to others for input at an 
early stage, and research in the field 
involving human interaction through 
interviews and networking. 
Intuition Perceptual preferences.  Trusts 
instincts to make connections 
across diverse information.  Values 
insight and creative thinking and 
generalising to larger meanings.  
Potential to overlook detail. 
The generation of ideas and the building 
of models will appeal which should relate 
well to an abductive iterative approach to 
theory building.  Care required not to 
overlook factual data that are presented in 
preference for more abstract and intuitive 
patterns that may be apparent. 
Feeling How we make decisions.  
Concerned with feelings of others, 
seeking to find out what is 
important to them, empathic.  
Tends not to critique others but 
find appreciative position of their 
perspective. 
Supports the need for immersion in the 
data and through this developing deep 
accounts of what actors are saying and 
through that interpret their meaning from 
their own personal and unique standpoint.  
Aligns well with the constructionist 
position and the interpretation that is 
required from the data collection.   
Judging How we make time and prioritise.  
Plan and anticipate ahead, 
scheduling time carefully, making 
quick decisions.  Believe regular 
steady effort leads to 
accomplishment and enjoys 
completion. 
Supports a project and planned 
methodology which may be in conflict 
with the need to search in unplanned 
avenues as theory builds from the data 
gathering.  Need to maintain discipline to 
ensure that rigour is applied to following 
those avenues and not compromised for 
the sake of meeting the timetable. 
Table 3-1  – Myers-Briggs preferences and their implications for the research strategy 
                                                          
11
 An individual‟s Myers-Briggs Type is identified through the completion of a psychometric 
questionnaire intended to identify an individual‟s preferences with respect to how they make judgements 
and perceive situations. (Briggs-Myers and Myers, 1993). 
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3.2.5.2 Researcher stance 
Within the context of both my experience and behavioural preferences, I need to ensure 
that my role as researcher recognises these preferences, plays to potential strengths and 
stays focused on answering the research question. 
Blaikie (2000) suggests six potential stances for the researcher on a continuum of 
complete detachment to deep involvement, as shown in Figure 3-2. 
Detached          Involved 
 
Detached  Empathic Faithful Mediator of Reflexive   Dialogic 
observer observer reporter languages partner      facilitator 
     1       2      3      4      5      6 
Figure 3-2  – Researcher stances 
Stances 1 to 3 are based on the premise of detachment and are therefore inconsistent 
with the philosophical position taken.  The reflexive nature of this research suggests one 
of stances 4-6 should be adopted.  Stance 5 is more aligned to those typically taken by 
critical theorists or feminists with the researcher operating as a co-participant, with an 
objective of “emancipation of the participants from whatever kind of oppression they 
are facing” (Blaikie, 2000: 53).  The raising of the actors‟ consciousness of RMD that 
will come from the research may result in personal and organisational insights which 
are valuable to those individuals or their organisation (Habermas, 1987).  However, 
given that the aim of the research is not to trigger action within individual organisations, 
nor is it underpinned by some judgement of societal failure, then this appears to be an 
inappropriate research stance.  Stance 6 “attempt[s] to minimize their authorial bias by 
letting the natives speak for themselves as much as possible.  The aim is to produce a 
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„polyphony‟ of voices rather than a single voice, in order to reduce bias and distortion.” 
(Fontana, 1994: 214).  As the identified gap in the literature is one of confusion, 
because a multitude of perspectives have been offered on how reward mix is 
determined, it is proposed that although a range of views will be used to develop theory 
in this area these will be brought together into a unified scholarly theory of RMD.  This 
leaves stance 4 whereby the researcher aims to develop a scholarly account based on the 
lay accounts of the actors involved (Giddens, 1976).  This requires interpretation on 
behalf of the researcher and therefore can never been seen as detached or objective.  
This is consistent with the philosophical stance being taken in the research and 
supported by the author‟s personal working preferences. 
3.2.6 Summary 
Laughlin (1995) identified that research strategy was not a matter of extreme either/or 
choices as they are sometimes presented, i.e. objective versus subjective, positivist 
versus constructionist.  Rather, there are matters of degree in all the choices researchers 
face. 
The methodological approach to be taken is as follows.  Reward facts exist.  Knowledge 
on these facts can be generated through examination of causal relationships and 
relationships between variables.  Much understanding has been provided in the reward 
research field using this approach.  However, understanding how reward mix is 
determined is not an area of objective fact – the determination process has to be 
interpreted. 
Given the research question, the philosophical stance and influence of the researcher‟s 
preferences, a largely qualitative approach is considered relevant.  Research examining 
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the meaning and perspectives of individuals “lends itself to getting out in the field and 
finding out what people are doing and thinking” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 11).  The 
next section outlines the precise methodological choices considered in taking the 
research forward, describing how they operated within the research. 
3.3 Method 
This section lays out the structure of the research method.   
3.3.1 Data sources 
Adopting a constructed viewpoint means working on the assumption that the factors 
influencing reward mix are determined as a result of human interaction.  This does not 
mean that interaction is required with everyone who may be involved with the process, 
but rather that research needs “to decide which view offers us the best way of 
understanding ourselves and others and thus of guiding our research” (Burr, 2003: 32).  
Decisions have to be taken on whose views the research should access. 
The process by which reward mix decisions are taken is likely to involve social 
interaction as a range of individuals within the firm are likely to have both formal and 
informal influence on the final decision, e.g. the Board, Executive Team, HR Director 
and RE (Perkins and Hendry, 2005), with their consultants‟ support.  In this context the 
research gathers data from two sources involved in this social interaction who can 
provide insight and help develop the understanding needed.  The sources are RCs as 
close advisors to firms and REs as windows into organisational activities on reward 
mix.  The justification for this choice of interviewees as a way of accessing appropriate 
data is now provided. 
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3.3.1.1 Socially derived 
In line with Garfinkle‟s (1986) argument that individuals‟ perceptions are socially 
derived, and therefore drawn from their interaction with others, both the RCs and REs 
are valid sources of data on the RMD process.  The data collected through interviews 
with these individuals not only represent the unique meaning given by the individuals 
but also wider social phenomena that influenced the respondents‟ perceptions and 
actions.   Informants do not operate in a vacuum;  they are socialised in the 
organisations they advise or work for and the meaning that other actors within these 
organisations may give to RMD.  
3.3.1.2 Reward consultants (RCs) 
The research used RCs as informants for two reasons.  First, as acknowledged experts in 
the reward field they have relationships with REs and senior management in 
organisations and through this play an important role in reward decisions (Bender, 
2011; Clark and Fincham, 2002; Conyon et al., 2011).  They are an important 
component of the system that leads to RMD (Bender, 2011).  Second, the difficulties of 
researchers carrying out participant observation of organisational process have been 
noted with respect to entering the field, establishing a role and building a relationship 
(Luders, 2004).   However, Rynes and Bono (2000) noted the excellent access that RCs 
have to observe compensation practice and suggested forming alliances with these 
individuals as a way of furthering reward research.  This research adopts this approach 
as part of the data collection, to use their insight and access as a separate but 
complementary perspective to that of the REs also to be interviewed.   
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The RCs therefore provide distinct data on both industry practice in RMD and firm-
specific practice through discussion of specific consulting assignments they have 
conducted.  
3.3.1.3 Reward executives (REs) 
Two specific justifications are provided for the use of REs as the main source of data on 
the different interests, forces, practices and resources faced across the industry but also 
within their own firms. 
First, potential bias is reduced through personal not organisational recruitment.  Two 
methods of recruitment are possible.  Informants are either recruited as representatives 
of their organisation or in a personal capacity.   Buchanan  outlines how recruitment in 
the latter way can lead to richer, more complete data as informants “speak for 
themselves and speak of the organization” (1993: 297), due to the difference in the 
implicit contract in place between researcher and informant (Hoffman, 1980; Burgess, 
1984; Bressen, 1988).  Individuals recruited as representatives of the organisation are 
under more pressure to display competence which can lead to their censoring 
information which may be detrimental to this display of competence or lead to an 
unfavourable view of the organisation (Buchanan, 1993).  In addition, these individuals‟ 
accounts may be further sanitized by a requirement that a report will be provided to the 
participating organisation on the research.  In contrast, those recruited in a personal 
capacity speak as “a colleague with a mutual interest in the topic of interview.  
Respondents may then speak of their organisation, but do this in the context of speaking 
for themselves.....the interview is not located in the context of organizational permission 
and is thus not constrained by the cultural and moral pressures which that location 
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implicitly and typically creates” (Buchanan, 1993: 301).  All REs were recruited in a 
personal capacity. 
Second, more informed accounts are provided by using those closely involved with 
RMD as opposed to those who have little consciousness of the concept.  The issue 
regarding using single informants to report on organisations is not new; a number of 
issues are well documented, e.g. memory failure and distortion, hindsight bias and self-
justification to enhance self-esteem.  However, using multiple perspectives within an 
organisation also raises problems.   Kumar et al. (1993), in the context of survey 
research, note that response errors are likely to be higher when informants are not close 
to the phenomena being discussed.  They suggest it is important to verify the 
competence of the individual to comment.  The research uses REs as the senior 
individual in the firm with responsibility for the analysis and development of reward 
mix – either the HR Director in smaller firms or Head of Reward (or similar title) in 
larger organisations.   The RC interviews, conducted before those with REs, identified 
that, unlike some reward decisions, e.g. budget level, the organisational reward mix 
decision is generally not a formal one.  There was overall a lack of one „moment‟ or 
established process where reward mix was raised, with the actual mix tending to emerge 
over time rather than as a result of a set piece decision.    However, REs were seen to be 
the focal point for this informal process.  As part of the exploratory work, I also looked 
to assess the competence of the REs as informants.  Those interviewed appeared well 
placed to have deep technical insight into RMD and, significantly, were senior enough 
to have a wider organisational and environmental perspective of the decisions.  Two 
interviews I conducted with non HR executive managers within one firm (Sales and 
Operations Directors) did not demonstrate awareness of organisational practice and 
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determination pressures, or wider sectoral knowledge.  The lack of an established 
process and set discussion meant they found commenting on the issue problematic.  
3.3.2 Levels of analysis 
The research question which focuses on the reward mix determination approach was 
examined through two levels of analysis.  First, reward practitioners, both consultants 
and executives, as informants on how reward mix is determined at an industry level, 
drawing on their insights and experiences.  This allowed the research to explore whether 
the forces, pressures, interests and resource dependencies applying to RMD are 
strategically driven, uniform or untidy, and/or multifaceted.  A second unit of analysis 
was also explored – the organisational level.  First, drawing on the data from both the 
RCs and REs, this allowed the identification of variables that influence a firm‟s 
propensity to follow industry norm reward mix practice.  Next, solely drawing on the 
accounts of REs speaking of the practice in their respective firms, the research explored 
what commonality exists between the REs‟ accounts of specific organisations‟ reward 
determination activity and the dimensions influencing individual firms‟ propensity to 
adopt a non conforming reward mix.  Whilst accepting that adopting multiple levels of 
analysis adds complexity, the study of a whole situation is possible through the 
interpretation that others and the researcher have on the situation (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008).   
3.3.3 Research options 
A qualitative approach was selected as an appropriate way of establishing the 
constructed meaning put on reward mix decisions by those involved, advising or closely 
observing those decisions (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).   
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A range of qualitative techniques were considered including observations, analysis of 
texts, publicly available and internal, and case studies, before semi-structured interviews 
were selected.  An assessment of each of these rejected techniques and conclusions 
drawn is provided in Appendix 4 
Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that qualitative researchers should, where possible, 
look to increase the size of the sample used given the possibilities this presents in 
identifying a greater variety of similarities/differences.  However, they warn that if the 
sample becomes too large then it can create issues of data management, making a study 
unwieldy.  They note that “the price (of larger studies) is usually thinner data and at 
some point you say: why not do a survey?” (1994: 30).  Whilst a survey is appealing 
with respect to time and ease of data collating compared to face-to-face interviews, it 
was rejected for various reasons.  Whilst the research was keen to engage a relatively 
large number of key commentators/participants in RMD to allow a full understanding of 
RMD to be developed, it was important that the data collected were appropriately rich 
in order to provide insight into not just the „what‟ of RMD, but also the „why‟, so this 
explanatory element could be incorporated into the research outputs.  Surveys are not 
considered to be effective tools to obtain depth of this sort (Blaikie, 2000).   
Lofland and Lofland (1995) note that face-to-face interaction is the most complete 
method available to explore the thoughts and perceptions of individuals.  The research 
piloted, and found to be productive, the use of laddering questions (Baker, 2002) as a 
method to do this, which could not be pursued through a survey.   
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3.3.4 Semi-structured interviews 
There are a range of interview forms which can be utilised – computer-aided, focus 
group, factual, conceptual, narrative and discursive (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).  A 
blend of three of these was used:   initially, the interviews held were factual to gather 
data on the individual (i.e. background, experience, current role) and the organisation 
where they worked; next, concept clarification, exploring key concepts with the 
informant around what they understood by the term reward mix;  finally, the bulk of the 
interview was narrative exploring “the stories the subjects tell” (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009: 153).  Hopf felt that semi-structured, focused and narrative interviews of this type 
allowed  “combining a reserved, non-directive management of a conversation with an 
interest in very specific information and the opportunity for an object-related 
explanation of meaning” and “they are therefore superior to other interview variants” 
(2004: 204).   
Given the knowledge we already have from the literature review of the often 
unconscious institutional factors that may have an influence on reward mix, it is likely 
that informants were not fully conscious of how these institutional effects are 
influencing their organisations‟ policy.  Consequently, deep exploration through 
narrative, semi-structured interviews was considered appropriate to allow the pressures 
to emerge and be explored (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).   
My significant experience of interviewing in different contexts has taught me that 
interviews are not an „objective‟ research method, but rather that dialogue between 
interviewer and interviewee creates the understanding of the situation being discussed.  
Although there may be objective facts that occur when reward mix is determined, the 
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REs and RCs interviewed will have their own perspectives on RMD; this will be 
reflected in their accounts of what influences the determination process and also the 
justification being sought about why certain issues such as resource dependency, 
employee control and institutional pressures, may influence the process.    
One drawback of any interview approach is the retrospective nature of the accounts 
given.  However, Chell notes that interviewees‟ accounts “are partial; but partial or not, 
biased or not, such accounts constitute their reality, and, arguably it is the way they 
view the world which shapes their future actions.” (2004: 58).  Given it is this reality 
being explored, an interview approach appears appropriate as the investigation method. 
3.4 Research programme 
Following the decisions taken on the overall research strategy, the two main stages of 
the research programme are summarised in Table 3-2.   
Activity Main purpose 
First study - Examination of RMD 
– the RCs’ perspective 
Test initial findings from the literature review 
and begin the development of explanations for 
RMD.  Improve richness of coding structure for 
later studies.  Identify potential areas where lay 
and technical terms are inconsistent to help 
ensure use of the language of the informants, not 
academic technical language.  Act as a distinct 
but complementary perspective to RE 
interviews. 
Main study - Examination of 
RMD – the REs’ perspective 
Further development of descriptive 
determination model and development of 
explanations for determination process 
identified. 
Table 3-2 – Research programme 
Each of these stages will now be discussed. 
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3.4.1 First study - Reward consultants’ perspectives 
The purpose of this stage of the research was to gain insight into the field and through 
this begin the process of theory development around RMD.  This is an important stage 
of the research given that it provides a distinct but complementary perspective on 
addressing the research question to that provided by the REs that follows.  Whilst not 
triangulation (see section 3.5 below for comment on this) the use of multiple sources of 
data to explore the research question is an important part of ensuring that the findings 
make sense.   
Ten RCs, i.e. individuals providing paid for advice to organisations on the design of 
their reward strategy including RMD, whom the author had met at industry conferences, 
were approached and asked to participate in the research.  The understanding gained 
from the RC interviews provided an alternative perspective to the direct RE responses.  
The interviews were conducted to collect evidence of the RCs‟ experience of 
organisational practice, not their opinion on what factors should influence RMD.  This 
was managed, where possible, by asking for real examples of practice the consultant 
had seen in their work.  In addition, conceptual discussions of reward mix were carried 
out and factual data on who is involved in the reward mix decisions within 
organisations occurred to provide context for the RE interviews. 
Semi-structured, largely narrative interviews, lasting 30 to 80 minutes (and an average 
of 45 minutes), were held with ten RCs from three global reward consultancies and one 
independent consultancy between December 2008 and October 2009.   An interview 
protocol was developed building on a comprehensive literature review with respect to 
RMD.  Although not possible to pilot the interview protocol, given the relatively small 
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number of informants available, it was reviewed by colleagues at Cranfield School of 
Management and a number of their suggestions incorporated.  The final protocol is in 
Appendix 5.   
With respondents‟ permission, all interviews were recorded and transcribed leading to 
160 pages of single-spaced text.  The data were then coded using NVivo 8 software 
against the conceptual framework derived from the literature review.   
The interview findings are outlined in Chapter four.   
3.4.2 Main study - Reward executives’ perspectives  
3.4.2.1 Initial exploratory interviews 
Six exploratory interviews were carried out with REs from six different financial 
services firms.  These were conducted in April-June 2009 ahead of the pilot interviews.  
The purpose of these interviews was to further test the conceptual model developed 
from the literature review and refined through the interviews with the RCs and to begin 
to see whether the research method chosen would be successful in soliciting the „thick‟ 
description desired (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  In addition the interviews were a 
useful source of interview leads for the main study.  The exploratory interviews were 
conducted in a similar manner to the RC interviews, recorded and professionally 
transcribed for later review. 
Two significant insights came from these interviews.  First, it became apparent that rich 
data were often more forthcoming when the interviewee had an event or change on 
which to anchor their discussion.  This assisted their thoughts on not only what 
influences the determination of reward mix but, significantly, why they felt the change 
had occurred.  Second, the interviews identified that RMD was not a decision typically 
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taken in an established and formal process.  What emerged was that reward mix was 
much more of an evolving concept within organisations.  On no occasion during the 
exploratory interviews could the interviewees point to one formal process of 
determination, which was in sharp comparison to issues such as overall pay levels in the 
firms and agreement of pay structures (i.e. pay spines, job families or job evaluation 
factors) which were subject to at least annual formal review and sign off by an 
appropriate committee.  This meant all the interviewees had to think through what was 
determining the mix they had in place and why they had got to that position, and caused 
them to ask questions of themselves.  The example below from one of the exploratory 
interviews illustrates this point. 
Why do we have benefits?  What a good question.  Given it’s such a large 
component of the mix I should know that.  
A significant pause then ensued before the interviewee gave the following response. 
Having thought about it, there are a number of drivers but we don’t actually 
question them on a regular basis.  
The interviewee continued by discussing their thoughts. 
3.4.2.2 Pilot interviews 
Four pilot interviews were carried out in June-July 2009.  Easterby-Smith et al. 
identified that the purpose of pilot interviews was to “test methodologies and to assess 
the feasibility of initial ideas” (2008: 24).  However, given the extent of the initial 
exploratory work already carried out in this research project and the RC interviews that 
were already well underway at this point in the research programme, the focus of these 
pilot interviews was on testing the interview methodology that had evolved over the 
exploratory interviews.  The protocol used in the pilots is shown in Appendix 7. 
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The pilot interviews were transcribed (details of the transcription process are given 
below) and the transcripts reviewed to establish what had worked effectively and 
whether any changes would be required.  The interviews were reviewed against Kvale 
and Brinkmann‟s (2009) six interview quality criteria.  All of these were met for each 
interview with the exception of one where the interviewee did initially begin to talk 
about reward level decisions as opposed to reward mix.  I quickly identified this and 
carefully directed the interviewee‟s thoughts to reward mix.  Overall what materialised 
was that the interview protocol, used in a people-centred (Rogers, 1976) and flexible 
manner to follow the flow of the interviewee rather than a predetermined direction of 
the interviewer, worked well with all the pilot participants settling well into the 
interviews.   
The pilots also allowed me to test the data reduction and analysis techniques that I had 
planned for the main study (outlined in detail below).  They were operated as described 
and no amendments were necessary.  Due to the success of the pilots the data collected 
were also used in the main study now discussed. 
3.4.2.3 Main study 
A limitation of the interviews carried out with the RCs is that they provided their 
interpretation of RMD rather than a direct assessment from the protagonists involved, 
REs.  The main study – interviews with REs – was carried out to gain access to their 
interpretation of RMD. 
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Thirty REs were interviewed from 30 firms12.  Those interviewed were senior 
individuals in the firm (on two occasions the business unit within a much larger firm) 
with responsibility for the analysis and development of reward mix.    
Wolff (2004) notes a number of difficulties that can arise in gaining access to interview 
with senior management. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) and Buchanan et al. (1988) argue 
that issues around cooperation levels will mean compromises have to be made regarding 
the „rigour‟ of sampling.  They suggest the researcher should start with personal 
contacts and sample from there, bearing in mind the need to look for similarities and 
variance – an opportunistic approach adopted in this study.  Personal contacts (including 
REs that were met at remuneration conferences which I attended at this time), 
consultant contacts, Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development (CIPD) and 
British Bankers Association (BBA) introductions and „snowballing‟ leads from 
interviewees (Miles and Huberman, 1994) were used.  Non probability sampling of this 
nature was not seen as an issue given the aim of the study to develop theory rather than 
fully generalisable results.  A map of interviews was built up by financial services 
sector (asset management, insurance, banking, capital markets, retail intermediaries, 
mortgages, etc.) to see the spread obtained through this pragmatic sampling approach 
and assess any consequences.  Ongoing decisions of interviews to be conducted were 
taken with reference to the theory that was emerging. 
I found little resistance in the interviews, with a number of the interviews exceeding the 
allocated time.  The respect that I developed through contact with the REs was further 
                                                          
12
 In some larger firms multiple REs were in place, i.e. separate REs for the retail and wholesale entities 
in the firm. 
136 
 
confirmed by interviewees regularly (at the end of the interview) asking for my thoughts 
on how they viewed RMD and various invitations to come and speak to their colleagues 
about the research (see section on validity below for details).  Appendix 6 sets out the 
interviewees, the financial services sector of their current organisation and their job title.   
3.4.2.4 The interview protocol 
The structure used in the interview was not changed from the pilot protocol shown in 
Appendix 7.  This was derived from the literature review, the RC interviews and the 
second phase exploratory interviews carried out as discussed above.   
The research question was intended to establish what factors the REs felt were driving 
reward mix choices and why these factors were significant.  What emerged in the 
exploratory interviews was that interviewees were comfortable tackling this up-front 
after being „warmed up‟ with some basic questions on their background, their 
conceptualisation of reward mix and a short outline of the mix that was offered in their 
organisation at that time.  This approach elicited rich detail on the influences and began 
the process of probing into why these influences were felt to be important by the 
interviewee.  What also emerged during this phase was the need to push for further 
understanding from the interviewee on why they felt the driver was significant beyond a 
first level justification.  This is, in the words of Baker, intended to “force the respondent 
up a ladder of abstraction” (2002: 226).  In addition, I used the interviews to explore 
each individual‟s thoughts through focusing on an instance of reward mix change when 
one was raised by the participant.  In carrying out the laddering, I followed a policy of 
“deliberate naiveté” (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009) to ensure that I asked follow-on 
questions when I may have felt I already „knew the answer‟.   
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Significant time was also given to allow the interviewee to think through and reflect on 
the questions asked and the answers they gave.  Silence in interviews can be 
uncomfortable for the interviewer.  I found the technique to be very powerful with the 
individual, unprompted, laddering themselves to a further level of meaning. 
3.4.2.5 Carrying out the interviews 
The interviews were conducted between June 2009-March 2010.  All of the interviews 
were carried out in person in a range of locations across the UK. It was important that 
the interviews were face-to-face, given their open nature and the importance of dialogue 
and engagement in the process, which I felt significantly less comfortable managing 
over the phone.  Ahead of the interview an email was sent to the interviewee setting out 
the broad areas to be covered and noting that I would be asking for permission to record 
the interviews.  This was intended to ensure that the meeting took place and allowed the 
interview to begin reflecting on RMD before the session. 
The 30 interviews carried out for the main study lasted between 32 and 73 minutes (and 
averaged at 57 minutes).  With respondents‟ permission, all interviews were recorded 
and transcribed.   
3.4.2.6 Interview introduction 
Initial contact with interviewees usually began in the reception area of their organisation 
(only five interviewees sent secretaries to „pick me up‟).  This provided an ideal time to 
begin to establish crucial rapport with the interviewee and conversations were begun 
often around the current business environment, how the organisation was finding the 
difficult market conditions etc.  This was an important time as Kvale and Brinkmann 
note that “The subjects will want to have a grasp of the interviewer before they allow 
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themselves to talk freely, exposing their experiences and feelings to a stranger” (2009: 
128).   
My first question simply asked them to talk through their current role.  This question 
allowed me to check that I was interviewing someone with an appropriate position for 
the research, but also allowed the interviewee to start confidently on a subject of which 
they had good knowledge. 
3.4.2.7 Reward mix conceptualisation 
The interview then commenced by asking the interviewee to outline what they 
understood by the term „reward mix‟.  This was intended to establish their 
conceptualisation of the term rather than imposing on them my definition or one derived 
from the literature.  The findings on reward mix conceptualisation are discussed in 
Chapter five. 
3.4.2.8 Interview section 1 
The main body of the interview proceeded with open questions around what the RE felt 
influenced RMD in their organisation and why the elements raised were influential.  
The first question often revealed a shortlist of reward mix determinants.  I took a written 
note of each determinant as it was raised so that once the interviewee had concluded 
their initial thoughts I could probe into each of the elements in detail to ladder down to 
why each of the elements raised were felt to be significant.  This interview section often 
led to discussion of changes to reward mix that the RE had led.   These were useful in 
allowing the interviewee to explore the motivation for the change as a means for them 
to more clearly construct their understanding of the reasons for reward mix change. 
139 
 
3.4.2.9 Interview section 2  
“Interviewers should primarily adopt the role of attentive listener and contribute to the 
maintenance of the narrative through supportive gestures and non-directive brief 
comments.  Only in the follow-up section do researchers have the opportunity of a more 
active contribution” (Hopf, 2004: 206).  During the first section of the interview I 
offered no comment on any responses that were given.  However, in line with Hopf‟s 
position, section 2 was about more direct engagement.  I signalled this to the 
interviewee by asking for permission to adopt a more direct approach.  This section was 
then used to explore contradictions in what may have been said earlier.  Specific probes 
were also employed to explore areas not raised that the literature or other interviewees 
suggested were important.  Miles and Huberman note that interviewees can be selective 
with the information that they provide “sometimes deliberately, sometimes unwittingly” 
(1994: 56), and suggest the researcher should look to use techniques to minimise this.  
The specific probes were one way in which I attempted to do this. 
3.4.2.10 Interview closure 
The closure of the interview was used, as suggested by Gaskell (2000), to ask the 
interviewee whether anything had not been covered which they, on reflection, felt 
should have been.  More often than not this proved remarkably productive with the 
interview extending as further insights emerged from the interviewee.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) note the importance for validity of interview data of 
seeking feedback from interviewees on their position.  I used the interview closure to 
summarise my understanding of what had been identified, the key drivers and the 
reasons for their significance.  This was the start of building an individual model of 
RMD for each interview.  This allowed the interviewee to correct any 
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misunderstandings I may have had and also helped ensure that my interpretation of the 
interviewees‟ position was as close to theirs as possible.  Again, this often led to more 
discussion which provided a further rich source of data.  Recording continued 
throughout this stage to elicit any further information that was given often in a relatively 
casual way (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
Some interviewees did ask who else had been interviewed for the research and although 
unable to tell them, due to confidentiality reasons, I was able to give an indication of the 
type of firms being interviewed (i.e. banks, insurance companies etc.).   I was also asked 
for my thoughts on what the interviewee had said and how it compared with other REs‟ 
and RCs‟ perspectives.  This allowed me to outline what the research was showing to 
date which I did through sketching out the current state of the model of RMD as I 
construed it.  During the exploratory interviews I learnt to leave the recorder on at this 
point as this stage also led to further insights. 
It was these discussions that also led to a number of requests for me to return at the end 
of the research to take the RE, their team and on one occasion their Executive Board 
through the research findings.  I was happy to do this as a courtesy for their time in the 
interview, but also as a chance for me to obtain further practitioner challenge to the 
findings of the research as the theory was developing (see sense checking below). 
3.4.2.11 Post interview 
After the interview, I made my own notes on a post-interview sheet that was developed 
ahead of the exploratory interviews.  This is attached as Appendix 8.  The sheet allowed 
me to quickly capture my impressions from the interview both with respect to what I 
had heard but also how I had performed so that I could improve at future interviews.  
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These notes provided an initial invaluable dataset when the transcripts were analysed 
and the reflection carried out assisted in theory building which was underway 
throughout the time the interviews were conducted.  In addition I sent the interviewee a 
thank you email and followed up on any documents they promised to send and also 
further RE introductions that they offered to make.   
3.4.3 Interview data analysis 
The interviews were analysed with reference to Miles and Huberman‟s (1994) three-
stage process for analysis of qualitative data.  First, the data requires reduction from its 
original form.  Next, the data needs displaying so that sense can be made of the high 
volumes of data that have been generated.  Finally, this reduction allows the drawing of 
conclusions and the building of theory from the thick description that has been 
generated.  Consistent with the constructionist stance taken, this was carried out 
alongside ongoing collection of data (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).  The data reduction 
and analysis phases will now be discussed. 
3.4.3.1 Data reduction 
All the interviews carried out after the initial exploratory interviews were transcribed to 
“make fleeting conversational behaviour permanently available on paper for scientific 
analysis” (Kowal and O'Connell, 2004: 248).  This was done by a professional 
transcriber and resulted in 519 pages of single-spaced text from the 30 main study RE 
interviews, in addition to the 160 pages resulting from the first study interviews with 
RCs.  Whilst recognising the benefits of personal transcription with respect to getting 
close to the data and beginning to identify potential themes, these were outweighed by 
the need to keep the work on track and allow the focus to be on interpretation and 
analysis.  In order to ensure quality and reduce the risk of incorrect transcription, which 
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has been identified as being frequent (Kowal and O'Connell, 2004), a process of 
corrective listening was carried out (Schmidt, 2004).   
Handling large volumes of interview transcript data can be problematic (Bazeley, 2007).  
To make this process more manageable NVivo 8 software was used to assist in data 
reduction and analysis.  Computer support was deemed appropriate for three reasons:  
first, to improve efficiency in managing the high volume of text which allowed a large 
sample to be used and therefore meant that saturation was more likely to be reached; 
second, the system allowed for transparent analytic assessment, such as cross-interview 
comparison and filtering; finally, as an encouragement to creativity, the software 
allowed me to experiment with the data without disrupting original data integrity. 
The initial concepts identified in the literature review were entered into NVivo as nodes 
(points at which similar data can be identified) which were then built into trees (allows 
relationships between nodes to be built) in line with the relationships identified in the 
conceptual model.  In addition, whilst the transcripts were being reviewed NVivo 
allowed the creation of free nodes (i.e. nodes that do not at that stage have any 
relationship with other nodes) where data can be identified.  This was in line with Miles 
and Huberman‟s (1994) suggestion that “one method of coding – the one we prefer – is 
that of creating a provisional „start list‟ of codes prior to fieldwork.  That list comes 
from the conceptual framework, the list of research questions, hypotheses, problem 
areas, and/or key variables that the researcher brings to the study”.  The conceptual 
framework was the frame of analysis but this was applied with flexibility to allow data 
not fitting that frame to be captured elsewhere.  Where free nodes were identified 
previous transcripts were reviewed to establish whether elements relevant to the newly 
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defined node were present in that text.  Whilst time-consuming, this was productive in 
establishing new themes in the area under study.  
NVivo also allows text to be coded against multiple nodes where, for example, two 
themes or ideas are raised by the interviewee in a section of discussion.  This was 
significant in ensuring that as much of the meaning as possible that the interviewee was 
giving was captured against various aspects of the conceptual model and additional free 
nodes developed.  This flexibility meant that the framework could evolve as the data 
were collected in line with Miles and Huberman‟s contention that “as qualitative 
researchers collect data, they revise their frameworks – make them more precise, 
replace empirically feeble bins with more meaningful ones, and reconstrue 
relationships.  Conceptual frameworks are simply the current version of the researcher‟s 
map of the territory being investigated.” (1994: 20).    
No unit of coding was defined (i.e. word, sentence, paragraph), rather text was coded at 
whatever level was deemed appropriate to ensure the meaning that the interviewee was 
conveying could be understood in later analysis at the node level (Miles and Huberman, 
1994).  NVivo also captures data in each code in the wider context of the text around it 
(i.e. it shows not only the data highlighted for the node but also the area of text 
surrounding it).  This was particularly useful in ensuring later analysis did not 
misinterpret the meaning in the transcript by reading it out of context.  
The use of a second coder was considered but rejected.  I believe that after over sixty 
interviews my coding and analysis will be more insightful than that carried out by an 
individual with less knowledge of the field (Milne, M.J and Adler, R.W., 1999). 
144 
 
3.4.3.2 Data analysis 
Analysis was carried out through examination of all text coded at the same node.  This 
allowed checks to be carried out that the data had been appropriately coded or, in some 
cases, sub nodes may be required to better display and analyse the data in a specific 
node.  The final coding structure is presented in Appendix 9.  Whilst the data were 
being allocated to nodes, I also took notes on ideas and themes that occurred to me 
during this analytical process.  
Cross-case displays were also used as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) i.e. 
a meta matrix.  This was done through a large Excel spreadsheet.  This cross-case 
display allowed the examination of themes and trends across the interview data through 
the use of both frequency data but also yes/no analysis.  In addition it allowed the 
collection of static data (see Appendix 6) and supported the data analysis discussed in 
chapter five (see Appendix 10). 
3.4.4 Saturation 
The research is about generating findings into theory and not wider generalisation to a 
larger population.  Given this, the concept of how much data is enough is very 
subjective.  However, “looking at many cases strengthens a researcher‟s grasp of the 
empirical world and helps in discerning variation in the studied phenomenon” 
(Charmaz, 2005: 510).  Miles and Huberman (1994) note the importance of having 
enough data such that you can have confidence in the theory that these data are assisting 
you to build, but not so much data that they become overwhelming and inhibit analysis 
and reflection of the data.  In this context Gaskell (2000) suggests that interviews should 
be limited to between 15 and 25 cases.  However, other authors suggest fewer are 
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necessary in order to build robust theory; Miles and Huberman (1994) and McCraken 
(1988) identify that 12 cases and eight interviews respectively was generally sufficient.   
In this context, a target number of interviews was not set, but the interviews were 
carried out until a consistent picture was obtained and a coherent model developed from 
these accounts.  This is in line with „theoretical saturation‟ as outlined by Glasser and 
Strauss (1967).  In total 61 interviews (plus further sense checking activities) were 
carried out as shown in Table 3-3. 
Initial exploratory    13 
Reward consultants    10 
Reward executives – exploratory    6 
Senior Managers      2 
Reward executives – pilot interviews    4 
Reward executives – main study  26 
Total interviews    61 
Table 3-3 – Interviews completed 




Figure 3-3 - Concept saturation 
This shows the instance of new concepts that were seen as influencing reward 
determination emerging through the course of the RE interviews.  As this graph 
highlights, only one new concept was raised (interview 24) between interviews 14 and 
30. 
3.4.5 Sense checking activity 
Sense checking interviews were also conducted with representatives from different 
financial services trade bodies as a key population engaging with and commenting on 
RMD.  The events in financial services and their impact on the sector and how it is 
regulated, had significantly increased trade bodies‟ interest on the way in which reward 
is managed and their interaction with their member firms on this issue.  A number of the 
trade bodies had established specific policy expertise and working groups in the area of 


































individuals from different trade bodies who had led policy making or lobbying activity 
on remuneration structures in the financial services sector on behalf of those bodies.   
In addition, a number of the interviewees formally invited me back to present the 
findings of my research
13
.  This was done on four occasions.  The Financial Services 
Reward Group, an independent self-organised regular meeting of REs across financial 
services, a number of whose members I had interviewed, invited me to speak at their 
meeting in April 2010 when the data collection was nearly complete.  Twenty-two 
financial services firms were represented at this session which comprised of a 20-minute 
presentation of the main model and typology developed and 25 minutes of their input 
and comment.  In addition, I presented to the Executive Committee of one firm (for 45 
minutes, to ten individuals including CEO, Finance Director, HR Director and other 
operational directors of the firm) to elicit their thoughts.   Further I presented my 
findings to the entire reward team of a major banking conglomerate (2 hours of 
presentation and discussion with 10 individuals), and to the global head and UK head of 
reward from a major insurance group (90 minutes discussion)   These sessions were 
helpful in obtaining immediate feedback on the theory that had emerged and also 
focused my thinking on potential practical implications of the research findings.   
Presentations were also made to staff from two of the consultancy firms who had 
provided interviewees for the RC study.  Again, this provided discussion and feedback 
particularly on the practical implications of the findings for the financial services reward 
sector. 
                                                          
13
 During the research I sent regular updates on my progress and findings to the REs who I had 




All of these presentations and meetings allowed „member checking‟ (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  The robustness of the work was tested in particular to ensure that the 
abstract second order concepts derived from the first order lay concepts retained a close 
connection, ensuring that interviewees were able to recognise the accounts (Glasser and 
Strauss, 1967). 
3.5 Validity, reliability, generalisability 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) identify that the issue of research validity, reliability and 
generalisability depends on the philosophical perspective of the research.  As this 
research adopts a constructionist perspective, they suggest that three tests have to be 
applied. On validity they ask whether “the study clearly gain(s) access(es) to the 
experiences of those in the research setting?” (2008: 109).  Regarding reliability, the 
question is whether there is “transparency about how sense was made from the data?”  
(2008: 109) and finally generalisability is about whether the “concepts and constructs 
derived from this study have any relevance to other settings?” (2008: 109). 
Validity was sought through careful method design and thorough use of exploratory and 
pilot testing of the method and specific interview techniques to establish, as much as 
was possible, that the meaning placed on the phenomena by the interviewee was 
discovered.  Thirty-five interviews were carried out before the main study which 
allowed the area of phenomenon and the techniques used to investigate it to be 
extensively reviewed.   Bryman notes that triangulation can be carried out through the 
use of “multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data and methodologies” 
(1989: 379).  In this research multiple sources of data are used (RCs and REs), not to 
formally triangulate the findings but rather as part of the analysis as to whether they 
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make sense.  The use of RCs was felt to be particularly helpful in this respect and the 
findings from these interviews are presented separately to allow the reader to see the 
specific insights gained from this part of the research.  In addition, I used the sense-
making sessions with trade bodies, the financial services reward group and the 
executive and reward teams that I presented to, to assist in testing and challenging my 
conclusions.  
Reliability was sought through the rigour of the interview capture (i.e. verbatim 
recording and transcription) and robust data reduction and analysis techniques.  These 
methods are transparently recorded in this chapter to allow others to see the techniques 
employed in forming the overall theory.  Clearly the research process is a series of 
interpretations.  Views and thoughts may change over time.  However, it is felt that the 
process was robust enough to provide a reliable abduction of the interviewees‟ thoughts 
and the meaning they put on RMD. 
Finally, no claim is made to wider generalisability.  However, the theory generated has 
been presented at a range of academic and practitioner conferences and discussed in the 
sense-making sessions discussed in section 3.4.5.  However, theoretical generalisation is 
possible because what is significant for this is not the statistical robustness of the 
number of people involved in the research but rather the variation in cases sought to 
help achieve maximal variation.   
3.6 Conclusion to chapter three 
This chapter presented the philosophical stance of the research and from this laid out the 
research design intended, consistent with that philosophical approach, to answer the 
research question set.  A transparent approach to how the data were collected and 
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analysed was provided, alongside an outline of how the approach taken was assessed for 
validity, reliability and generalisability.  The next section begins the presentation of the 
research findings through outlining the findings of the interviews with the RCs. 
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4 Chapter four: Reward mix determination:  Reward 
consultants’ perspectives 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the next two chapters is to report the data collected to address the 
research question.  This chapter gives the results from ten interviews with reward 
consultants (RCs)
14
.  In chapter three I described how interviews with these key 
participants in reward strategy determination would be used to review the conceptual 
framework developed from the literature review and build an initial descriptive model 
of RMD.  The interviews were intended to provide a distinct but complementary 
perspective on the research question to that provided by the REs that followed.  The 
data are, therefore, presented separately so that the perspectives provided can be 
assessed alongside, rather than integrated within, those of the RE interviews. 
In section 4.2 the RCs‟ perspectives on how reward mix is conceptualised in practice 
are presented, followed by, in section 4.3, presentation of the factors raised as 
influencing reward mix decisions.  In section 4.4 I briefly draw conclusions from the 
interviews including presenting a generic descriptive model of RMD which is then built 
on and refined, in the context of the financial services sector, through the interviews 
with REs presented in chapters five.  
Significant use is made throughout the findings of direct quotations so that the 
interviewees can be heard through the text.  The quotations are provided directly so that 
as much as possible, the reader is able to get a feel for the interviews and the interests, 
pressures and resource dependencies they discuss.  Each quotation is attributed to the 
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 Elements of this chapter have been published in Chapman and Kelliher 2011. 
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RC who made the comment by reference to a number relating to the order in which they 
were interviewed i.e. RC1, RC2 etc. 
Those interviewed had longstanding consulting backgrounds accompanied by further 
experience in other areas such a strategy consulting, actuarial science, research, graphic 
design, as well as senior level experience in reward management in industry.  Given this 
they appeared well qualified to discuss RMD.   
4.2 Reward mix conceptualised 
Two definitions of reward mix were raised in the interviews.  The first was based on 
monetary value.  In this definition the mix was made up of two factors – fixed reward, 
i.e. as one consultant put it, that which “you can expect to get year by year by year”, and 
variable reward with the amount payable varying either in relation to overall 
organisational performance, or more specifically in relation to individual performance.  
Views varied as to the extent to which employee benefits were considered as part of the 
fixed element of the mix or whether they were worthy of separate consideration.  One 
interviewee felt that given pension, generally the largest component of benefits, is 
largely dependent on base salary then it is effectively an extension of base salary.  
Others felt that given the significance of benefit costs as a proportion of the overall 
reward mix, and that it has a different purpose from base salary, it should be considered 
separately.  However, what did emerge was the dominance of base salary, not just with 
respect to overall cost where it is generally the dominant element of the overall 
monetary reward mix
15
, but also psychologically with the focus of REs and employees 
                                                          
15




being on this element of reward in strategy decisions (from the organisation‟s 
perspective) and job offer and retention (from the employee‟s perspective). 
The monetary value definition was summarised by one interviewee: 
What you are typically looking at is how are we segmenting the total spend that 
we are investing in an individual….the total defined contribution. (RC1) 
Significantly, this view focuses on organisational cost, as opposed to measures of value 
to the employee which may be more commonly considered when looking at wider 
definitions of reward mix.  All interviewees noted that there was a wider definition of 
reward mix which could be applied which, in addition to the monetary elements, 
included more relational elements such as career and learning opportunities, and work 
environment.   
It can be having the right kit, good equipment to work with.  It can be having 
good colleagues, a sort of high quality of work.   It can be location.  Very 
importantly it can be learning and development opportunities and career 
progression opportunities. (RC3) 
It was felt that wider definitions were generally used by organisations, at least in 
rhetoric if not in practice, to better align the overall organisational offering to a package 
that better meets a wide definition of preferences of employees, “so that you have 
reward mix that has some chance of being motivational” RC6.  Whilst all noting the 
existence of such an approach, a number questioned how widely it was adopted by 
organisations in their decisions on reward strategy and reward mix within it.  Four of 
the RCs reflected that this approach was often more consistent with the models pushed 
by the consultancy firms than the reality of how the concept is used within firms where 
monetary definitions dominate. 
154 
 
I think there is a distinction between what they say they are doing and what they 
are actually doing and I think that in reality firms don’t adopt a total reward 
mindset when looking at reward. (RC5) 
4.3 Drivers of reward mix 
Interviewees discussed a range of ways in which both external and internal factors 
influence reward mix.  External elements raised were market benchmarks, legal, 
regulatory and taxation requirements, political and societal pressures and the state of the 
economic cycle.  Internal factors discussed were business strategy and risk appetite, 
talent needs and employee preferences.  Each of these is assessed in turn. 
4.3.1 Institutional pressures 
The interviewees identified mimetic and coercive pressures as dominant in RMD.  
Normative pressures were not raised. 
4.3.1.1 Mimetic pressure - The market 
The primacy of „the market‟, through the examination and mimicking of the reward mix 
of other organisations, was uniformly identified as the main external influence on the 
reward mix decision.  Informants generally referred to the market in the context of 
labour market pressures and the extent to which labour was seen to be scarce, as 
opposed to the overall competitiveness of the product market within which 
organisations were operating.  No explicit discussion occurred regarding the influence 
product markets may have on reward mix, although one consultant did note that 
different sectors had differing mixes due to historically developed employee 
preferences, which were a legacy of the influence the sectors‟ capital structure had on 
reward structures at the time they were established. 
155 
 
There was seen to be relative safety in pursuing policies that were widely adopted by 
other organisations.  This was explained by one informant: 
There are organisations that actually say ‘I am not taking chances, and I am 
going do whatever the market does’ and therefore they are prisoners of data in a 
way – and they can never have enough data.  (RC1) 
Consequently, the market was seen as promoting reward mix inertia with the following 
comment being typical: 
.....everybody is waiting for each other, the market is telling them nothing and it 
requires balls to go out and do something different.   (RC5) 
Alongside the role of market data in managing organisational risk, it was also used by 
some more sophisticated organisations to identify competitor reward mixes with a view 
to understanding differences and ensuring that these differences were offering an 
advantage. 
More sophisticated organisations now are looking at every detail of the reward 
mix and they are certainly basing that on market benchmarking ……. they will 
be looking at norm data with other employers to see whether they are different 
and why.  (RC3) 
A number of examples were provided of organisations adopting this more 
„sophisticated‟ approach and gaining, albeit potentially temporary, advantage.  
Nevertheless, these examples were the exception to wider practice, where ultimately 
mimetic pressures were felt to dominate at the expense of what the consultants 
considered to be more strategic thinking and reward mixes better aligned to the unique 
context of the organisation.  The following comment aptly portrays this view. 
We look for sameness, which we just wouldn’t do with anything else that was 
either that costly or that strategically important to us.  (RC5) 
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Where new innovative mixes were introduced, the speed at which the new practice was 
adopted more widely meant that enhancements to the mix were seen to deliver only 
temporary advantage.  One consultant said: 
I don’t think companies realise what they entering into at a cost is yet another 
zero sum game where you will find no competitive advantage because everybody 
will be doing it.  (RC5) 
Confusion in what „the market‟ actually meant and how it is seen in benchmark data 
was also considered.  Interviewees identified that the common claim to be targeting 
market median was, by definition, almost impossible for everyone to achieve.  This 
problem of data interpretation was also evident in how some organisations targeted 
competitive positions in each element of the mix and as a result may be „overpaying‟.   
Most organisations look at – well they say they look at – total remuneration.  In 
fact they don’t, they look at element by element.   What are our salaries like? 
What is our bonus like? What is our pension like? What are our cars like? (RC6) 
Sectoral mimetic pressures were identified as strong, with a range of examples given of 
different mixes linked to particular sectors.  For example, manufacturing with its ability 
to measure employee output, contrasted with the public sector where measurement was 
more problematic and expectations with regard to benefit provision more entrenched.  
In addition, reward mix norms have been formed in certain sectors that, as a result, have 
become firmly established in employee expectations.  Examples given included the 
generous benefit component in the public sector and the high levels of variable pay in 
investment banking.  One interviewee identified the level of capital required to operate 
in the sector as an important consideration in these mix decisions.  Industries with high 
capital needs were identified as typically having higher proportions of defined benefits 
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as fluctuations in the cost of these, relative to the overall capital costs, were small and 
therefore had a much lower effect on the overall profitability of the business.  This was 
in contrast to sectors where people costs were a higher percentage of overall cost, such 
as professional services, and thus the sensitivity to changes in these costs was much 
higher. 
If you are running, say a shipping company, you won’t care about a swing in the 
pension scheme funding because compared to the cost of owning all those ships 
and fuelling them and so on it’s neither here nor there.  (RC6) 
4.3.1.2 Coercive influences 
In addition to the mimetic pressures discussed above, a number of coercive influences 
on mix were identified, namely legal, regulatory, societal and taxation. 
The significance of legal and regulatory frameworks in different countries was 
identified by five of the consultants, with the need for mandatory pension and 
sometimes wider benefits being the main target. 
It’s all a bit influenced by things like the social security systems and what does 
the State think that the State has to provide….[which] tends to influence what 
the private sector has to pick up…., which is why we get different benefit 
practices in different countries.  (RC2) 
The need for improved employee long-term saving, as well as wider understanding and 
responsibility for personal financial management, were identified as having some, albeit 
not large, influence on reward mix policies, particularly in relation to benefits and 
pensions provision.  This partly reflects the government‟s desire for better citizen 
wealth management.  
It’s about encouraging employees to take more ownership of their financial 
future.   So an employer is helping to mitigate the risk of lower potential 
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guaranteed retirement benefits by making sure that people take more personal 
active interest.  (RC9) 
These wider societal and political pressures were consistent with the predictions of 
institutional theory.   
Whilst taxation was raised by six of the interviewees, its influence was considered to be 
more historical.  Despite the fact that a large number of tax advantages were no longer 
available, they still exerted a significant influence on reward mix policies today.  
Company cars, which are still part of the reward mix for a number of professional roles, 
were repeatedly cited to illustrate this point. 
At the time it seemed very tax efficient to provide a car benefit, so all of a 
sudden car benefits become prevalent and then if you are going to compete in 
the marketplace you have to have a car benefit – at the time its tax advantageous 
to do it and here we still are trying to get ourselves out of tax driven benefits.  
(RC2) 
Defunct historical tax breaks were not limited to influencing benefits.  Historically share 
options, a component of variable reward, that had been a tax-efficient means of 
delivering reward were still used.   
So a lot of organisations have their share plans go quite a long way down the 
organisation and the reason for this is historically share options were tax 
favoured.  (RC6) 
The one area where the consultants felt tax regimes were still significant, with respect to 
real savings for both the employer and employee, was pensions.  This, alongside 
political pressure, meant that they were still an important component of the reward mix 
for many companies. 
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4.3.1.3 Agency interests - Business strategy 
Whilst acknowledging that in order to be successful reward mix should align the 
interests and efforts of employees with those required by the organisation in line with 
agency theory, the ability of organisations to do this was questioned.  The difficulties 
associated with performance management and setting outcome driven targets that are 
genuinely within the control of the employee were raised.  Exceptions to this, such as 
sales forces and manufacturing pieceworkers, were identified as groups where a clearer 
line of sight could be established between the daily work of employees and overall 
company performance.  In this context they noted that variable reward schemes have 
typically been more akin to profit sharing, than genuinely performance-related pay and 
therefore not necessarily designed to motivate day-to-day behaviour, but rather share 
some of the organisation‟s success with employees who, however opaquely, may have 
contributed to it.  This was summarised by one consultant as 
....getting people to understand what ownership represents.  (RC7) 
The degree to which such variable reward schemes make up part of the overall reward 
mix was felt to be influenced by norms established in the particular sector, which in turn 
were often driven by the perceived scarcity of key talent and the preferences of that key 
talent for fixed or variable reward.  It was suggested that motivation of employees 
comes not from organisational level policy decisions on mix, and specifically the 
amount of pay which varies with some performance-related variable, but rather local 
understanding of the individual.  This was cogently explained by one consultant. 
You need to understand what it is that motivates individual people and makes 




4.3.1.4 Agency interests - Cost management 
The significance of the effective management of reward mix for cost management 
purposes was raised by all interviewees.  Whilst not an agency theory explanation of 
mix, it was presented as a means by which both the principal‟s need for cost control and 
the agent‟s need for an attractive employment package could be better met.  In this 
context the interviewees identified that a number of organisations used „imaginative‟ 
reward mixes to keep costs down, whilst still maintaining an attractive overall package 
from the employee‟s perspective.  This was typically done by introducing relatively low 
cost elements to the mix, such as career development and changes to the overall 
working environment, and then effectively communicating these items to segmented 
groups of employees.   This was illustrated with respect to one client‟s overall reward 
mix. 
....by appearing to create a positive image or working environment, then they 
can afford not to have to pay top dollar.  (RC2) 
This holistic approach was not commonplace, with cost management of the overall 
reward mix typically managed in a much more disjointed and market-led manner.  The 
focus was on cost minimisation of each mix component.  Three informants felt 
particularly strongly about what they saw as an accounting treatment of people and their 
overall reward packages with the following quote typical.  
Firms see employees as a liability to be managed and the costs kept down….. 
[treating] them as a transactional commodity, [rather than] as a business 
partner, or even customer, where you are going to be much more sensitive about 
your mix.  (RC3) 
This approach has led to organisations focusing on base pay given, in one consultant‟s 
words, “the multiplier effect it has on some of the other elements of mix” which are 
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linked to this number (e.g. pension contribution, bonus, car allowance).  This focus, 
however, may have been at the expense of attention to other areas of significant cost, 
particularly around benefits.  
It can be really quite a drag on employment cost if you have a particularly 
generous benefit package.   It might be much more generous than you need to 
give.  (RC4) 
Historically, prosperous times for organisations meant that cost control decisions and, in 
particular, the control of the benefit component of the mix, had not been the focus of 
reward activity. 
The reward mix is taken for read and because we have had such good times the 
real decisions about what we should pay for and what the mix should be haven’t 
had to be taken.   (RC5) 
However, a number of the RCs noted a shift to wider reward mix management, due to 
the large rises in medical and pension costs for defined benefit pension schemes.  
Critical attention on pensions from outside of the HR function was also on the increase.  
Finance departments were increasingly seen to be driving changes in the mix to reduce 
cost volatility with changes to accounting practices.  Accounting changes had also 
focused the attention of institutional investors.  They were now reported to be openly 
questioning the viability of defined benefit schemes.  This had the effect of 
concentrating attention on the control of benefits and whether employers were 
generating real value for the investment from this element of the mix.   
4.3.2 Resource perspective 
4.3.2.1 Talent and employee preferences 
The relationship between the scarcity of key talent and the influence that gives to those 
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staff to determine their own reward mix was raised by eight of the ten consultants and 
aptly put by one consultant: 
The scarcer they [employees] are the more employee expectations weigh in. 
(RC1) 
Nevertheless, sophisticated organisations assess all employee preferences in 
determining the right mix.  This was illustrated by a number of consultants with 
examples from various sectors, the following quote being representative. 
If you talk about a research scientist then the opportunities to publish, the 
opportunities for professional recognition, the opportunities for learning and 
development and having a really state-of-the-art lab are going to matter a lot to 
them ...but if you thought about a call centre employee who was a student and 
who was doing this to keep the loan to a reasonable level, the drivers for them 
....might be having good kit, having a supervisor who didn’t breathe down their 
neck and treated like a grown up.   (RC3) 
Employees‟ awareness of the typical mix for roles was also reported to have been 
accelerated by the availability of relevant data on the internet.  This was seen to be 
exhibiting a moderating pressure on innovation within the mix.  This led one consultant 
to suggest that, as a result of this uniformity, employee expectations have been 
institutionalised by sector or profession, rather than being based on the real underlying 
preferences of employees. 
That [industry practice] has conditioned your expectations as you have grown 
up through your career, your expectation is market practice and your 
expectation becomes your preference...It’s a conditioned response.  (RC3) 
4.3.3 Explanations for inertia 
Alongside these drivers of reward mix decisions, significant comment (all raised the 
issue) was made on the reasons for the dominance of institutional pressures or, as 
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termed by the consultants, inertia in reward mix.  Two recurring reasons were given for 
this inertia – the quality of HR and the effect of organisational history and legacy 
arrangements.  These two areas will be considered in turn. 
4.3.3.1 Quality of HR 
All of the consultants raised the issue of HR quality as a key moderating variable on the 
extent to which reward mix was influenced by industry norms rather than the specific 
strategic intent of the organisation.  The overall impression of the quality of HR and its 
leadership was generally low.  The importance of aligning reward mix to business 
strategy was raised on a number of occasions.  However, the occurrence of HR 
executives consciously doing this was disputed as the following quote illustrates. 
A lot of reward decision makers nod to strategy, but don’t actually understand 
what it means and therefore what it means for reward.  (RC5) 
Further, a split between the reward function and other elements of human resource 
management was identified which was felt to have particularly significant consequences 
for ensuring reward mix was aligned with recruitment and talent management 
programmes.   
All of that spreadsheet-based reward that we can look at is viewed as a different 
entity to the stuff about leadership and progression and the stuff about the kind 
of environment we work in.... it requires quite a broad thinking HR director to 
weave those two things together.  (RC5) 
A number of the consultants noted that the low quality of thinking meant there was a 
lack of understanding with regard to what reward mix was trying to achieve, with the 
default position again being what the market does and what has been done in the past.  
This is illustrated below with reference to benefits. 
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Do you know, I don’t actually think a lot of people know why they offer benefits 
to be fair – you just do.    (RC2) 
Research into the drivers of benefit provision has been limited too.  Various studies 
have provided a range of sometimes contradictory drivers (Hume, 1995; Wright, 2004; 
Taylor and Earnshaw, 1995; Terry and White, 1997) resulting in no dominant 
theoretical approach emerging in this area of reward management (Perkins and White, 
2008). 
The problems arising from lack of leadership from the reward community was 
representatively summarised by one consultant. 
It is a failure on the part of the HR community, the reward community and the 
consulting community to convince real decision makers that people are 
important and that the reward levels and mix can genuinely have an effect that 
is causing this.  (RC5) 
4.3.3.2 Organisational history 
Alongside the perceived low quality of HR, organisational history was identified as 
influencing reward mix inertia (raised by seven consultants).   
Organisations are always to some degree hostages of their history and you do 
find organisations where there are taboo words and taboo practices.   (RC3) 
The influence of history was felt to be particularly significant for the general employee 
population when compared to executive reward mix.  This was attributed to the relative 
ease by which Executives‟ reward packages could be changed, given the negotiation 
was with a relatively small number of individuals as opposed to wider organisational 
reward change affecting much greater numbers. 
In truth at executive level making changes... is reasonably easy to do because 
you have got a small population of people who are not going to rock the boat in 
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a dysfunctional way.   They may kick their toys out of the pram, but they are not 
going to go on strike........Taking stuff further down into organisations is much 
harder to do because you can have serious industrial relations problems if what 
you are doing is, or is perceived to be, a worse deal.     (RC6) 
Where little organisational history was present, such as was the case for newly formed 
organisations, conscious and economically driven choice of reward mix was seen to be 
exercised.  However, as an organisation matures in the words of one consultant “they 
start professionalising”, leading to shifts in reward mix and the development of accepted 
practice.  This is congruent with a path-dependent perspective that change is difficult 
even when rationally, and in line with contingency theory, other choices would produce 
a more optimal position (Scott, 2008).   
4.3.3.3 Breaking down the inertia – The role of events 
One finding of the research was that although inertia was strong, crisis events could 
break it down (raised by six of the ten interviewees).  A number of examples were 
quoted of clients that were reviewing their reward mix to manage costs down in the 
economic conditions present at the time of the interviews.  This was largely viewed as 
an opportunity to make the reward mix more effective, through differentiating the 
offering from competitors and breaking free of the isomorphic pressures that were 
perceived to exist. 
You have to follow the crowd when everything is going fine.   When things are a 
little different that is when you can be more different from other organisations.  
(RC4) 
Alongside the economic downturn, mergers were also suggested as potential catalysts 
which could instigate a more effective use of reward mix in organisational strategy. 
If you are in crisis, if you have been taken over, if you are merging, you have 
166 
 
cover to tackle those things.   (RC6) 
From these examples it can be seen that, although pressures to maintain the status quo 
are strong, organisations have used events to catalyse change.  However these were seen 
as the exceptions to the wider practice of conforming to industry norms that have 
developed in line with perceived labour market patterns in the sector. 
4.4 Implications for main study 
This chapter has examined the RCs‟ perspectives on RMD.  The interviews have 
provided an alternative insight into practice through the perspective of a participant 
observer rather than an assessment based solely on the views of those directly involved. 
The interviewees did not, on the whole, give accounts in line with agency theory.  
Mimetic and coercive institutional pressures were found to be significantly more 
influential through market benchmarking and the development of industry norms.  
Normative isomorphism was not found. 
Figure 4-1 shows a descriptive model of RMD developed from the findings (using the 
methodology proposed by Whetten (2002))
16
.  The main constructs in the model are 
market forces and reward mix, mediated by industry norms.  Note the relationships 
between these constructs are not seen as causal.  However the arrows are intended to 
indicate my interpretation of the relationship that the RCs identified existed between the 
elements discussed.  The industry norms were seen to emerge from the specific market 
forces organisations face.   
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Figure 4-1 – Reward consultants’ model of reward mix determination
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The constructs shown above and below the main sequential association are considered 
moderators in the relationships shown, i.e. the presence of these factors may change the 
main relationship when present.  The influence market forces may have on industry 
norms is moderated by legal factors, such as minimum wage legislation, tax changes 
such as changes to pension legislation, or regulatory changes.  The transmission of the 
industry norms to organisational reward mix policy is also seen to be influenced by a 
number of variables.  First, leadership beliefs and how they influence employee 
behaviour.  Second, the organisational strategy and how its execution is affected by 
specific talent needs and cost pressures.  Finally, the extent to which change inertia 
exists.  This inertia is found to depend on the capability of the HR function in managing 
reward mix reform.  Company history and legacy arrangements were also found to 
further restrict change.  However the occurrence of events such as recession or mergers 
can act as a catalyst, breaking down established norms and practices. 
The descriptive model developed challenges agency theory as an explanation of RMD.  
Institutional factors seem to be endemic in the decision making process.  The significant 
role of the labour market highlighted in the interviews and the relationship between 
market pressures and talent shortages are consistent with the main premise of resource 
dependency.  Employee power was seen to be influencing the reward mix given to these 
individuals based on their own, rather than the organisations‟ preferences, which then 
may become established as industry norms (Tremblay et al., 2003; Balkin and 
Bannister, 1993).   
The findings presented a number of implications that were considered further in the 
interviews with the REs.  Doubts were expressed by the RCs as to the breadth of reward 
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conceptualisation that applies in reality with a wide definition including benefits and 
relational returns being raised but scepticism as to whether in reality reward 
management was considered as holistically as this conceptualisation implies.  In 
addition, further exploration is required of what defines the market and how product and 
labour markets may have similar or different influences on RMD. 
In addition, a number of factors raised in the RMD literature were not raised by RCs.  
Concluding that they are not factors in RMD would be premature, especially given the 
number of interviews involved.    These „missing‟ factors are further explored in the RE 
findings presented in the next chapter.   
4.5 Conclusion to chapter four 
This section reports the findings of interviews with acknowledged reward experts and 
participant observers in RMD.  The interviews established that the conceptual 
framework was a suitable approach to coding the data albeit with one element – 
institutional theory – dominating the decisions taken.  Further, the framework was 
developed into a descriptive model of the determination process which will be 
developed through analysis of the findings from the interviews with REs and discussed 
in chapter six.  The results also aided in developing my understanding of the concepts 
involved (particularly reward mix) and the field to be studied ahead of the RE 
interviews.  Additionally, a more refined set of codes for these interviews was formed 
for the next stage of interviews from the development of the initial descriptive model of 
RMD.  The next chapter report the findings of these interviews. 
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5 Chapter five:  Reward mix determination:  
Financial services reward executives’ perspectives 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I set out the findings from the interviews conducted with 30 reward 
executives (REs) from the financial services sector.  As discussed previously REs were 
chosen as informants, given the close involvement they have with RMD in firms.  As 
argued in chapter three, potential bias in their accounts was reduced through personal 
not organisational recruitment, allowing them to speak of their organisation rather than 
organisational recruitment whereby informants speak for their organisation.  The REs 
provided data both on how they saw the overall reward mix practice across the sector, in 
particular the strength of the industry norm and the factors that have led to the 
development of such a strong norm position, alongside their assessment of their own 
firms‟ practices in this area. 
The findings of the RCs‟ interviews, outlined in chapter four, showed that analysis built 
on the three main dimensions of the conceptual model developed from the literature was 
a suitable means to analyse the discussions on RMD.  This conceptual model was built 
upon three dominant theories provided by the literature on RMD – agency, institutional 
and resource dependency.  As presented in chapter three, these three perspectives are 
central to the analysis and interpretation of the extensive interview data, although the 
findings are presented with regard to staying true to the accounts provided by the REs, 
rather than some externally imposed conceptual structure.  The findings explore the 
pressures that REs believe are an influence on RMD across the financial services sector 
and specifically their own firm‟s RMD.    Are certain influences dominant over others?  
Do firms respond differently to the pressures and if so how does this influence their 
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final reward mix decisions?   
Figure 5-1 presents the flow of the chapter.  The figure presents, for each section in 
chapter five, the question the section examines, the areas raised as being important in 
addressing this question and finally the section of the interview protocol (provided in 
Appendix 7) from which the data were gathered.   Figure 5-1 shows how the chapter 
first examines, in section 5.2, how reward mix is conceptualised by the interviewees and 
the factors that are found to influence this conceptualisation.  Three conceptualisations 
are presented and the implications of each of these discussed.  Section 5.3 examines the 
determination process with respect to the hierarchical nature and (in)formality of the 
reward mix decision and the extent to which the process is a coherent one.   In sections 
5.4 and 5.5 I then examine the central concept emerging from the RC interviews 
reviewed in chapter four – industry norm – and how that is viewed by REs.  This 
section explores the significance of this concept on RMD in the financial services 
sector.  In addition, it also examines the REs‟ perspective on why an industry norm 
position has emerged, through examination of the main determinants of the norm, but 
also the moderating influences on the relationship between these determinants and the 
industry norm benchmark.  Section 5.6 examines the relationship between the industry 
norm position and individual firm reward mix, through examination of the dimensions 
which are seen to influence individual firms‟ propensity to follow the industry norm 
position.  Finally section 5.7 goes on to explore the extent to which the dimensions 
identified by REs and RCs as catalysts for firms to adopt a non industry standard reward 
mix were seen to be present in each of the interviews conducted and, from this, 
develops a typology of firms based on the extent to which they were inclined to follow 
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Significant use is again made throughout the findings of direct quotations so that the 
interviewees can be heard as much as possible through the text.  The quotations are 
identified by RE as outlined in Appendix 6 with, for example, RE1 referring to the RE 
speaking of firm one and so on.  In addition, to aid transparency, the number of REs 
offering a particular perspective is noted through the findings, in line with the 
recommendation of Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) that providing more precise figures can 
further substantiate the weight put on the evidence and, in addition, make clear when 
voices are dissenting to a wider, more general point being made.   
5.2 Reward mix conceptualisation 
This section examines how reward mix is conceptualised by the REs interviewed.  
Before examining the influences that the REs perceive are operating on RMD we need 
to establish what they understand by the term, what commonality or differences of 
understanding exist and from this how any differences might influence their perceptions 
of the influences on RMD. 
Three broad definitions of reward mix were raised.   
 Fixed/variable – The balance between the fixed components of reward, in 
particular base pay, and the variable components of bonus or incentives both long- 
and short-term.  No consideration of benefits or relational returns. 
 Total compensation – The proportion of each element making up total 
compensation, namely base pay, short- and long-term incentives or bonuses and 
benefits which have a financial value.  No reference to relational returns. 
 Total reward – Holistic consideration of all elements making up total compensation 




The first two definitions were based on monetary value, but varied in the specific 
elements which were included.  In the first definition, the mix was made up of two 
factors – fixed reward and variable reward, with the amount payable varying in relation 
to some overall measure of organisational or individual performance.   
There’s very much a focus on pay mix at base and bonus level, and the split 
between the two.  (RE15) 
This definition was particularly prevalent among the REs from the four investment 
banks, with variable pay dominating all the other elements of the mix as illustrated by 
the following comments: 
It is about cash compensation. We’re not very holistic in the way that we think 
about reward.  (RE16) 
This was attributed to the large proportion of the overall reward mix that could be made 
up of bonus, even for support staff, which meant consideration of benefits and relational 
elements of mix were immaterial. 
It’s not benefits as they just aren’t significant enough. (RE20) 
As well as the four REs from the investment banks, three other REs detailed how their 
firms took this narrow conceptualisation of reward mix management.  
Beyond this narrow approach, a second definition was provided which included tangible 
employee benefits (i.e. benefits with a monetary value) in the reward mix definition.   
What you are typically looking at is how are we segmenting the total spend that 
we are investing in an individual….the total defined contribution.  (RE29)  
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Significantly, this view focuses on organisational cost, as opposed to measures of value 
to the employee, which may be more commonly considered when looking at wider 
definitions of reward mix.  REs from 20 firms spoke of their firms taking this total 
compensation approach. 
The third conceptualisation offered was a more holistic approach encompassing not just 
the monetary factors but wider non financial rewards that accrue to an employee 
through their work.  Three interviewees spoke of this wider approach being adopted by 
their organisation. 
So it is about pay, it is about benefits, it’s about well-being, it’s about the 
working environment, it’s about the health and safety infrastructure we have 
around them, it’s about having subsidised Costa on the site, it’s about free 
parking.  It really is about working … it even includes, when we talk about the 
[firm name] offer to individuals learning and development.   (RE19) 
The REs explained that this wider approach was felt to align the overall organisational 
offering to a package that more appropriately meets a wide definition of preferences of 
employees.  The perspective of reward mix was taken through the lens of the employee 
and the value they place on reward as opposed to the monetary-based definition which 
was generally taken from an employer-cost perspective. 
It means a whole variety of things.  But it means compensation, and it means 
benefits, and it means short-term, and it means long-term.  It means other things 
as well, if you want to look at other things that employees value like learning 
opportunities and career development and so on.  (RE24) 
The extent to which this wider approach to reward mix was taken may be related to the 
background of the individual RE.  Of the three firms that the REs reported were taking a 
total reward approach to reward management, two (one HR Director and one Head of 
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Reward) of the REs came relatively recently (within the last five years) from non 
reward backgrounds, namely development and recruitment.   Both of these individuals 
noted their wider perspective was an influence on how they approached reward 
management and the interactions they had with colleagues within their firms. 
Whilst not reported as being adopted within their firms, the holistic approach to reward 
mix management was raised by ten interviewees who spoke of their aspirations to move 
their firms towards this approach.  Despite the desire to manage reward in this manner it 
was generally seen as problematic due to the difficulty of pulling together such a variety 
of rewards not managed by one part of the HR function.  
So [Firm name] has a lot of schemes and initiatives across the HR piece rather 
than just reward and performance management.   So it’s integrating those, and I 
think that is the biggest challenge, particularly from my experience of [Firm 
name] because we are not together as one HR.  (RE27) 
Despite being considered by the REs and others within their firms as a compelling 
approach it was just seen as being too difficult to implement.  
Largely because in this business we don’t have the level of sophistication to 
actually be able to incorporate it.  (RE3) 
However, total compensation accountability, which was the responsibility of 29 of the 
REs interviewed (the other interviewee did not have formal responsibility for the firm‟s 
benefit offering which was the responsibility of the employee relations team), was much 
clearer and could be managed more as an integrated whole. 
It’s difficult to get people to cotton on when they operate outside your direct 
control, because people really think in silos still, even within HR.   The bigger 
the organisation, the worse that is actually. (RE5) 
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In addition, four of the REs noted that their firm‟s line management was typically 
focused on a very narrow fixed/variable definition, given the role they played in 
decisions of base pay and bonus, compared to the generally corporate decision on 
benefits. 
If you're going to talk to people in business, to people on business lines, they will 
talk about fixed and variable split.  So in terms of the business, if we want as 
reward practitioners to start talking to them about the whole sphere of reward 
then the re-education feature needs to be there. (RE28) 
5.2.1 Summary 
In summary, the research found three definitions of reward mix adopted by the REs.  
The dominant approach was a total compensation definition although both narrower 
(fixed to variable) and broader (total reward) conceptualisations were also presented.  
Next, the findings on the process by which reward mix is determined are examined. 
5.3 Determination process 
Ahead of examining the findings on the influences on RMD, this section examines the 
RMD process and whether it may have a role in influencing how we view the 
determinants of reward mix.  The interviews identified that RMD was not a decision 
that was seen to be typically taken in an established formal process.   
There isn’t a – there have never been thinking or statements that say well we 
think the reinsurance mix should be this proportion of salary, so on and so forth.   
There has never been that rigour of thinking. (RE1) 
Only on one occasion did an interviewee point to a formal process of RMD in operation 
in their firm, which was in sharp contrast to issues such as overall pay levels in the 
firms and agreement of pay structures (i.e. pay spines, job families or job evaluation 
factors) which were subject to at least annual formal review and sign off by an 
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appropriate committee.   
The group has got a formalised body for reviewing all this sort of stuff, which 
we’ve called PayNet.  It’s a body of people from the central HR functions in pay 
and the business people, and we review periodically issues to do with philosophy 
and mix and so on.  (RE24) 
Much more typical was the following response, 
 But has there ever been a committee decision?  No, it just happens. (RE26) 
The reward mix typically emerged over time through the aggregation of the separate 
decisions underpinning the mix, namely base pay level, bonus level, benefits provided 
and overall non financial returns delivered.  It was not considered to be one thought-
through decision.  Papers were not prepared assessing the firm‟s reward mix position, 
nor meetings held nor minutes taken of the thinking behind the mix and the overall 
reward mix decision.  Discussion of reward mix amongst firm‟s management was not 
seen to occur, as it was believed that management were not generally aware of the 
concept, but rather focused on the separate decisions making up reward mix. 
It’s an unconscious decision.  (RE22) 
In addition, this often meant that these separate decisions were influenced by different 
elements as illustrated by the following interviewee: 
But in terms of thinking about the mix concept, that thinking just won’t exist.   
What will exist will be what I have said, specific decisions around each 
component dependent on the issues most relevant to each one and what is going 
on in the company at the time a change is proposed. (RE1) 
Overall, decisions on reward mix were not viewed as being taken in a holistic manner.  
Base pay decisions were generally seen as being driven by market levels (heavily 
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influenced by formal and often highly analytical benchmarking) and the need to attract 
and retain employees.  Bonus decisions were similarly influenced by market 
benchmarks for total cash (i.e. base pay plus bonus) but were also moderated by the 
firm‟s overall revenue or profit.  The market benchmarks influenced the proportion of 
either revenue or profit to be distributed into a bonus pool.  The market benchmark 
position was a strong influence on the benefits that a firm would offer, but as a separate 
consideration from the cash compensation comparison just discussed.   However, whilst 
the market was important, with very much a view to ensuring that the overall benefits 
package remained competitive relative to other firms, other considerations were 
sometimes also relevant with respect to employee welfare and health, tax efficiency and 
legal compliance.  The extent to which these were important considerations varied 
between firms and is discussed further in section 5.5. 
Further evidence of separate decision making, as opposed to a coherent consideration of 
the whole package, came from the REs speaking of their firms as subsidiaries of larger 
parent groups (10 of the 30 REs interviewed worked for such firms).  These REs, on the 
whole, highlighted how they perceived control was typically exercised from head office 
in two areas:  first, on the operation of bonus schemes, largely due to regulatory interest 
in their home countries as the firm‟s main regulatory contact was typically at group 
level;  second, on share schemes due to the importance of effective investor relationship 
management when determining share based awards.   
Well, Head Office would have pretty much control over the types of plan that we 
offer.   So whereas we have previously offered stock incentives for new joiners, 
that changed this year and we moved towards a more cash-related scheme as 
head office was concerned about investor relations.  (RE7) 
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Much less influence was seen on base pay and benefit offerings, which were largely left 
to local control.   
The philosophy is a minimum standard that it applies on benefits and then 
countries have to work within those guidelines and build a set of competitive and 
fit-for-purpose schemes.   (RE24) 
Within this context there was no evidence from the REs of the subsidiaries adjusting 
base pay, which adhered to local market benchmarks, to take into account the rest of the 
mix that had been imposed on them. 
With respect to these separate decisions, what emerged was the dominance of base 
salary.  This was predominately due to its significance on overall cost, given it was the 
dominant element of the overall monetary reward mix
17
.  However, it was also seen as 
having the largest effect on employee‟s propensity to accept job offers and their 
retention. 
5.3.1 Organisational level and role 
The interviewees identified a relationship between the level (i.e. in the firm‟s hierarchy) 
and role of employees, to the actual mix that was offered.   What emerged was that 
different mix policies were in place for three distinct groups.  First, senior managers – 
defined as those responsible for the strategic direction and accountable for the overall 
performance of the business.  This group had a higher proportion of the mix devoted to 
longer term incentives.  Next, sales staff – those engaged in direct customer contact with 
a view to securing business for the firm.  Their reward mix was one of relatively high 
proportions of the mix in short-term incentive programmes linked to either individual or 
                                                          
17
 Notable exceptions to this were identified by the interviewees around some sales and investment 
banking environments where bonus was the largest element in the reward mix. 
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team-generated revenue.  Finally, general employees – those not in senior management 
or sales roles.   
Sales staff have their own bonus scheme and therefore their mix is different from 
other staff.  For other people outside the sales team the discretionary pool is 
generally dependent on level.  (RE13) 
Typically benefit offerings were considered more „egalitarian‟ with standard packages 
being offered to all employees, although the level of certain benefits may be related to 
salary, e.g. the amount of life assurance, which would typically be a multiple of base 
salary.  However, some benefits were also identified as being linked to an individual‟s 
place in the organisational hierarchy.  Certain benefits were only provided, or provided 
at a higher level, as employees moved up organisational levels. 
Are they hierarchical? There are some-, there are some which are hierarchical. 
Also, perk cars are-, are available only to sort of senior managers. Private 
medical insurance, for the most part is again only available to senior managers. 
The rest of the benefits tend to be sort of like all the same so whether you’re, you 
know, the filing clerk or the CEO the same pension scheme would apply to you.  
(RE25) 
In addition, one RE reported that during the recent economic downturn their firm had 
looked to protect the overall package for more junior employees when cuts were made 
to the provision up the organisational hierarchy.  This was justified on paternalistic 
grounds.  The firm was keen to protect its lower paid workers from the effects of the 
downturn which were seen as having a more significant influence on their lives relative 
to higher paid employees who were seen as being more able to share the firm‟s financial 
difficulties. 
So therefore when times were getting tough this time last year – prices of gas, 
petrol and everything was really going up – so what we decided to do was 
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having put the whole salary review process together and we decided to cut the 
chunk that was £75,000 and above, anybody who got a salary increase on 
£75,000 and above, we took it away and gave it to the bottom of the 
organisation.   (RE2) 
It was apparent that the interviews identified clear differences in the reward mixes for 
these different levels in the organisational hierarchy and for certain role such as sales 
and executives.  However, when questioned about these hierarchical and role-related 
differences in reward mix, what did emerge from the interviewees was that although 
actual reward mix outcomes were different (i.e. different mixes were deployed) the 
determination process was the same.  The following quote illustrates this point: 
We think through the same areas – what the market is doing, what employees 
expect, what the senior team think is the right approach – and then develop the 
right mixes. (RE30) 
The industry norm position for the level and role was the main determining factor.  One 
notable exception to this was the process for firms‟ executive employees (i.e. CEO and 
other executive directors) which was significantly more formal, due to the nature of the 
design and approval process (requiring Board approval through the Remuneration 
Committee) and the transparency of the individual end result, given that the reward mix 
would be published.   
5.3.2 Summary 
In summary, the REs identified that the determination process was a considered but 
informal process developed largely from the aggregation of the decisions made with 
respect to base pay, bonus and benefit provision.  Whilst differences in outcomes did 
vary between organisational hierarchical level and types of role the thought process to 
get to these outcomes was the same.  Benchmarking was central to the determination 
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process and the issue of the industry norm position underpinning these benchmarks will 
now be examined. 
5.4 Industry norm 
Having examined how the REs conceptualised reward mix and their accounts of the 
informality of the determination process, this section now examines the main focus of 
the research question, namely the influences that the REs saw on RMD.  Whilst the 
interviews demonstrated the relevance of the elements in the conceptual framework 
developed from the literature, in line with the RC interviews, they showed a clear 
dominance of the concepts underlying institutional theory.  Discussions were, with two 
notable exceptions detailed later in this chapter, dominated by interviewees outlining 
how the influence of practice in the market shaped the mix their firm offered as 
illustrated by the following typical quote given when a participant was discussing the 
influences of their firm‟s reward mix.  
Market driven.   Because everybody else does, that is the short answer. (RE30) 
The dominance of market practice and the interviewees‟ understanding of the market 
will now be explored. 
5.4.1.1 The role of the market 
The primacy of the market was identified in all the interviews as being a factor which 
required consideration when developing reward mix approaches.  The market was 
defined in two ways.  First, it was defined with reference to the market for labour – seen 
as the skills, knowledge and experience that the firms required in doing their work.  
This was by far the most dominant understanding of the term with the following quote 
being a typical response.   
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It’s all about the skills, knowledge and experience you need to have and keep.  
That’s how we think about our market when benchmarking our package. (RE29) 
Second, a minority of REs(six) also made reference to the product market that their firm 
was operating within and, in particular, the issue of the volatility of revenue which was 
typical in their firm‟s product market. 
The type of business we are in has greater volatility of results and, therefore, a 
bigger element of variable pay is helpful if you’ve got more volatility, because 
you’ve got more flexibility in your costs.  (RE30) 
Given the dominance of the first definition of the market, discussions largely focused on 
the influences on the labour market and how this market was established through formal 
and informal benchmarking activities. The role of benchmarking will now be reviewed. 
5.4.1.2 Benchmarking 
All the REs interviewed explained how their firms carried out some form of 
benchmarking of the reward levels of other „similar‟ firms.  We have already seen how 
decisions on each of the individual components making up the mix (i.e. base pay, 
bonus, benefits) were typically seen as being taken independently.  This was generally 
through the receipt of benchmarking data from the range of reward consultancies 
providing reward benchmarking services.  These benchmarks were largely separate 
datasets for cash compensation (base pay and bonuses) and less frequently a separate 
exercise on benefit packages, given this was seen as more problematic.   
You can benchmark salary, bonus, total cash, even stock to some extent, but 
benefits, even the basis of cost is problematic and then how do you get a true 
comparison of one benefit package against another when some are hierarchical, 
some are flat … it is fiendishly problematic.   So we have never done it. (RE1) 
No RE reported that their firm carried out formal benchmarking of the more relational 
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returns that accrue to employees.  Assessment of other firms‟ positions in this area was 
either not carried out, consistent with the narrower conceptualisation of reward mix 
generally taken, or, where a wider approach was considered, assessment of other firms‟ 
practices was carried out through informal networking.  The difficulty of accurately 
assessing other firms‟ non financial offerings was seen by one interviewee as a positive.  
They identified how this allowed their firm to differentiate in this area as a key retention 
tool, safe in the knowledge that the lack of transparency in the market would mean that 
any innovation would be less likely to be replicated by competitors.   
I think the less tangible elements of reward are where you can really 
differentiate yourself and make a statement about what working at the company 
really means.  It’s difficult to benchmark that or replicate it if it doesn’t fit with 
who you are as a company.  (RE17) 
5.4.1.3 Sources of data 
Given the significance of the labour market in influencing the reward mix outcome it is 
sensible to examine where companies source these data.  The REs outlined how their 
firms used a variety of sources. 
You access the market through different means and therefore it’s a sort of 
external factor which simply shines a light on your position in the market.  
(RE1) 
Four sources of benchmarking data emerged through the interviews.  First, the use of 
formal benchmarking reports provided by RCs with Watson Wyatt, Towers Perrin, 
McLagan, Monks, Mercer and Computer Economics explicitly raised as benchmark 
suppliers.  Second was the use of relationships with recruitment consultants as a means 
of gathering market intelligence, through update bulletins they provided on how they 
see reward in the recruitment market or more informally through discussions.   
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Then you’ve got your agencies that you use that you can call on and just say, 
look, can you give us some ideas on what’s happening out there in the market, 
what companies are planning on doing, and so on.  (RE13) 
Next, REs from eleven firms noted how their firm was a member of a financial services 
reward network group which had been established by a selection of REs.  This group 
met regularly to discuss reward trends and market shifts and share data and intelligence.  
Finally, nine REs cited the route of ongoing informal networking, which they carried 
out amongst their peers in order to gain an impression of the market and the activities of 
other firms.   
As outlined above, formal benchmarking reports were reported as being used 
extensively across the firms interviewed.  Benchmarking was typically carried out 
against other financial services firms in the same geographical region as opposed to 
comparisons with firms from other sectors in other regions, with the exception of the 
large scale retail operators as shown by the following example: 
I think the other thing that you probably need to remember is that we don’t just 
fish in the financial services sector pool for our people to work in a branch. 
(RE4) 
The account of one RE appeared to suggest that their firm was a significant exception to 
the general approach to benchmarking.  The RE discussed how their firm carried out 
only limited benchmarking activity and this was not against other financial services 
firms or roles, but against the legal, accounting and professional services sectors.  This 
was described as being a conscious decision taken in order to differentiate the firm‟s 
mix from other financial services firms and position it relative to these professional 




Because we are different in what we do it [benchmarking] is quite difficult.   
There are no other IFAs that pay their advisers in the way that we do.  We have 
had to create our own benchmark using hybrids from other sectors as we were 
looking for our staff to move from the role of sales to one of professional 
service.  Therefore we looked to these advisory sectors for the benchmarks. 
(RE2) 
Interviewees explained how their firms‟ choice of benchmark data providers was driven 
by both their coverage of financial services, but also their role specialisms (e.g. IT, HR, 
sales, etc), with the REs explaining how they used a mix of providers depending on the 
mix of their workforces relative to the coverage and expertise of the firms.   
Geographical location of the firms interviewed also appeared to have a role to play.  
Nineteen of the REs‟ firms were based in London.  All but one of these firms identified 
formal benchmarking as the primary driver of their reward approach.  However, the REs 
interviewed from the eleven firms based outside London were less inclined to carry out 
formal benchmarking in order to understand what was going in their local geography.  
Typically, they would rely more heavily on data they had collected through their own 
recruitment activities, local recruitment agencies and local networking groups to get a 
feel from the local market. 
Every time we hire somebody we go through a process of understanding the 
benefits of the company that they have left, and we also work with recruitment 
agencies and we get benchmarking from them.   (RE11) 
However, the role of informal networking was not confined to the non London-based 
firms.  Eleven of the REs interviewed referred to the significance of informal 
networking as a key source of data on reward mix trends and emerging patterns 
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considered by their firm.  This was illustrated by one interviewee who, while outlining 
the significance of formal benchmarks on reward determination, sought to add how 
informal networking was also useful. 
We are also involved in the Financial Services Reward Group.  This is really, 
really handy because you just get a kind of holistic view really of what other 
people are facing at the same time.  (RE7) 
The significance of informal approaches to understanding other firms‟ activities was 
raised in the context of looking forward at trends, rather than backwards at history, 
which was identified as one of the main problems with the formal benchmarking data 
that were collected. 
One key issue with that is by the time you get all the surveys, they’re nine 
months out of date already, ..... so it’s very difficult to go out there into the 
market and find out what other companies are doing and that’s where you rely 
on your networks.  (RE13) 
This was seen as particularly problematic at the time of the data collection because of 
the state of flux that REs saw in reward practices, due to the financial crisis and lack of 
certainty that existed over exactly how to implement the regulatory rules that the FSA 
had introduced. 
There is no clarity in the market at the moment. It’s impossible to define. It’s 
very… as last year, what people are doing is very driven by their own facts and 
circumstances, and it means that you can’t just say ‘well, that’s what they’re 
doing so we should do the same thing.’  (RE16) 
5.5 Influences on the industry norm benchmark position  
I have just reviewed the significance of the market benchmark or industry norm on 
RMD.  All firms were seen to monitor the market, albeit through different methods.  In 
this context, this section examines the influences on the industry norm position that was 
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so central to the accounts provided.  Why was the industry norm position as it was?  
What influenced the development of the norm?   
Interviewees offered four explanations for the benchmark position being as it was.  
These four main constructs in the formation of the industry norm – employee 
expectations, union expectations, employee control and organisational paternalism –  
will now be discussed, followed by a review of the items which were seen to moderate 
the effect of these constructs on the market benchmark when they were present – 
regulation, legal requirements and taxation. 
5.5.1 Employee expectations 
The importance of employee expectations on forming the industry benchmark position, 
and therefore what should be offered by the firm, was highlighted by all of the REs 
interviewed.  Concern was repeatedly raised that any divergences from the market 
position made their firms vulnerable to attraction and retention issues.   
We have to offer because that is what the market offers.  These core areas are 
not an area where it is sensible to be different as that brings in risk around 
employee expectations of what they should get when working for a bank and we 
don’t want to challenge those assumptions. (RE6) 
The strength of employee expectations of what a package in the financial services sector 
should look like was highlighted on a number of occasions.  These expectations were 
felt to be a particularly strong feature of the financial services market due to the close 
proximity of firms to each other in London both in the City and Canary Wharf areas 
(where 19 of the REs‟ firms were based) and the mobility of staff in this sector.   
Employees were seen as being particularly well informed about what the overall 
package typically looked like in the sector and in turn what they therefore felt they 
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should receive.  
There is a huge amount of information out there if you can find it – if you are 
linked into the network.....so everybody knows what everybody else is 
getting......you go into any of the City wine bars and sit next to a crowd of 
bankers, its 90% certain that someone will be discussing their pay.  (RE10) 
This pressure was not confined to London-based firms, but was also apparent in the 
accounts of the three REs from firms located in the home counties, who although 
recruiting locally, noted the effect of London norms and the influence this had on their 
employees‟ negotiating position. 
We are in an area of high employment generally.   We have quite a tough job in 
the sense that we are not in London, but we have a vast majority of our 
population in the professional areas who are more than happy, more than 
willing to work in London because it is a very quick jump on the train.   So you 
have the tension between not wanting to be paying huge London salaries, but 
also trying to counter that, you have to be aware of them.  (RE3) 
This pressure was seen as significant due to the perception that there was a general 
shortage of talent which the REs believed allowed groups of employees to dictate the 
terms of their reward mix in line with their market-formed expectations. 
 If I think about the UK, I think in some ways, or maybe I should say London, 
which is different, it is quite an adult, transactional relationship which is, you 
know this is the employer, here I am as the employee, this is what I’ve got to 
offer, what are you going to pay me for that?  Which is why you don’t see the 
loyalty around, you know, people jump. (RE17) 
This was amplified by a perception that employees often had greater loyalty to their 
profession rather than the firm for which they worked.  This created a greater sense of 
an appropriate reward mix for the profession which people then expected to receive.  
I think one of the interesting things about this labour market is that there is more 
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loyalty to the profession than to individual companies.   People look at 
themselves in comparison with their opposite numbers in [firm name] or [firm 
name] rather than within the company.   (RE2) 
The relationship between firm and employee was often portrayed as being imbalanced, 
with employees holding a powerful position over the firm and the firm constantly 
feeling the need to justify that the package was attractive relative to other firms. 
I make constant reference to McLagan because we constantly regard ourselves 
as an organisation that needs to prove its paying market.  [Firm name] is 
proving to its bankers that they are paid more or less how they would be paid 
somewhere else.  (RE16) 
Consequently, the process of benchmarking was seen as being as much about 
confidently communicating the reward package to employees, as well as to 
management.  This often led to a relatively defensive position being adopted with 
reward communications revolving around comparisons of what was being offered 
elsewhere. 
What we do want to be able to say is come to [firm name] for  the opportunities 
that it provides you, and, by the way, you will get a market competitive reward 
package to support that, so we will look to make sure that we at least pay you 
the same as what you’d expect to be paid in any other similar organisation, 
whether it be a [firm name], whether it be a [firm name], whether it be an [firm 
name] or a [firm name].  (RE15) 
A number of interviewees contrasted this position to that faced in other sectors they had 
either worked in or had received benchmark data on.  The main differences that were 
highlighted were the size of the potential returns that were typically made by financial 
services firms, the reliance on individual talent rather than financial capital in achieving 
these returns and the perceived shortage of talent to allow the substitution of lost skills, 
should an individual move from the organisation.  All of these were contributing to a 
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stronger bargaining position for the employees than perhaps was typical in other sectors. 
We have a small number of individuals who personally have very strong 
contacts and have very strong market relationships enabling them to bring in 
business or they happen to have the context. We are heavily dependent on these 
individuals as they drive high proportions of revenue and profit.  This has a 
knock-on influence on the rest of the business in that we also want a degree of 
consistency across the piece.  (RE1) 
This employee power was raised by REs interviewed from firms covering all sub 
sectors of financial services.  Significantly, the effect of this power to dictate the 
package by revenue generators was seen to have been an influence on the packages 
across the organisation with a pattern emerging for all staff. 
So again, it’s more of a reward for success because small numbers of people can 
have a very big impact.   This has knock-on effects to other employees in the 
same area, a sort of coat tail effect with the mix of all affected by the 
rainmakers.  Consistency does matter here so if the top earner’s package is 
heavily variable then it will mean that secretaries too get a higher proportion of 
bonus than may have been the case in more traditional secretarial roles in say 
retail.   (RE1) 
Employees‟ knowledge of the overall industry reward mix was felt to be particularly 
strong and this was a heavy influence on their expectations about the appropriate reward 
mix that they received.   
5.5.2 Union influence 
The second influence on the industry reward mix was Trade Unions.  Ten of the REs 
described how they saw their employees‟ union playing a role in RMD.  These were 
predominately in the retail sector of financial services and concerned with more junior, 
non management, levels of employees.  None of the REs from the eight solely 
wholesale firms raised unions as an influence.  Unions were seen as playing a role in 
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looking to maintain the historical reward mix position that had been established.  The 
REs reported that there was an inherent conservatism within the unions, which they 
attributed to a desire for, as much as possible, there to be equality of treatment across 
the workforce, not just within the firm but also across firms in the marketplace. 
The agenda for the union has always been to try and harmonise everything 
because there have been some big anomalies....because they’re representing 
their members and they think that their members at the same level within the 
same organisation should have the same opportunities in terms of salary and 
bonus and benefits. (RE25) 
However, this was sometimes encouraged by management with their use of 
benchmarking data in communicating with the unions and in negotiating the annual pay 
review percentage. 
It’s not just a case of going along to the benchmark houses and just picking up 
any data. We will take it to two or three levels down in terms of detail. And it 
helps you to communicate the position; it helps you to sell the change to the 
trade unions.  (RE12) 
The unions‟ interest was reported as being on an item by item basis rather than through  
consideration of all the elements forming the reward mix at the same time.  This was in 
line with the approach that the REs reported was conducted within firms (discussed in 
section 5.3).  The REs who had dealings with unions noted that it was their impression 
that although the unions would typically have input on all elements of the mix, their 
main interest was the annual salary review and the negotiation of the „pay pot‟. 
They are most interested in pay, by a long shot.   They are then probably next 
most interested in defined benefit pensions and protecting what is currently in 
existence.   (RE5) 
The REs reported that their experience in dealing with the unions meant that they 
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believed that as well as a desire for fairness, the unions were also driven by paternalistic 
concerns for their members and ensuring that the package provided for a range of 
different needs.  
I think it’s just natural to them. I think paternalism is just in their nature.  
(RE23) 
However, the extent to which they really understood their members‟ real expectations 
and needs was disputed.  One RE identified issues with what he perceived as the 
unions‟ dislike of variable pay, which he believed was not in line with employees‟ 
beliefs as explained in the following extract: 
Well, I think that their position is that they don’t like variable pay. They’d rather 
have as much as possible in base because it’s certain, it’s guaranteed. Benefits 
that depend on it like pension are obviously enhanced. I think there’s the 
perception in the unions that variable pay… it’s subject to things like 
favouritism, for example, you know.  (RE23) 
What did emerge was the REs‟ view that their influence was contextual depending on 
how the firm more generally viewed unions and the extent to which the relationship was 
seen as being a productive route with which to engage with their employees. 
So I think it is a positive – they wouldn’t necessarily always agree with what we 
have done, but I think it is good because it regulates in the sense that... it keeps 
us honest.... they don’t formally regulate us, but they regulate our actions in the 
work that we do. (RE27) 
5.5.3 Influences on employee expectation – Historical reward patterns 
The interviews provided further insight into the REs‟ thoughts on what had caused the 
formation of such strong employee and union expectations.  Twenty-one REs identified 
that these expectations were shaped by historical reward patterns formed over several 
decades which were strongly engrained in employees‟ expectations and therefore were 
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seen as being particularly difficult to change.   
This way of rewarding staff has been around for a long time, they expect to be 
rewarded that way and we are not in a position to break those expectations. 
(RE13) 
This was illustrated by eight of the 21 REs in relation to a number of benefits that 
continued to be offered to employees, despite the original reason for their introduction 
having long since disappeared.  This was particularly the case for benefits introduced 
because of tax concessions that the government had made available, but was also raised 
with respect to the employee demographics of the organisation.  The benefits continued 
to be offered because employees had become accustomed to receiving them and firms 
were reluctant to change, fearing the employee disruption that change may cause, given 
the strong expectations they were dealing with.  For example, one RE noted how private 
health cover had been introduced as an attraction and retention tool for a relatively 
mature workforce.  However, over time, the RE‟s firm had seen its workforce 
demographics change dramatically to a much younger workforce.  However, the 
healthcare benefit is still perpetuated. 
It’s crazy really that we continue to offer private medical cover for our staff.  
I’m not sure they value it at all but we haven’t changed it as I’m not sure how 
they would react.  (RE8) 
These historical reward patterns were seen to have been formed by a combination of 
two factors.  First, the interviews identified how the REs felt owner beliefs about the 
role of reward structures were significant in forming historical reward patterns and, 
through this, influencing employee expectations over time – in particular, the role 
played by incentive and bonus schemes in controlling employee behaviour, and 
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employee benefits and the responsibility firms felt for the welfare of their employees 
both for paternalistic reasons, and with respect to their search for productivity and 
engagement effects.  Second, the general structure and profitability of the sector, i.e. 
product market effects, had led to the formation of a general sense of entitlement 
amongst employees with respect to the sharing of wealth created in the industry 
between the owners of the firms and these employees.  Each of these will now be 
examined. 
5.5.3.1 Control over employees 
Agency theory suggests that reward mix, at least with respect to the balance of fixed and 
variable elements within that mix, will be established in line with management of the 
conflicting interests of owners and employees.  This theoretical position was not 
overwhelmingly supported in the interviews.  Thirteen of the respondents talked of 
alignment in this way. 
The best way of getting the alignment between the employee interest and the 
shareholder interest is obviously to have people as employee shareholders, but 
also for the employee shareholders to have bought and put their hand in their 
pocket and to have bought part of their stake.  (RE14) 
Furthermore one interviewee rationalised the use of market benchmarks with reference 
to employee alignment and control. 
The market may dictate the mix we offer but there is a good reason why the 
market is as it is.  The banking mix helps incentivise our employees to drive 
sales which we need to survive. (RE4) 
Where the interviews discussed alignment as a key element, interviewees did note that it 
may be less about the use of incentives to directly and overtly influence employees‟ 




So it’s legitimate to pay someone one million pounds if they’ve brought in twenty 
million quid’s worth of revenue, but if they don’t bring it in the next year we 
don’t want to pay it to them and we won’t.  (RE18) 
There was general scepticism about whether the reward mix was genuinely acting as an 
influence on behaviour, but rather was more about employee expectations of their 
entitlement to their „share‟ of the revenue generated.   These accounts supported the 
contention that the variable component of the reward mix was more about recognition 
and entitlement than a pure incentive.   
On our team we debate sometimes whether or not we think the-, the-, the level of 
the bonus is going to change somebody’s-, somebody’s behaviour or 
contribution level because of the bonus that we offer. We always think that the 
answer is always no, that people who will deliver will always deliver because 
they are just that sort of individual that you’ve got in your team and don’t need 
the carrot of a-, a bonus to incentivise them. It’s just something they get because 
it’s acknowledgement of that contribution.  (RE25) 
The emphasis placed on incentives in the reward mix was further challenged as not 
being in the interests of firm owners as it was felt that the effect on behaviour might not 
be in line with the longer term interests of the firm.  It was suggested that incentive-
based pay can cause problems with respect to potentially encouraging inappropriate 
risk-taking behaviour that was not in the longer term interests of the firm, as employees 
carry out transactions or encourage customer sales that were inappropriate and could, 
over the longer term, actually destroy value in the firm.  A number of examples of this 
occurring were provided with respect to the „mis-selling‟ of financial products to 
customers in the areas of pensions, endowments and payment protection insurance.  
These product sales had been rewarded with a bonus immediately following the sale, 
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but later were seen to be unprofitable as compensation had to be paid to customers when 
it was discovered that the sales were inappropriate. 
As an employer, I don’t think that would be a responsible thing to do.   I think 
we should be encouraging to think of the short-term versus the long-term. 
(RE11) 
Finally, interviewees questioned whether the incentives payable through bonuses could 
in reality be truly varied with firms‟ performance and therefore be genuinely aligning 
principals‟ and agents‟ interests.  They cited recent cases of their firms paying out 
bonuses despite making significantly reduced profits, or even losses, as they were 
concerned about the effect non-payment would have on overall employee morale and 
through that motivation, retention and performance going forward.  
For all our talk about alignment of interests between management and 
shareholder, we didn’t actually mean that because when push comes to shove, 
you still need to pay your management team for doing work even if shareholders 
are not receiving pound for pound the same benefit.   And that is a massively 
important point.   It’s a point that no one was prepared to acknowledge while 
share prices were going up.  We have alignment – you win, I win.   But it doesn’t 
work the other way round.  (RE19) 
This also limited the extent to which reward mix through higher proportions of variable 
pay was seen as being able to align the costs of the business with its overall 
performance. 
Well we see regularly firms paying out bonuses in poor or even loss making 
years.  Although they are meant to vary with firm performance, it is still hard to 
break employees' expectations that if they have individually worked hard then 
they should get some form of bonus reward.   (RE16) 
5.5.3.2 Paternalism 
The extent to which employers had certain responsibilities to their employees which 
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could be, at least partially, met through the way in which their reward package was 
delivered to them was raised by 22 of the REs interviewed as being an influence on the 
industry norm position.   
You have to have some form of benefits from a corporate responsibility 
perspective, you want to ensure that your employees are to the best of the 
organisation’s ability looked after. (RE10) 
However, overall the interviews showed that the REs believed that their firms were 
becoming less concerned with delivering reward to employees in order to manage their 
welfare, but were rather expecting employees to take more control over areas that 
historically might have been the preserve of the firm, especially around pensions.  This 
had occurred gradually over time in line with the shift in coercive pressures, largely 
from government, on company pension provision, but also the overriding concern of 
cost management that 18 of the REs raised as a major consideration at their firm.   
So really we went through almost every-, well, we did every single benefit where 
there was a cost to the business for having that benefit and said, look, do we 
want to sort of like address whether or not we continue at the same level or 
reduce it. But in-, I think in the end, we-, we decided that we weren’t going to do 
some of the things that we could have done to save money and we felt that on 
balance that was-, it was the right thing to do for our employee’s health, welfare 
and futures. (RE25) 
Moreover, one RE noted how a shift to employees taking greater responsibility for their 
own investment decisions was in line with a wider shift in their firm to encourage 
greater personal accountability and responsibility for business decisions to help make 
the firm more fleet of foot and improve its competitiveness. 
We need to get employees to think about things in a different way, take more 
accountability, more responsibility, and I think from that perspective reward has 
a part to play as well in the fact that we are changing the employee deal here, 
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whether it’s implicit or explicit.  (RE15) 
A number of the REs commented how their firms had shifted to increased employee 
choice in how benefits were provided to them through the adoption of flexible benefit 
systems.  However, even here some restrictions were made on this employee choice as 
the firm looked to deliver a base minimum for certain benefits, particularly life 
assurance and critical illness cover, in order to meet what it felt were its moral 
obligations in these areas.   
We look at the benefits package that we would consider to be standard and we 
said right which elements do we believe as a responsible employer, cannot be 
removed?    (RE3) 
However, firms moralising over benefit provision was seen as problematic by one 
interviewee: 
It’s almost arrogance for me to assume that I know how you would wish to be 
rewarded, because what you fall into, the trap you fall into, which most 
organisations do, is a leadership of a corporation believes that their own 
personal drives and value set are actually representative of the entire 
corporation – well they are not because in the FTSE 100 there are only 100 
CEOs, yet the FTSE 100 employ, I don’t even know – 7 million people who are 
driven by different aspirations, desires.  (RE26) 
Discussions about the extent to which firms had responsibilities to their employees 
tended to focus on the benefits package that was offered, but this was not exclusively 
the case.  Four REs noted that their firms had identified they had a wider responsibility 
to their employees and putting high proportions of their reward at risk was not seen as 
responsible behaviour by the firm.  The REs noted that their firms felt that employers 
had a responsibility to ensure the fixed proportion of their reward was at least enough 
for them to achieve a standard of living appropriate for their role.  This included the 
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need to ensure that they could secure mortgages and meet family commitments in years 
to come in which bonuses may not be payable due to poor firm or individual 
performance. 
Well, one, people need to have a base salary to be able to do things like buy 
mortgages and so on, to live, there has to be … people need to know that if there 
was a very poor year and there was no bonus, that they do have the minimum 
amount of income, so the security of having a base salary.  (RE13) 
In addition, these REs discussed how they believed putting high proportions of pay at 
risk was not in the firm‟s interest as it was seen as potentially inducing levels of 
pressure and stress on employees that may not be conducive to effective performance.  
As an employer, I don’t think that would be a responsible thing to do.   I think 
we should be encouraging them to think about longer term performance and not 
putting too much short term pressure on results.  (RE11) 
Further justifications for paternalistic behaviour were also provided.  However, these 
were often as much about the firm and improving firm performance as they were about 
employee welfare.   First, certain insurances within the mix were seen as crucial for 
ensuring employee health and therefore attendance and productivity at work. 
There’s things that we did, like introduce things like private medical insurance, 
we introduced a doctor, we introduced a number of health and well-being points 
a couple of years ago, and the key driver for that was ensuring that people are 
healthy and they get treatment for any illnesses or diseases as early as possible 
so there’s no barriers to their recovery, but the other benefit was you’re saving 
time on them being out of the office.   (RE13) 
Less prevalent but still raised by three REs was the importance of managing the firm‟s 
liability to an employee‟s family should death occur, or illness leaving the employee 
unable to work.  The need to continue to deliver some form of income when employees 
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were unable to work or provide a payment to the employee‟s family on the event of 
death therefore was not solely an act of paternalism, but rather one of reputation 
management. 
People can be very stupid and not provide for themselves in some issues and if 
someone dies and they haven’t got any death benefit while investment banks 
don’t have a particularly strong reputation position, we do worry a little bit 
about our reputation.  (RE10) 
Eight REs also raised an issue that their firms were increasingly having with the 
delivery of reward through provision of the firm‟s equity to employees, either directly 
or in the form of options.  Concern was raised about the extent to which over time this 
would mean that a high proportion of the employee‟s wealth and future income was 
dependent on the firm‟s performance.   Although this increased individual and firm 
alignment, as outlined in agency theory, it also created investment concentration risk for 
the employee.  A rational position for the employee was seen as more diversified 
through investment of accumulated wealth in a more balanced portfolio.  One RE noted 
that this had become particularly acute at his firm when its share price had fallen by 
over 90% in the year preceding the interview and therefore had seen large numbers of 
their employees lose relatively sizeable amounts of money as they had held shares 
provided by the company both within and beyond vesting or deferral periods.  The 
collapse of Lehman Brothers was also identified as having seen this risk crystallise for 
employees. 
I mean clearly people who worked at Lehmans lost most of their worth through 
the collapse in those share prices, so I mean a very significant issue for them..... 
It means that there is a certain concern around the whole notion of being tied 
into… well, this concentration.... It raised that whole question about is it 
legitimate to ask employees to put all their wealth into the firm’s stock, and 
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that’s clearly not an investment strategy you’re advised to do.   (RE18) 
Finally, six REs noted that their firm believed operating in the financial services sector 
presented a certain obligation to assist employees in managing their finances.  This was 
particularly relevant to firms operating in the pensions sector who, as a result, felt the 
need to offer relatively generous employee pensions and also provide advice on 
managing retirement risk in line with the standards provided to their customers.  The 
message that was sold to customers with regard to the importance of long-term savings 
had to be congruent with how the organisation delivered its reward.  This did have the 
effect of making the overall package more attractive than that offered by non financial 
services firms operating in the locality which had benefitted both recruitment and 
retention. 
We, as an employer in this sector, have to give employees a progressive way to 
gain wealth and handle debt.  That is going to be a much more attractive 
relationship than one that just coldly hands me the money and leaves me to get 
on with it.  (RE9) 
5.5.3.3 Industry structure and profitability 
Seven REs speculated that the historical structure and overall relatively high 
profitability of the sector (pre financial crisis) were influencing factors in informing 
current reward mix expectations that employees had.  For example, two of the REs from 
investment banks noted specifically that their historical structure as partnerships before 
the reforms to the City that occurred in 1987 with the „big bang‟ were still influencing 
today‟s reward mix.  These partnerships had operated with partners receiving high 
proportions of their reward in variable pay related to the firm‟s profitability.  This had 




A lot of what we see now has endured from pre 1987.  High rewards for high 
risk taking, just that the risk taking is now on behalf of the shareholders not your 
own pocket.  (RE10) 
In addition, they were seen to have high levels of power to insist on getting the market 
package and influencing it so that it was increasingly generous both with regard to its 
size, but also how it is paid, especially around the entitlement to share relatively high 
proportions of the overall revenue. 
The variable pay element grew out of the fact that the profits were so large and 
it became possible for … the market for employees became so hot it became 
possible for employees to bargain, basically, for a much bigger portion of the 
income that they brought in than in other industries. (RE20) 
This was felt to have permeated throughout the sector and was a strong influence on 
packages at all levels and for all types of roles. 
5.5.4 Moderating employee expectations 
Having examined the main constructs seen to be determining reward mix and, in 
particular, the influence employee expectations and their formation has had on the use 
of industry norm positioning by firms, the chapter now reviews the findings with regard 
to a number of moderating variables, i.e. variables that change the relationship between 
employee expectations and industry norm reward mix when they are present, that were 
identified.  These were regulatory change, legal and taxation matters. 
5.5.4.1 Regulatory change 
The coercive nature of regulatory pressure on the mix was reported as influencing the 
thinking of the REs and their accounts of the RMD approach within their firms, given 
the industry discussion on the appropriate regulatory framework which was underway at 
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the time of the research
18
.    Whilst significant uncertainty was present at this time about 
what the final regulatory requirements might be, it was reported as beginning to 
influence thinking, with 22 of the REs identifying the changing regulatory landscape as 
a moderating influence on market practice at that time.  The following quote was typical 
of the REs‟ comments that this pressure would make a difference to reward mix 
structures across the industry. 
 Well the big one for us at the moment is the FSA code..... that code I think will 
have the biggest impact on financial services remuneration for fifteen years at 
least.   I have no doubt about that. (RE4) 
The increased regulatory attention was identified as defining more clearly „best 
practice‟ with respect to reward mix, which in reality meant that the benchmarks 
followed may become even sharper in the future. 
We’re licensed to operate and we obviously get inspected.  They set a minimum 
standard that we find quite helpful, even though there might be a minimum 
standard on some things that we don’t need to follow, if you see what I mean.  
(RE24) 
Adherence to this newly emerging industry norm position was also considered 
important as it provided a good narrative for firms to explain their position to their 
stakeholders. 
I think if the business is trying to demonstrate to the group that it’s managing its 
risk and its reputation well, it’s a great story to say we have met all the 
requirements. It’s a good place to be.  (RE24)  
Meeting the regulatory requirements was also seen by a number of REs as a discipline 
                                                          
18
 The interviews were carried out when, in the UK the FSA, which had some form of regulatory 
responsibility over all the firms interviewed, was consulting on and implementing new remuneration 
restrictions (known as the FSA Code), for major banks, building societies and investment firms. 
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on firms to do what was seen as the right thing for their customers through their reward 
offering. 
But treating the customer fairly, we work very hard with the FSA to ensure that 
we are fully compliant with that.   It’s really embedded in our culture, it’s part 
of our main business strategy aligned to it.    (RE27) 
Generally, with one notable exception (discussed in further detail in section 5.7.1.3), 
non compliance with the regulations was not seen as an option.  Furthermore, the 
coercive nature of the new regulations was not always seen as a negative outcome.  The 
existence of regulation was a means by which REs could push through changes that 
they wanted to make to their firm‟s reward mix. 
And I have used the regulator as the reason for why we should be doing things 
which are good practice, very helpfully actually. (RE1)  
However, the extent to which this coercion would have a lasting effect on the 
benchmark position was doubted by a number of interviewees who felt that the 
institutional framework established in the industry would endure, despite the 
moderating regulatory pressure for change. 
It’s very much a culture that is going to take years and years to shift.   (RE5) 
5.5.4.2 Legal pressures 
The extent to which legal, non regulatory, constraints were seen to operate on RMD 
were relatively limited.  Whilst acknowledging that a range of legal factors influenced 
reward determination around areas such as reward level, with the minimum wage being 
cited, and reward structure, with equal wage considerations being raised, the extent to 
which they influenced the actual reward mix materially was weak as illustrated by the 
following comment.   
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But those are really, to me, more noise on the line, as opposed to something 
which fundamentally drives it. (RE26) 
There were two exceptions to this.  First, the restrictions on some groups of employees‟ 
reward mix due to Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) regulations 
(TUPE)
19
 following mergers or takeovers, which required organisations to maintain 
certain elements of reward for groups of staff transferring from one to another. 
Well partly it’s for legal reasons, so there will be elements protected under 
TUPE, of course.  (RE17) 
Second, pensions were raised as a further area where legislation was an influence on the 
overall mix.  Two legal developments were seen as influencing the pension component 
of the overall mix.  First, the introduction of age discrimination legislation which had 
caused some firms (four) to change the structure of their pension schemes. 
We also offered quite generous pension contributions which were actually based 
on length of service.   Obviously age discrimination legislation came in and 
really put paid to that and we had to rethink very, very carefully. (RE8) 
In addition, the impending UK reform of company pensions‟ provision coming with the 
introduction of personal accounts through the National Employment Savings Trust 
(NEST) was highlighted as an influence on the industry benchmark position.  This 
requires firms, from 2012, to enrol all employees automatically into a NEST pension 
scheme, unless they offer a suitable alternative, and contribute at least 3% to this fund.  
This was reported by the REs as causing a number of the firms to consider the structure 
of their pension scheme, in particular the level of contribution being made by the 
                                                          
19
 The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 is legislation designed to 
protect the rights of employees in a transfer situation enabling them to enjoy the same terms and 
conditions, with continuity of employment, as before. 
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organisation and the likely take-up rate. 
We will have to consider the whole affordability of our reward package in light 
of the personal account changes.  (RE11) 
5.5.4.3 Taxation 
A specific subsection of legal constraint – taxation – was raised by 24 of the REs 
interviewed as an influence on the industry benchmark reward mix.  However, the 
influence was not considered as strong as the regulatory and legal coercive pressures 
and the employee expectations already discussed.  The tax regime was seen to be 
influencing the reward mix “at the edges” rather than being a central influence on RMD. 
We use the tax concessions that are available......  The tax regime points you in a 
direction because both us and our staff can get a better deal through exploiting 
the tax provisions.  We aim to do that to everyone’s benefit.  (RE3) 
Certain tax advantages arising from salary sacrifice arrangements involving benefits 
such as pensions and childcare, where national insurance payments could be avoided, 
were embedded in the industry practice.  However, more complex tax schemes were not 
uniformly taken up.  The extent to which these more complex options were used was 
seen to be dependent on two elements.  First, the capability of the organisation to 
manage the complexities that certain schemes around shares, pensions and capital gains 
tax regimes for employees presented.  
We were once bitten, twice shy on that one.   We did try a number of years ago 
instead of actually paying a bonus, we actually gave staff free shares in the 
company and never again.   The tax legislation around it is still working its way 
out.   (RE8) 
Second, was the firm‟s philosophy on its role in assisting employees manage their tax 
liabilities more effectively.  A position articulated by five REs was that their firms 
209 
 
would not actively manage mix with a goal of lowering tax liabilities of their employees 
as this should be left to employees to manage.   
We are so risk averse it’s untrue. Certainly from a tax perspective we have a 
stated policy that we will not do anything to assist employees in avoiding tax, 
which is giving us, you know problems, with the budget changes that were 
announced.   (RE15) 
However, eleven REs identified that their firms‟ use of these more complex tax 
avoidance schemes was an important part of what the firm could do to maximise the 
value of reward to the employees.  This was particularly apparent during the research 
when the UK government increased the level of personal income tax payable by 
employees earning over £150,000 to 50%. 
The 50% tax rate is going to affect the mix because there’s going to be much 
more of an incentive to see how we can structure packages to … it’s not tax 
evasion but tax avoidance, so what are the most tax efficient schemes that we 
can have, and maybe that’s going to be more of a draw away from paying more 
as cash in terms of the bonus and things like that, so that’s definitely going to 
drive … especially amongst our higher earners, how we structure the reward 
mix.  (RE14) 
This shift in personal tax rates for the highest paid was seen by the REs as a „tipping 
point‟ for a number of firms with the management of employee tax liabilities likely to 
become increasingly proactive than had historically been the case.  The following quote, 
which was provided before the change to the 50% tax rate was made, was given in the 
context of media speculation that the rate would increase. 
I think we are pretty close to the level of tax that people see as reasonable, any 
increase on where we are now is going to start people saying ok, actually we are 
going to start doing something about it.  (RE10) 
Furthermore, one RE spoke of one globally active firm which was looking to transfer 
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fully tax change risk from employees to the firm through consideration of net payment 
agreements with employees.  This was felt to be necessary due to the global nature of 
the labour market in financial services and the resulting multinational workforce which 
operated in London and other key centres.   
The point about that is that the people are saying to us, well, you want to 
operate out of London. I shouldn’t have to pay the penalty for that. They’re just 
as happy working out of any other city..... Most of our people would happily go 
to Zurich, happily go to New York, happily… love to go to Hong Kong.  (RE18)  
5.5.5 Summary 
The industry norm emerged as the main influence on firm reward mix positioning.  The 
strength of established employee expectations of what reward mix should be delivered 
was identified as influential in setting the norm position.  These expectations were 
attributed to the established historical patterns that had emerged through a combination 
of the influence of owners‟ beliefs with respect to controlling and motivating 
employees, some paternalistic responsibilities that they historically had felt and the 
particular characteristics of the financial services sector with respect to its profitability 
and structure.  Whilst significant, these employee expectations were seen to be 
moderated in their effect on the industry norm with legal, taxation and in particular 
regulatory coercive influences disrupting the transmission of these expectations through 
to the overall industry norm reward mix. 
Whilst the industry norm was strong the research did also identify how firms could 
diverge from this mix.  These findings will now be presented. 
5.6 Diverging from the industry norm 
The findings discussed above show the strength of employee expectations on reward 
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mix across the financial services sector and the influences, such as historical reward 
patterns, contributing to the development of these expectations.  In addition the findings 
demonstrate the moderating role that legal, taxation and regulatory coercive forces play 
in influencing the industry position.   
The REs‟ accounts were consistent in raising the influence concern over the attraction 
and retention of key employees was having on RMD, with firms reluctant to step away 
from the industry norm position due to strong employee expectations that they should 
receive this industry position. 
I’d love to say that business is the prime driver of the reward mix, but I think 
that heritage, history and the hiring market is probably a bigger influence. 
(RE30) 
However, during the interviews, changes that firms had made to their reward mix were 
explored in order to understand the extent to which firms felt compelled to follow the 
industry norm and, where they did not feel this compulsion, what influenced their 
decisions to adopt a non industry norm reward mix.  This section discusses the 
influences in order to develop an understanding of why a firm may diverge from the 
industry norm position. 
The changes that were raised are shown in the final column of the table in Appendix 10.  
Of the 30 firms of which the REs spoke ten provided examples of reward mix 
adjustments they had made that moved them away from the benchmark position.  Most 
common were adjustments to benefit schemes, either enhancement or reduction to 
higher value benefits, such as pension contributions or medical cover relative to the 
benchmark, or provision of additional benefits, such as retail and leisure voucher 
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schemes.  Five firms differentiated their reward mix in this way.  In addition, five firms 
had changed the proportions of overall reward payable between fixed and variable 
compensation relative to that suggested by the benchmark.  These firms had increased 
the proportion payable through base or fixed salary relative to the variable or bonus 
award.   
Through the REs speaking of these changes that their firms had made, alongside the 
accounts of REs where they had felt inhibited in making changes, a number of factors 
emerged as significant in determining the extent to which firms were likely to move 
away from the established norm and differentiate their reward mix.   
The overriding influence on behaviour and the desire to adopt the industry norm 
benchmark position was the security that operating either at or close to the benchmark 
was perceived to provide.  The need to operate within a „safe harbour‟ of the mix 
offered by other firms in the market and, specifically the perceived danger of being the 
first to move away from this „safe harbour‟ was widespread. 
There is a considerable concern in the market about first mover disadvantage 
...... whoever moves first will lose. (RE10) 
Only ten REs spoke of what they saw as their firms having both sufficient conviction in 
their ability to manage the risk that moving away from the norm was felt to imply and, 
alongside that, belief that moving away from the benchmark position would deliver a 
competitive advantage to lead them to deliberately target reward mixes away from the 
general market consensus.   
The extent to which REs believed firms were willing to take a risk and operate outside 
the perceived „safe harbour‟ of the industry norm position appeared to be formed 
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through the interplay of two variables.  First, the firm‟s desire to resist the industry 
norm and differentiate its reward mix.  Second, alongside the firm‟s desire to operate to 
some degree away from the established industry norm was the firm‟s capability to 
manage employee expectations should such a move away from the norm be attempted.  
The dimensions identified as influencing this desire and capability will now be 
reviewed. 
5.6.1 Desire to differentiate 
The REs identified five dimensions as influencing firms‟ desire to differentiate their 
reward mix away from the industry norm – leadership, business strategy, political 
pressure, parental influence and firm specific history.  The findings related to each of 
these influences are now presented. 
5.6.1.1 Leadership  
The focus of the leadership team was highlighted as significant in reinforcing mimetic 
behaviour by 17 of the REs who identified how the leadership in firms set the tone for 
the significant role of market norms in setting the mix position.  Leaders wanted to 
know what reward practices other similar firms were adopting and then generally their 
expectation was that their firm should operate in line with that position.  The interviews 
highlighted how, on the whole, the REs saw the leadership of their organisation as 
reluctant to take risks with regard to the operation of the organisation‟s reward strategy 
in contrast to other areas, such as strategy and marketing, where differentiation was 
believed to be actively sought.  This was seen as an explanation for the dominance of 
market benchmarking in influencing reward levels, bonus scheme operation and benefit 
packages and, through these separate decisions, the overall reward mix.  Moving away 
from the benchmark was considered a high risk strategy for firms.  This was clearly 
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articulated by one interviewee who stated: 
We appear to be risk averse when it comes to decisions of reward and reward 
mix but risk loving with respect to strategy, and marketing.  The same leaders 
influence but very different risk perspectives.   (RE1) 
A number of explanations were provided as to why this may be the case.  First, four 
REs speculated that the background of the leadership team was influencing the 
importance they attached to benchmarking, not just reward positioning but all aspects of 
organisational performance. 
I think it tends to be the people who have worked in bigger organisations, so 
they come very much from benchmarking culture and they come from a culture 
where you’re not just maybe benchmarking your benefits and your salaries, 
where you’re constantly benchmarking your performance, and particularly on 
our investment side, your performance against your peers.   (RE14) 
In addition, a further six REs noted that this conservatism was reinforced by the nature 
of decision making in the firms. 
Quite often in… we’re a classic example of a traditional financial services 
organisation because it’s death by committee, you know. Nobody is willing to 
stick their head above the parapet – very cautious, very risk averse.   (RE15) 
Alongside this, was concern that operating a different position from the safe harbour of 
the market benchmark might attract negative publicity, especially at the time of the 
interviews when financial services remuneration news stories were rarely far from not 
only the business pages but the front pages of the media.  Fourteen REs identified this 
as an issue. 
Public perception is very important to us. It is absolutely key. (RE15) 
The perception of others related not only to the media but also the equity analysts and 
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the rating agencies, given the significant influence they had on investor sentiment and, 
through that, firms‟ share prices.  This was aptly illustrated by one interviewee with 
reference to their firm‟s credit standing. 
You know, we say that we’re proud to be boring. Boring is the new sexy because 
we feel that’s one of the reasons why the bank has remained strong and still has 
its AAA rating. (RE20) 
This position of safety was reinforced by a perception that divergences from the norm 
would only lead to negative publicity. 
There is a fear, I think that is probably the right expression, of getting that silly 
newspaper headline and that is not to be underestimated. (RE20) 
In addition, the credibility of the HR function was seen as an issue by 13 of the REs, 
with the firm‟s leadership looking for external assurance of the „right‟ position for the 
reward strategy, with this often coming through consultants and the benchmarking data 
that they were able to provide.   
I think it’s part of their make up anyway.  Let’s not just listen to what our 
internal people are saying but … I guess it’s just seen a bit as, well that’s what 
they’re paid to do totally out there in the marketplace, so there must be some 
substantiating evidence that they’re bringing to the table. (RE8) 
Whilst generally identified by the REs as a relatively conservative influence on mix 
decisions, and a force pushing the organisation towards the industry norm, five REs 
noted how their firm‟s leaders were the catalysts for change.  This was particularly 
apparent at one organisation that had adopted a reward mix diametrically opposed to the 
industry norm consensus (section 5.7.1.3 gives details of the nature of this 
differentiation).  This was attributed largely to the vision of the CEO and his desire to 
radically differentiate the firm from those against which it was competing. 
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But [name] is just a fantastic CEO.   He is very open, he is very honest and I 
knew where we were heading, where he wanted to take the organisation.  (RE2) 
5.6.1.2 Business strategy 
Two aspects of firms‟ strategy were raised by the REs as being pertinent to the firms‟ 
propensity to differentiate their mix relative to others – firm size and their customer and 
supplier relationships. 
5.6.1.2.1 Firm size 
The firm‟s size was raised as an influence on the extent to which they considered the 
benchmark data in determining reward mix.  Four REs discussed how they believed that 
their firms‟ size, relative to their competitors, gave them the opportunity to operate a 
reward mix away from the industry norm. 
Often people will say well what do other people do?   What do [firm name] do, 
or what do [firm name] do? … What do our big competitors do?  And I say, I 
don’t really care very much what they do because we are big enough that we 
should do what we want to do. (RE7) 
However, this was not a universal position with a RE from another large firm in its 
market sector showing how they felt that size does not necessarily build confidence to 
adopt a reward mix away from the industry norm. 
We are the largest of our kind of business in the world – or if not the largest, we 
are the second.   So why should we worry about what the slightly bigger or 
slightly smaller competitors are doing in what we do?   Why don’t we do our 
own thing?  And I don’t think we have the confidence and that is problematic. 
(RE1) 
In addition, three REs also identified size as a barrier, within their firms, to adopting a 
more innovative approach, especially in the area of total reward, given how it pulls on 
areas that traditionally do not sit within the compensation and benefits function as 
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illustrated by the following: 
Actually I have worked in small organisations and huge organisations and I 
have found that that is a lot easier in small organisations......., I found that a lot 
easier to get that going just because there are only a few people you need to get 
within that discussion to make that start to happen.   (RE5) 
5.6.1.2.2 Customers 
As well as being dependent on employees, six REs identified the influence their 
customers had on the mix chosen in their firm.  One RE noted how her firm had 
departed significantly from the industry norm position to allow the reward mix offered 
to their employees to be used as a marketing tool to clients. 
It is important that what we do looks right to the client should this come up or 
should they see something in the press or on our website.  In fact, as you know, 
we actively promote what we do on reward here because we want clients to 
know how we reward our employees and through this the benefits we think that 
brings to the service we give to them.  (RE2) 
Product market influences were also seen as being present with elements of the mix 
offered because these were products that they offered to customers.  This was identified 
as being particularly relevant by REs in six firms that provided, as a significant business 
stream, pension products to their customers which, in turn, they felt compelled to 
deliver to their employees in their mix. 
Obviously the pension benefit because we are a pensions company, we felt as an 
employer we ought to be promoting very strongly that if you save well for your 
retirement.   So that was always a benefit that was going to be generous because 
of the nature of what we do.  (RE8) 
Furthermore, for those firms providing tax planning services for clients, this business 
was seen by their REs as an influence on their own reward mix design with regard to the 
use of tax efficient reward delivery vehicles.   
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It would be sensible though that if we are looking at tax changes and what they 
mean for our clients that we reflect this in our work with our employees’ reward 
packages.   (RE2) 
5.6.1.3 Political pressure 
Eight of the REs interviewed raised political pressures as having an impact on their 
firms‟ behaviour and their appetite to adopt a mix that differed from the industry norm 
position.    This pressure came in two ways.  First, indirectly through concern over the 
general media focus on the reward mix in place.  Second, directly through intervention 
for those firms subject to full or part State ownership, or subject to restrictions under 
certain guarantee arrangements provided by the State.  Six of the firms were under 
direct government influence at the time the REs were interviewed.  
The REs noted how the media pressure, whilst not having a dramatic effect on actual 
mix, was causing firms to reflect, following assessment of the benchmark data, on how 
the mix may be perceived externally in the media and with government and regulators.  
In 2008 all of our bonuses were obviously subject to quite a lot of media 
attention in [Firm name] and our CEO only two weeks ago, three weeks ago 
asked people to consider voluntarily giving them back at the senior levels.   
(RE3) 
However, a more dramatic effect was seen by REs working for those firms directly 
subject to government control either through ownership or support through the range of 
State-backed guarantee schemes that were in place at the time of the research.  Here the 
industry norm position was still significant but the coercive force of the new „owners‟ 
had meant that divergences from this benchmark had occurred.  This was summed up by 




The impact of government intervention and then government rhetoric has been – 
mostly the rhetoric rather than the intervention itself – has been the driver of 
significantly increased salaries in those firms which have major government 
investments in them. And the question really was whether other firms would 
follow them.  (RE18) 
Government intervention appeared to be having an influence on a number of firms‟ 
behaviour, but this had not fully translated through to all firms and was considered 
unlikely to do so, given the strength of mimetic pressures permeating the rest of the 
market.  However, what had emerged was that this intervention had caused some 
uncertainty in reward mix benchmarks and potentially weakened the clarity with which 
the industry norm position was viewed.  This in itself was seen as presenting a 
challenge for a number of firms as illustrated by the following: 
There is no such thing as the market at the moment. It’s impossible to define. It’s 
very… As last year, what people are doing is very driven by their own facts and 
circumstances, and it means that you can’t just say ‘well, that’s what they’re 
doing so we should do the same thing.   (RE16)   
This uncertainty led one RE to speculate that in reality two benchmark reward mix 
positions were forming, one for government-influenced firms and one for the rest of the 
market. 
There used to be a very tight range around base, very tight in the market, I think 
that's changed.  So there'll become a very wide range around base, and so you'll 
have those banks that pay low base, high bonus, and you'll have those banks that 
pay high base, low bonus.  (RE20) 
5.6.1.4 Parental influence 
Of the thirty REs interviewed, ten worked for subsidiaries of other entities.  The extent 
to which their firm was seen as having autonomy over their RMD, compared to how 
much was mandated from the parent group, did vary.  Restrictions were an issue for 
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these firms, with directions as to the appropriate reward mix, or at least certain 
components of that mix, coming from their parent groups.  This was aptly illustrated by 
one RE from a parent firm who had acquired a significant number of other firms over 
the last decade.  Their approach to managing the reward mix of these subsidiaries was 
very clear. 
The philosophy has been - you are acquired, you will do what we do.   There is 
no debate. (RE26) 
A number of explanations were given for the role that parent groups played in 
determining reward mix.  First, there was pragmatism with the centralisation being 
operated for administrative ease and cost management reasons. 
If you look at the size of the organisation and the costs that we were able to 
commit to the infrastructure, we didn’t see any point in reinventing the wheel in 
going out and finding our own pension advisers and setting up a pension 
scheme. So we would piggy back on their arrangements.  (RE11) 
Second, recent changes in the regulatory regime and wider concern about reward 
management structures and the balance between fixed and variable reward had meant 
that parent companies that had previously let their subsidiaries operate with autonomy 
were taking much greater interest and control, especially around bonus policies. 
When we first set up as an organisation five years ago there really wasn’t a 
huge level of interest in what we did, they didn’t actually really know what 
people were paid and as long as we were doing great business, then they were 
really happy.   Increasingly over time that has changed, there is now a real 
interest in what we are paying. (RE3) 
Finally, stronger control was also identified over share-based elements of the mix.  This 
was attributed to the need for the firm to keep control over the shares that were being 
allocated to ensure that they were appropriate with respect to shareholder interests and 
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avoiding unnecessary dilution. 
They abolished the share option scheme and they said we are bringing in 
another long-term incentive.   To be perfectly honest with you, some of the rules 
they have set around the scheme, if we were setting it up wouldn’t have been 
rules we would have set.   Culturally they are quite different to [firm name]. 
(RE11) 
Overall, the theme, where control was exercised, was one of bonus and share-based 
elements of the mix being heavily controlled, benefits being influenced but with some 
freedom to adapt to local expectations and base pay being left to the local team to 
determine in line with the benchmark data on local labour rates.  This meant that mix 
was not considered holistically and that the different reward components were not 
assessed collectively in the overall decision making process.  This contributed to a 
frustration amongst a number of the REs due to the lack of autonomy they perceived 
their firm having, and a concern that this meant they were out of line with local labour 
market practice.  
We are bringing in a new bonus scheme to be in line with the FSA and 
regulations and that is being designed from Frankfurt.   I actually have a bit of 
an issue with that because I am just hoping that they do take into account the 
particular type of market that we have in London, which is not the same as the 
investment banking market in Frankfurt. (RE10) 
However, the trend of parental control was not uniform with a range of REs noting the 
freedom within their firm for the operation of reward mix. 
The philosophy is a minimum standard that it applies on benefits and then 
countries have to work within those guidelines and build a set of competitive and 
fit for purpose… and there’s a lot of variety because things like pensions are 




5.6.1.5 The influence of history 
Five REs noted how, although the industry benchmark was important, specific historical 
factors solely related to their firms led them to operate elements of the mix that were not 
fully consistent with this benchmark.  First there were legacy contractual positions that 
meant that non industry norm conforming positions were adopted. 
There were a lot of legacy arrangements, and as you try to understand how did 
we get to where we are now, there were variable elements in the old, shall I say, 
[firm name] package, but not very much, and it really went through a phase 
where cash was king, so everything was consolidated into base pay.  Benefits 
was very, very meagre.  (RE17) 
In addition, one RE noted how his firm was reluctant to move away from the historical 
position they had adopted, even when this was not consistent with the current industry 
norm, given the high level of investment that had been put into the development of what 
were perceived to be relatively sophisticated reward mixes. 
It has taken us a lot of effort to get to the mix that we have now and I’d be 
reluctant to overhaul this given the amount of investment that has occurred.  The 
benefits of changing would not outweigh the cost of making the change so why 
would we throw away all that we have done.  (RE28) 
Finally, three REs noted specific historical cultural factors within their firms that led 
them to operate away from the mix in certain areas.  This is illustrated by the following 
quote. 
Where we have come from as a company is really important.  If it is right for us 
then we will use this to resist the benchmark. (RE24) 
5.6.2 Capability to differentiate 
Having reviewed the findings with regard to the five influences on the overall desire 
firms have to diverge from the industry norm, I now look at the influences affecting 
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their capability to differentiate their offering.  Two dimensions became apparent 
through review of the interview data – HR capability and capacity, and line 
management capability.  These will now be discussed. 
5.6.2.1 HR capability 
The strength of the isomorphic pressures and resource dependencies meant the pressure 
to conform to the industry norm position that was firmly entrenched was strong.  Eleven 
of the REs identified that any divergences from the industry norm position required 
significant HR capability in managing change and, in particular, managing potential 
employee unrest arising from offering a different package from what they would 
generally expect.  This capability was often acknowledged as lacking by the 
protagonists themselves, the HR professionals.  This was particularly true of the wider 
reward management capability in HR business partners, a structure that was common 
across the firms interviewed.  The business partners, including HR Directors, were seen 
as key conduits of change in all HR areas including reward, but overall the confidence 
of the REs in their ability was relatively limited and this acted as a break on pushing 
through more radical reform. 
You’ve got a lot of good to average HR people, not all of whom are comfortable 
in the reward space.  How many HR people, how many HR Directors would you 
say are comfortable in the reward space?  (RE21) 
This capability also related to the appetite of the reward and HR team itself, in the 
absence of any leadership pressure, to actually go through changes to the reward mix 
given the stress that managing change in this area could create. 
It’s a lot of angst to go through some of these things.  Generally if we can avoid 
making changes then we will.   (RE25) 
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Furthermore, trust in HR by business leaders and employees was seen as relatively low.  
The function‟s track record was not considered strong enough for these groups to have 
confidence that any changes proposed were appropriate and that the risk in moving 
against the industry norm was therefore worthwhile. 
I think there will be too much cynicism and not enough trust to enable us to do 
that.  (RE1) 
In addition, it was not only capability to manage change that was a concern but also the 
function‟s capacity to reform reward mix practice.  This was illustrated in the context of 
the ongoing changes to the legal framework underpinning reward policies.   
I guess on the one hand that kind of legislation should/could make you think 
about things and be a bit more creative.   But sometimes you kind of haven’t got 
time to step back and be creative about a global programme and so you just 
tweak the edges.   (RE6) 
And size did not appear to be a factor in this area. 
You look at a big company like this and think wow, they would have it all fixed; 
they would have it all sorted; they would be at the cutting edge of everything.   
...but no, it is an operational reactive function ..... there just literally hasn’t been 
the headcount previous to offer more support.  (RE7) 
The lack of capability and capacity within HR functions was also offered as a reason for 
why consultants were often influential in managing reward change within firms. 
We didn’t have any experience in-house at all and it’s such a sensitive area, we 
really wanted to make sure we got it right. (RE9) 
In all, seven REs believed their HR capability was strong enough to bring about reward 
mix change.  However, no pattern emerged across these firms with regard to their size, 
location, union representation, ownership or financial services sector. 
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5.6.2.2 Management capability 
Barriers to change were not only identified as being limited to the capability of the HR 
function to push through changes away from the established norm.  The significance of 
management‟s capability to manage reward change and, in particular, communication 
with employees was raised by seven REs.  One participant in a large retail firm noted 
that its line managers had well-established views which had been formed by the market 
position and reinforced the entrenched employee expectations that already exist. 
That’s a very interesting area which we have not been able to deliver on 
because of folk lore assumptions by management....  unfortunately management 
who have got to a point where many of them – this is a gross generalisation, but 
its true – have got stuck in a rut that unless they believe they incentivise people, 
people will come to work with the intention of doing a bad job, it’s very difficult 
to get them to a place which says this is a load of bollocks and actually people 
will come and do a good job because actually they are inspired to do a good job.  
(RE26) 
5.6.3 Opportunity to differentiate 
Alongside the dimensions influencing a firm‟s desire and capability to differentiate 
from the industry norm position, one further dimension was found to influence both the 
firm‟s desire and also its capability to resist this pressure – opportunity.   
Whilst the findings have shown that isomorphic pressures are strong, twelve REs were 
able to point to examples of practice that they had carried out within their firms that 
went against, to varying degrees, the established industry norm.  Exploration of these 
change events identified a high degree of opportunism.  Three specific events were 
identified as opportunities to reform the reward structure.  These will now be discussed. 
5.6.3.1 The financial crisis 
As already noted, the research was carried out at a time of significant dislocation in 
financial markets across the world.  These events had a major effect on a wide range of 
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firms across the financial services sector.  This was a key business issue at the time of 
the interviews.  However, eight REs identified that the crisis was also acting as a 
catalyst for a more fundamental review of their firms‟ reward approach.   
It’s not politically correct to say this openly but the crisis was useful in helping 
us move our reward practices forward.  We were able to make a range of 
changes that previously no one was interested in because times were so good, so 
why upset the boat.  (RE21) 
The crisis was an influence not only to those firms that were suffering relative financial 
weakness, but also as an opportunity for firms who considered their position to be one 
of relative financial strength.  This had afforded them the opportunity to position their 
mix to be more attractive than the industry norm to the most successful revenue-
generating staff and attract them from other firms, despite regulatory pressure in this 
area. 
We are using our strength to aggressively focus our mix in the way these key 
people like it.  We are keeping bonuses high and deferrals low, the State-owned 
firms just can’t match us either in level nor in structure.  (RE18) 
5.6.3.2 Regulatory change 
We have already identified that various regulatory developments were seen as a strong 
coercive constraint on the industry norm which was generally pursued by the firms 
interviewed.  However, as well as being a constraint, changes in regulation were also 
seen by twelve REs as an opportunity to challenge established entrenched internal 
beliefs on reward mix and make wider changes. They were seen as an opportunity to 
initiate reviews and, through this, potentially change the structure of reward from inside 
a firm. 
They gave us stuff to hang our hat on that we think we needed to change 
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anyway.  It was a good excuse.  Certainly Treating Customers Fairly was.  
Retail Distribution Review, you know, it’s yet to impact, but TCF was definitely 
a case of saying, hey, there’s some stuff here that provides a good excuse to 
insert some of the controls that we want.  (RE21) 
Moreover, whilst the REs sometimes found that the regulatory change underway was 
helpful, they did note that it was not causing fundamental reform, rather providing a 
chance to manage some change at the edges of the overall policy 
We used the FSA, the regulatory change, helpfully actually as a means to make 
a number of reward changes.... but it didn’t fundamentally make us say oh we 
better stop paying bonuses or change the mix.   It was at the edges.   (RE1)  
5.6.3.3 Merger 
Eight REs identified mergers, that their firms had been through, as times when more 
radical reform of reward mix was considered, including whether to depart from the 
industry norm.   Explanations for this were threefold.  First, there was the relative 
freedom it brought with respect to the legal contracts that were in place with employees 
which were reviewed at this time.  Whilst safeguards did exist as to the extent to which 
they could be changed, they were not as large as changing terms in a „normal‟ business 
operation. 
We are going through a big harmonisation process, so ultimately we are going 
to be changing people’s terms and conditions of employment, we are going to be 
changing people’s contracts.   So there is a whole legal overlay to what we are 
doing and it captures the terms and conditions piece in that.  (RE4)  
In addition, mergers presented an opportunity to break historically entrenched reward 
mixes that had developed over time and allow the organisation to return to the industry 
norm. 
Because-, because we were separate companies – [firm name1], [firm name2], 
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[firm name 3] – we had different terms and conditions. And I think it was-, in 
part, it was a case of looking at what the external market might expect people to 
be receiving in terms of a benefits package and trying to deal with any 
transitional arrangements basically to try to harmonise terms and conditions.  
(RE25) 
Mergers were identified not only as an opportunity to deal with the immediate issues 
around aligning terms and conditions of staff by looking for commonality, but also as a 
time when more fundamental reform could be considered. 
We discussed loads of different things but ultimately we said let’s go to the full – 
if we are going to give people bad news, let’s make it as bad as it gets and just 
do it. (RE1) 
5.6.4 Summary 
In summary the research identified eight elements that in combination increased the 
likelihood that firms would not adopt the industry norm reward mix.  These were shown 
to be influential on the firm‟s desire and capability to resist the strong institutional 
pressures to conform, especially when operating in combination with some opportunity 
to change the mix due to a crisis, merger or other major event such as a change in 
leadership.  These eight elements are discussed further below. 
5.7 Specific firm propensity to follow the industry norm 
The table in Appendix 10 shows for each firm discussed by the REs, the extent to which 
each of the desire, capability and opportunity dimensions outlined in section 5.6 were 
found to be present in the accounts provided of how the firms determined their reward 
mix.  Representative quotes from each of the interviews against these categories are also 
provided in Appendix 11 to provide transparency to the assessment made in the table.  
In addition, Appendix 10 shows whether the RE was able to provide examples of 




Appendix 10 highlights a number of important results.  The table shows that at least one 
dimension of desire to change was present in the accounts of the REs speaking of firms 
that they identified as having made a change to their reward mix which took them away 
from the industry norm.  From this we can tentatively conclude that „desire‟ is a 
necessary condition of movement away from the industry norm.  Furthermore, the 
degree to which a firm diverges from the industry norm appears to be further influenced 
by the extent to which either one of the desire dimensions is held particularly strongly, 
or that there is more than one of the desire conditions holding.   
Whilst having one of the desire dimensions present is a necessary condition of 
divergence from the industry norm, it does not appear to be sufficient.  For divergence 
to occur, at least one of the „capability‟ dimensions must also be present.  However, the 
table also shows that capability without the requisite desire appears to mean minimal 
divergence from the industry norm position.  
The findings can be used to categorise firms based on the extent to which they are 
willing and able to diverge from the industry norm.  Three positions emerged.  These 
are show diagrammatically in figure 12 which presents a three-way typology of firms 




















Figure 5-2 - Typology of firms 
These three categories of firms will now be reviewed. 
5.7.1.1 Market followers 
From the accounts of the REs speaking of their firms, twenty of the firms were 
categorised as operating in line with the industry norm position – this position 
demonstrating the dominance of the industry norm in influencing reward mix positions.  
The REs‟ accounts suggested that these firms had made no, or only minimal 
adjustments, to the industry norm position.   
It comes back to the sheep mentality doesn’t it, just following at a slight 












Analysis of the REs‟ accounts appear to identify that these firms typically had low 
desire (none or only one of the desire dimensions present) to operate outside the 
industry norm position.  Six firms were identified as having higher levels of desire for 
change, with two of the desire dimensions present, but these only operated in tandem 
with one or usually none of the capability dimensions leaving the desire to operate away 
from the industry norm unfulfilled.  These firms have been described as market 
followers and would be positioned in the yellow sections of the grid in Figure 5-2.  The 
accounts suggest that mimetic pressures are particularly strong within this group.  They 
are outward facing in their RMD looking for what their competitors are doing, both 
informally through conferences and networking, but also a strong use of benchmark 
data to establish their reward mix.   
The leadership within these types of organisation were identified as being keen to 
understand what others were doing, why any divergence in their reward mix had 
occurred and what was being done to „correct it‟.  The market position is considered a 
„safe‟ position with respect to meeting employee expectations and ensuring an ongoing 
ability to recruit and retain staff in what is perceived as being a highly competitive 
marketplace.   
5.7.1.2 Cautious leaders 
A series of accounts suggest that there is a group of firms who operate with moderate 
changes to the industry norm position.  Accounts of these firms indicate that they had a 
stronger desire to operate away from the industry norm reward mix position than the 
twenty market followers, exhibited by two or more of the desire dimensions being 
present.  The reports of eight REs suggest their firms were operating with moderate 
differentiation from the industry norm.  These are positioned in the orange sections of 
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Figure 5-2 and have been described as cautious leaders, given the lead that they were 
providing to others in the market, but always with „an eye on‟ what the market is doing 
to ensure they do not stray too far from this position. 
We would do if there was a need to, we are not slaves to the market. (RE27) 
Three of the REs from firms categorised as cautious leaders, identified their size as 
being a key factor in providing them with the commitment to adopt a more innovative 
position with respect to their reward mixes.  However, even these larger firms were also 
cautious about moving too far away from the established industry norm.  The REs for 
these firms believed the risk that this may damage the organisation‟s ability to attract 
and retain employees, due to strong employee expectations around the mix, was greater 
than the benefits that may accrue in this area from radically differentiating their reward 
package, as illustrated by one interviewee: 
So part of you says well let’s be the leaders rather than the followers, which is 
OK.   But you still have to compete in those markets and you still have employee 
expectations which are heavily influenced by what they see going on in the 
market so you do need to follow the market practice to an extent.  (RE5) 
In addition, opportunistic behaviour was apparent in the REs‟ accounts from these firms 
with „events‟, either internal such as a change in leadership, or external such as a 
takeover or merger, providing opportunities to change the reward mix and innovate.    
However, changes resulting from these events were still managed within the context of 
the relative safety of remaining within touching distance of industry norm reward mix.  
5.7.1.3 Mould breakers 
Finally, the accounts of two REs led to their firms being identified as having both high 
desire and capability to operate away from the industry norm position.  This appeared to 
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have led them to have highly differentiated reward mix positions relative to the industry 
norm.  This small group have been categorised as mould breakers and are shown in red 
in Figure 5-2.  The REs‟ accounts from these two firms paid significantly less regard to 
industry norm reward mix than the other accounts.  Mix was seen as being developed in 
relation to strong beliefs around the role of reward in influencing behaviour and 
supporting company strategy on the part of the leadership team and how the reward 
structure should therefore be aligned consistent with their distinctive company 
strategies.  A strong desire to operate differently from others in the market was present 
in order to secure competitive advantage.   
For one firm, an investment bank operating in central London, the RE‟s discussion 
suggested that this was about attracting the best staff through resisting the changes that 
were occurring to the industry norm position due to the moderating effect regulatory 
pressure was having at that time.  The RE described how the firm was proactively 
resisting strong pressures that were present for all firms in this section of the financial 
services industry, to raise the proportion of bonus to be deferred, increase the proportion 
of fixed pay making up the mix and eliminate the offering of bonus guarantees.  The 
firm was considered atypical, with other firms falling into line with these coercive 
changes. 
The changes were being resisted in order to secure significant advantages with respect 
to what were seen as financially weaker and more politically constrained competitors.   
Anything they do to make it more difficult for any other investment banks to 
compete is fantastic. (RE18) 
This led the RE to believe that although others would want to follow their resistance of 
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the coercive changes, they would be unable to do so.  This was due to the combination 
of direct, firm-specific, political pressure faced by those where the government was 
providing direct support and the relatively weak capital bases that they were carrying 
caused by the losses they had suffered during the financial crisis which could not absorb 
any additional capital charges that may be imposed by the regulator as penalties for 
adopting this non regulatory compliant mix position.  This weakness was not seen as 
being shared by this firm. 
We are saying ‘How much is it going to cost us?’ We will pay the additional 
capital cost.  (RE18) 
This RE identified that the firm was using its relative financial strength and strong 
business rationale (to use this position to attract and retain the highest quality of staff), 
aligned with strong line management commitment to resist the recent changes in this 
sector, to differentiate itself accordingly.   
The RE from the second firm, a long-term saving adviser and wealth management firm, 
also identified that her firm had radically moved its reward mix away from the 
established norm.  She discussed how the norm in their sector of the financial services 
industry was a position of high proportions of „variable‟ pay for employees linked to 
individual performance metrics (largely outcome not behavioural metrics).  However, 
she described how this firm had established a position of high proportions of fixed 
reward through offering significantly higher salaries than the market but with much 
lower bonus potential, alongside a very broadly defined benefit offering.  To keep the 
overall pay level the same as the market, the variable component remaining was small 
(typically no more than 10% of total compensation) and performance-related, but at a 
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company not individual level.   
Big bonuses for a few stars was not consistent with the values, payout based 
solely on sales regardless of whether the sale was justified were not consistent 
with the values, hierarchical benefits were not consistent with the values.  (RE2) 
This particular RE did not expect the rest of the industry to follow their position unless 
coercive constraints (especially regulatory change) impose this change on them.  
We are leading the way, but the others won’t follow unless the FSA forces them 
to.  (RE2) 
This non conformist position was, as in the first case, believed to be driven by a clear 
business rationale, with the RE describing how the firm was looking to show clients 
how its reward offering was in clients‟ interests and aligned with the advice provided. 
We actively promote what we do on reward here because we want clients to 
know how we reward our employees and through this the benefits we think that 
brings to the service we give to them. (RE2) 
Attraction and retention concerns have been a problem with this radical departure from 
the industry norm (in contrast to the other mould breaking firm where the package was 
seen as significantly more attractive than the newly emerging norm post-regulatory 
pressures).  On making the change, the RE identified that retention and recruitment 
were problematic as employees found the shift difficult to understand, given how 
different it was from the industry norm and the strong expectations that existed that this 
was the way people were rewarded in this sector.   
Some people got off on the way, they didn’t like the new environment, they didn’t 
like not being listened to as they saw it – typically. (RE2) 
Note, this is despite the fact that what had not changed was the overall level of total 
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compensation (which does remain heavily influenced by market pressures), but rather 
how that reward is delivered to employees.   
Both of these mould breaking positions are consistent with Lazear‟s contention that 
reward mix can be changed without increasing costs (Lazear, 1998).  Both firms noted 
that the reward level they operated was still constrained by the market, and they used 
market benchmarking to ensure they continue to pay around the market level.  However, 
what was not constrained was the reward mechanisms which they used to deliver the 
overall reward level. 
The limited evidence of mould breaking may suggest that the institutional pressures are 
too strong for this level of differentiation to occur regularly.  What did emerge from 
these cases was that although the institutional pressures are apparent, they are resisted 
due to the leadership team‟s beliefs on what is the right thing to do for each of these 
firms and strong HR change management capability which has shown its strength in 
making the change happen with limited disruption to the employment base. 
5.8 Conclusion to chapter five 
This chapter sets out the findings from thirty interviews with REs from financial 
services firms examining the influences on RMD.  The chapter, after first examining 
how REs conceptualise reward mix and how the RMD process operates at their firms, 
reviews the influences that apply in the formation of an industry norm reward mix 
position or benchmark, namely strong employee expectations, and moderators to these 
expectations in the form of legal, regulatory and taxation pressures.  The findings then 
go on to examine the extent to which firms feel compelled to follow this industry norm 
position through examining moderating variables that influence an individual firm‟s 
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desire and capability to adopt a divergent reward mix position 
Building on the findings presented this chapter then outlined why some firms feel able 
to resist the norm position and operate alternative reward mixes.  Three groupings of 
firms were identified, depending on the extent of differentiation they pursue – mould 
breakers, cautious leaders and market followers – with the characteristics of each group 
examined.   
Chapter six takes the findings and initial analysis presented in chapters four and five 
and from this reformulates the conceptual framework first introduced in chapter two and 
developed further in chapter four, into a descriptive model of RMD in the financial 
services industry.   In addition, the chapter positions the research findings in the context 
of the reward mix literature discussed in chapter two. 
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6 Chapter six:  Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapters four and five the findings from the interviews with the RCs and REs were 
presented.  In this chapter I discuss how the insights from the interviews conducted help 
address the research question – What influences RMD in financial services 
organisations?  In doing this, I systematically build a descriptive model of RMD based 
on the process of theory building established by Whetten (2002) and, in addition 
alongside this, position the findings of the data within the context of the reward mix 
literature discussed in chapter two. 
This chapter is therefore organised as follows.  Sections 6.2 and 6.3 present models of 
industry norm reward mix development and firm specific RMD.  These are then 
aggregated in section 6.4 when an overall model of RMD is presented.  Sections 6.5.1.1, 
6.5.1.2 and 6.5.1.3 assess the model developed in the context of the agency, institutional 
and resource dependency literatures introduced in chapter two.  In addition section 
6.5.1.4 discusses two other theoretical perspectives that were found to have relevance – 
path dependency and strategic compensation.  Section 6.5.3 discusses how an 
appropriate combination of all these theoretical positions provides an overall theory of 
RMD.  The final section summarises the chapter. 
6.2 A descriptive model of industry norm development 
Sutton and Shaw observe that “Theory is about connections among phenomena, a story 
about why acts, events, structure and thoughts occur” (1995: 378).  In order to tell this 
story with respect to the findings, this chapter develops a descriptive model of RMD in 
the financial services industry.  This is developed as a way of structuring the findings 
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such that relationships which the REs and RCs have identified can be seen.  It is not an 
analytical model showing definite causality, but rather a diagrammatic representation of 
my interpretation of what I heard during the research presented in a logical manner to 
support wider understanding of this area and aid the discussion which follows.  Whetten 
noted that diagrams of this nature are useful “as visual aid(s) that helps storytellers 
highlight the main features of their explanations” (2002: 50).   In this context, the lines 
and directional arrows shown in the model indicate relationships believed to exist by the 
actors themselves with the interrelationships shown being drawn from my interpretation 
of their accounts.  The model presented is by definition exploratory in nature and should 
be considered academically as ongoing work available for others to test some of the 
hypotheses that the descriptive model suggests.  
The findings outlined earlier highlight the significance of the industry norm on the final 
reward mix position taken by the firm.  The framework developed from the RC 
interviews in chapter four (Figure 4-1) focused on the influences of market forces, in 
particular what were described as labour market influences, on the overall industry 
norm position, moderated only by specific legal, tax and regulatory requirements that 
may be present.  The data from the interviews with the REs provided greater clarity over 
what, at least in the financial services sector, is meant by market forces and the 
importance of employee expectations as the primary influence on the industry norm 
reward mix.  Employee expectations were seen by both REs and RCs as being the 
reason why benchmarking of market reward mix was so significant as there was a 
general belief that adopting a reward mix position away from the established norm 
would not be consistent with expectations employees have and therefore would cause 
problems with regard to attraction and retention.  This was even raised as being the case 
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when the differentiation from the benchmark position was intended to make the overall 
reward mix more advantageous for employees. 
This relationship is represented in the first stage of a model of industry reward mix 
norm development shown in Figure 6-1 with the arrow showing the direction of 




Figure 6-1 – First stage industry norm reward mix model 
 
Employee expectations are seen to both influence, and be influenced by, union 
representation, when this is present in firms.  The addition of the union influence on the 









Figure 6-2 – Second stage industry norm model 
Employee expectations (and those of their unions where present) were believed to be 
driven by strong historical reward patterns formed over several decades which were 
strongly engrained in employees‟ expectations and therefore were seen as being 
particularly difficult to change.  These patterns were seen to have been formed by a 
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combination of two factors.  First, the interviews identified that the general structure 
and profitability of the financial services sector, i.e. product market effects, had led to 
the formation of a sense of entitlement amongst employees with respect to the sharing 
of wealth created in the industry between the owners of the firms and employees.  
Second, owner beliefs about the role of reward structures were significant in forming 
historical reward patterns and, through this, influencing employee expectations over 
time – in particular, the role played by incentive and bonus schemes in motivating 
employee behaviour and benefits, and the responsibility firms felt for the welfare of 
their employees both for paternalistic reasons, and with respect to their search for 













Figure 6-3 – Third stage industry norm model 
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Finally, the interviewees identified that employee expectations, although the main 
determinant of the industry norm position, were not acting unfettered on the benchmark 
position.  Three key moderating variables were present, affecting the transmission of 
these strong employee expectations through to the final industry norm:  the influence of 
legal, taxation and regulatory requirements on remuneration structures.  These are 














Figure 6-4 – Final model of the development of an industry norm 
This industry norm reward mix was seen by the interviewees as the starting point for 
firms‟ RMD.  However, the research found that not all firms adopted the industry norm 
or benchmark position.  The next section will discuss the factors that the interviews 
identified as influencing the propensity of firms to follow the norm position or operate 
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6.3 A model of firm reward mix determination 
The interviews, with both RCs and REs, identified that there were risks associated with 
diverging from the industry norm reward mix with respect to the effect this may have on 
the ability of firms to attract and retain employees due to the strong employee 
expectations that had built up over a prolonged period of time (Note: this was even felt 
to exist when the changes to mix were believed to be positive for employees).  In 
chapter five we saw that the extent to which firms were willing to take a risk and 
operate outside the perceived „safe harbour‟ of the industry norm position appeared to 
be formed through the interplay of two variables.  First, the firm‟s desire to resist the 
industry norm and differentiate its reward mix which was seen as being influenced by 
the following five dimensions: 
 Leadership – The appetite of the leadership to adopt reward mix positions that 
differentiated the reward offering to employees from firms competing for the 
same labour. 
 Business strategy – Specific and unique positioning with respect to each firm‟s 
product and customer management strategies. 
 Political pressure – Exerted on the specific firm rather than the market as a 
whole.  The strength of this influence was further dependent on the extent to 
which the firm in question was subject to State control through participation in 
some form of Government support following the financial crisis. 
 Parental influence – For those operating as subsidiaries of overseas firms, 
specific parental requirements with regard to the reward mix that were not 
necessarily in line with the industry norm reward mix in the UK.  
 Firm-specific history – The influence of enduring historical, but firm-specific, 
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positions and precedents. 
These five dimensions could be further categorised into desires driven from within the 
firm through leadership, business strategy formation and firm-specific history, and 
coercive externally driven desires generated for the firm by others shown by either 
direct political pressure or parental dictum.   This distinction is significant in that it 
helps identify what actions the firm can take to manipulate the dimensions itself (i.e. 
those from within) and which it was simply a matter of reacting to (i.e. external 
pressures).  
Second, operating alongside the firm‟s desire to operate to some degree away from the 
established industry norm was the firm‟s capability to resist the institutional pressures 
formed in the industry norm.  This was influenced by two dimensions: 
 HR capability and capacity – To manage any change from the industry norm 
position and the potential implications this may have for attraction and retention 
of employees holding industry norm expectations with respect to their reward 
mix. 
 Line management capability – The findings identified that managing employee 
expectations could not come solely from the HR function but were dependent on 
line management understanding and supporting the messages in their daily 
interaction within their teams.  Therefore the capability of line management to 
work with HR in managing and communicating differences to the industry norm 
to their teams, and managing any implications, was important in adopting a non 
conforming reward mix position.   
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In addition, one further dimension was seen in the findings to influence both the firm‟s 
desire to resist the institutional pressure to conform to the industry norm, and also the 
firm‟s capability to resist this pressure – opportunity.   
 Opportunity – The presence of an opportunity, both to act as a catalyst for 
change and therefore influence the firm‟s desire, and also a justification, largely 
to employees, of the need for a differentiated approach relative to the norm and 
therefore influence the firm‟s capability to change.  These events were found to 
be firm-specific financial crises, regulatory pressure and mergers/takeovers. 
The presence of these variables had the effect of weakening the strength of the 
relationship between the industry norm and the reward mix actually deployed by the 
firm.  This base relationship is shown as: 
 
 
Figure 6-5 – First stage firm reward mix model 
The model is then completed by the addition of the desire and capability moderating 


















Figure 6-6 - Model of firm reward mix determination 
6.4 Overall model of reward mix determination 
In chapter two I developed a conceptual framework from the academic literature on 
RMD (Figure 2-1).  In chapter four this was then developed through interviews with 
RCs into an initial descriptive model of RMD (Figure 4-1).  Finally, in this chapter, 
with further reference to the findings from interviews with REs currently working in the 
financial services industry, this has been developed into an overall model of RMD.   In 
section 6.2 I developed from the findings a model of industry norm reward mix 
development and in section 6.3 a model of firm RMD.   These can now be combined to 
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form a complete model of RMD, in the context of the financial services sector – see 
Figure 6-7. 
The final model also incorporates a feedback loop.  What emerged from the interviews 
was that the model was not a static one.  A feedback loop was present between the 
individual firm reward mix and employee expectations.  Where firms did diverge from 
industry practice this would eventually be communicated back into the wider labour 
market.  The extent to which this feedback loop was influential was seen as being 
influenced by the size of the firm, with larger firms being seen as more significant in 
moving general employee expectations when they did diverge from the industry norm 
position.  This is incorporated into the final model shown in Figure 6-7. 
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This chapter will now examine the insights from the model developed through 
positioning the discussion in the context of the reward mix literature discussed in 
chapter two and in particular the theoretical approaches found to explain mix decisions 
found in the literature. 
6.5 Implications for the theoretical understanding of reward 
mix determination 
6.5.1 Theoretical perspectives 
In chapter two we saw that although RMD research has been carried out there is still no 
one paradigm emerging from the work (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003).  This may be 
because the determination of mix is inherently complex, or that the list of factors that 
statistical work has identified as being related to RMD has muddied the field and we 
need to develop a framework to better understand these multiple influences.  Gerhart 
and Milkovich (1992) noted that we should be looking to adapt the range of theories 
that have emerged to improve our knowledge of reward systems.  In this context the 
literature suggested that three theoretical explanations for how firms determine their 
reward mix were worth exploring further: 
 Agency theory 
o To manage potential misalignment between principals and agents. 
o Reward mix is intended to minimise shirking when monitoring is 
difficult/costly.  Relative weight of incentives versus fixed reward will 
be managed to optimise the alignment of agents‟ and principals‟ 
interests. 
 Institutional theory 
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o That coercive, mimetic and normative institutional forces create 
significant pressures on firms to be similar in how they operate in their 
search for legitimacy. 
o Reward mix will be influenced by other organisations and market 
practice to gain legitimacy.  The extent to which these constraints 
operate for each firm will influence how much freedom of choice the 
firm actually has in its operation. 
 Resource dependency theory 
o Organisational decisions are strongly influenced by those controlling 
„critical resources‟. 
o Reward mix will be influenced by the relative strength of employee 
groups determined by their criticality to organisation success. 
In this section I will discuss the model of RMD developed above within these 
theoretical perspectives and comment on how the insights that the model provides 
support, refine and add to what we know already about RMD through these 
perspectives. 
6.5.1.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory demonstrates how reward mix can be used to attempt to align employee 
and employers interests as it is felt that “Paying individuals to do X causes them to do 
X” (Prendergast, 1999: 11).   However, the literature identifies that a number of barriers 
exist to managing reward mix in this way.  First, the additional cost employers are seen 
to incur when managing mix in this manner, as employees require compensating for the 
higher risk that variable pay implies given the relative uncertainty of payment which 
exists (Tremblay et al. 2003).  Further, the theory proposes that the extent to which it is 
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rational to pay this additional cost, or risk premium, depends on whether roles can be 
monitored easily by the management team to ensure that workers are not shirking from 
their responsibilities and how much this monitoring costs, compared to the extra reward 
payments which are required due to the risk premium payable (Eisenhardt, 1989a) . 
6.5.1.1.1 Control, attraction, retention 
The agency prescriptions around aligning employees with the financial interests of the 
shareholders were a relevant consideration discovered in the research, although not the 
dominant issue in RMD as is perhaps suggested by the volume of research carried out 
under this theoretical perspective.  This result is perhaps surprising, given that the 
financial services sector is characterised by relatively high proportions of reward being 
paid through bonus, which is consistent with an agency consideration of using reward 
mix of this type to control and direct employees‟ behaviour (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 
1992; Delvey, 1999).  REs‟ accounts showed that they believed organisational success 
was aligned with employee reward during the period before the financial crisis when 
firm returns were relatively high and alignment therefore provided high levels of reward 
for employees as they took their „share‟ of the revenues generated.  However, with the 
financial crisis, this relationship has been seen to break down with REs noting that 
aligning employees‟ financial interests directly with the firm‟s shareholders was fine in 
theory, but that their organisations had not seen this through to its full and logical 
conclusion of zero bonuses when losses were recorded, for fear of significantly 
demotivating employees.   
What emerged was that reward mix was not used to control employee behaviour, 
through, for example, minimising employee shirking, as proposed by agency theorists.  
Thus the risk premium that theory suggests is paid when using variable performance-
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related rewards such as bonus schemes (Tremblay et al. 2003) was excessive as it was 
not withdrawn when performance outcomes for the firms were relatively poor as was 
seen for all the firms of which the REs spoke. 
Much more significant were the considerations of attraction and retention.  Throughout 
the accounts, the proportion of incentives in the mix was justified, not with reference to 
the prescriptions of agency theory, but rather the need to avoid changing the mix away 
from the strong employee expectations that were present in the financial services sector 
for fear of causing attraction and retention issues for the firm.  This did not mean that 
the proportion of variable pay in the overall mix would not have an influence on those 
currently employed by the organisation through incentive effects, but this was, at best, a 
secondary consideration.  This was apparent for the two mould breaking firms identified 
in the research.  The RE from the investment bank (RE18) noted that his firm was 
explicitly resisting the coercive changes in the mix being made by the financial 
regulator in order to have a more attractive package than their competitors and, through 
this, they were actively looking to recruit from other investment banks that were seen to 
be constrained, or in financial difficulties, and therefore unable to resist the constraints.  
The RE from the second mould breaker (RE2) outlined how her firm faced some 
retention difficulties, when it dramatically increased the proportion of fixed reward at 
the expense of variable pay.  This was initially seen as unattractive to employees simply 
because it was different from what was seen in the wealth management / advisory 
market from which they recruited.  Employees still expected a bonus, even when their 
fixed reward had been increased to compensate for its removal.  This behaviour can be 
examined in relation to one of the assumptions of agency theory – rationality.  Agency 
theory assumes that all parties to the economic exchange operate rationally (Eisenhardt, 
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1989a).  However, the findings show that the REs did not believe that employees had 
the level of sophistication and understanding of their reward in order to operate in this 
theoretically rational way.  An alternative explanation may be that employees were 
acting rationally, but were exercising poor judgement regarding the best economic 
outcome for themselves. 
Theory proposes that the shift of reward from variable to fixed pay, and therefore 
guaranteed, is theoretically a more favourable position for employees as risk to their 
income stream had been removed (Lazear, 1986; 1999).  However, RE2 explained that 
when they increased the certainty in the package in this way a number of employees still 
felt the need to leave the firm for the more established reward mix that continued to be 
offered by their „market following‟ competitors.  This was consistent with the overall 
strength of employee expectations that was discussed by both RCs and REs and how 
this dominated RMD.  Historical reward patterns were stronger than the suggested 
theoretically rational assessment of the optimal position – again, suggesting that poor 
judgement was being exercised by employees regarding the optimum position, 
economically, to adopt. 
Additionally, the findings showed that a number of REs cautioned how too high a 
reliance on incentives to align or control behaviour and incentivise employee 
performance could lead to a misalignment of employee/employer interests.  Two 
explanations are offered.  First, the damage that aligning interests in such an economic 
exchange may encourage short-term behaviour which, although bringing positive results 
in the short-term, were not in the longer term interests of the firm.  The need to consider 
time horizons when considering the role of mix in incentivising behaviour was seen as 
254 
 
important at this point in time for the financial services industry, given the consensus, at 
least among regulators and politicians if not all practitioners, that the reward mix had 
encouraged excessive short-term risk taking that was not in the interests of the long-
term sustainability of firms (McCarthy, 2008; Darling, 2008; Financial Times, 2008; 
Institute of International Finance, 2009; FSA, 2009b; Chapman, 2009). 
In addition, over-reliance on variable reward as a control and directing mechanism was 
potentially seen as being counterproductive due to the possible effects this approach 
might have on employee welfare through creating an environment of pressure and stress 
which may lead to lower levels of performance. 
These concerns with the role of incentives in aligning behaviour led to the development 
of an alternative perspective on the role of mix in aligning interests between employer 
and employee which will be discussed next. 
6.5.1.1.2 A more holistic alignment of interests 
What emerged from the research was that the RCs and the REs did see a role for reward 
mix in aligning employer and employee interests.  However, this was not solely through 
the use of incentives to control behaviour, but rather a more holistic desire to look at 
employee needs within the whole package and evaluate how best to meet those needs in 
the belief that this would lead to higher commitment, productivity and performance.  
The participants generally believed that the provision of a package which met employee 
needs through market competitive base pay, a bonus reflecting recognition of their 
contribution to organisational success (as opposed to reward for compliant behaviour), 
benefits that supported their welfare and provided protection against unforeseen events 
and wider relational factors such as respect of their home life, would lead to higher 
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performing individuals through engendering higher levels of commitment and 
performance.  Aligning employee behaviours through reward was important, but was 
not conceived as narrowly as proposed in the agency control and monitoring manner.    
This could be seen in the discussion surrounding why organisations provided employee 
benefits such as medical and health-related support.  Provision of these employee 
benefits was not with some altruistic intention, which many noted was their 
understanding of the origin of a number of employee benefits, but rather a business-
focused approach whereby ensuring that employees remain fit or recover quickly from 
illness or injury through the provision of health-related support was in both employees‟ 
and employers‟ interests.  The alignment of employees‟ and owners‟ interests was seen 
as important but was not viewed as narrowly as currently suggested by the economics-
based literature within which agency theory is found.  A true, more balanced, alignment 
of interests was what was being sought, not one based on assumptions of shirking, 
control and monitoring.  A refined agency theory may be required to account for this 
perspective. 
6.5.1.1.3 Conclusions 
Overall, significant questions are raised about the applicability of pure agency theory as 
an explanation of RMD, supporting the conclusions of Eisenhardt (1988), Conlon and 
Parks (1990), Deckop et al. (1999) and Fernadez-Alles et al. (2006) that, on their own, 
the theoretical prescriptions of an agency approach to reward mix are found wanting.  In 
particular, the fundamental assumptions of rational employees whose interests are 
different from their employers‟ are disputed, as firms take a more holistic, broader 
approach to RMD than is suggested by agency theory, in the belief that productivity and 
commitment is raised through ensuring that employees share in the success of the 
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organisation (but not necessarily the failure) through bonus schemes, and are protected 
through a range of benefit offerings.  This is not, as perhaps was the case historically 
when benefit packages were first introduced, due to paternalistic considerations by the 
firm, but rather a rational assessment of the attraction, retention and commitment 
benefits of operating reward mix in this way.   
The explanation for why these elements of agency theory need developing was that a 
wider perspective is taken on the reward mix with the need to create an overall package 
that both attracts and retains staff by meeting strong expectations of what the mix 
should look like, supports their well-being and health to ensure that they can remain 
productive at work as well as enjoy their home life, and creates commitment to the 
company through meeting a variety of their needs through reward.  This approach was 
seen as a more powerful way of encouraging behaviour that was in line with the 
principal‟s interests.   This explanation contradicts the media / popular opinion present 
at that time with respect to financial services reward with its focus on monetary gain 
alone amongst those working in the sector.  This suggests that it is perhaps time to 
develop the economic perspective of agency theory and adopt a wider perspective on 
employee alignment taking into account the need through all the elements of reward 
mix  to align employees‟ behaviour through building commitment and engagement not 
just by controlling and managing shirking.   
Based on the discussion of the findings of this research presented above, the 
contribution of this research to our understanding of RMD from an agency theory 
perspective is summarised in Table 6-1.  This shows how the findings either support, 
refine or add to theoretical explanation, and summarises how the findings achieve this. 
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Consequently, the results from this study support the call that we should extend our 
investigation of RMD beyond an agency perspective.  A pure agency-based approach 
appears to overestimate both efficiency and rational drivers of decision making in 
reward mix choice, and underestimates the institutional and political power-related 
pressures that may be relevant to organisations (Barringer and Milkovich, 1998; Bartol 
and Locke, 2000).  Furthermore, the weaknesses of agency theory‟s narrow 
conceptualisation of reward mix have been highlighted, with firms generally having a 
wider consideration of what reward mix means to them and how this influences 
employee alignment.  In this context an institutional perspective will now be examined. 
6.5.1.2 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory suggests that coercive, mimetic and normative institutional forces 
create significant pressures on firms to be similar in how they operate in their search for 
legitimacy.  The extent to which these constraints operate for each firm influences how 
much freedom of choice the firm actually has in its operation (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003; 
Crystal, 1991; Carpenter and Wade, 2002; Treiman and Hartmann, 1981; Slichter et al., 
1960).  This theoretical perspective was well supported by the research and forms the 
core of the model of RMD developed and shown in Figure 6-7.   
The model shows that the need for legitimacy was generally defined with respect to 
meeting expectations of employees, both current and prospective, as opposed to other 
stakeholders such as shareholders and government, and wider societal expectations.  
This is consistent with Suchman‟s definition of legitimacy as “a generalised perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (1995: 574) 
with employee expectations being the socially constructed position. 
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DiMaggio and Powell (1991) identified three ways that isomorphism influences 
organisational decisions – coercive, mimetic and normative pressures.   All three are, to 
varying degrees, seen in the research findings.  Each of these will be discussed in turn in 
the context of the findings on RMD. 
6.5.1.2.1 Coercive isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism results from the combination of both formal and informal 
pressures on organisations by other organisations on which they have some mutual 
dependency.  The research found that the dominant industry norm reward mix position 
was established following the application of a number of coercive moderating pressures 
on employee expectations (Figure 6-4).  The industry norm position was only weakly 
influenced by legal pressures.  Much stronger were the coercive pressures, and through 
this the formation of a revised industry norm, coming from the operation of financial 
services regulators, who were particularly active at the time of the research in defining 
new rules for financial services rewards.  The REs interviewed, with one exception, 
accepted the moderating shift that this regulatory coercive change had brought to the 
previously defined norm position.  This was attributed to the regulators‟ power with 
respect to providing the licence that firms needed to operate in the financial services 
sector, and also over their profitability through their capital setting powers.  This 
provides support to Pfeffer and Salancik‟s (2003) conclusion that, typically, politically 
driven coercive forces will be applied across the board and consequently are likely to 
restrict adaptability and flexibility across the sector.  One of the mould breaking firms 
was an exception to this position, given its desire to resist the changes for attraction and 
retention reasons, and also its ability to do so because of its strong financial position and 
management desire to gain competitive advantage from the regulatory change.  This is 
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in line with Oliver‟s (1991) contention that, whilst an extreme position to take, 
organisations may take a conscious decision to ignore regulatory requirements through a 
rational assessment of the consequences of such action.  However, the research extends 
the application of this regulatory coercive pressure as the pressure was not only 
operating at a sectoral level, but was also significant (for those firms receiving some 
form of direct Government support at the time of the research) at an individual firm 
level as Government looked to impose certain restrictions on how they operate their 
reward mix.   
Van der Stede (2003) and Roth and O‟Donnell (1996) contended that a further source of 
coercive pressure was the presence of “intracorporate isomorphism” (Van der Stede, 
2003: 268), reflecting the strong influence of parent companies on business unit policies 
including reward design.  Significant evidence of this was found, with a range of 
parental requirements for subsidiaries and branches in place which meant these firms 
often found they were adopting a reward mix away from the UK industry norm position.  
This created considerable frustration for a number of the REs, given the limitation they 
believed it imposed on the reward mix at their firm.  Whilst appearing efficient from the 
parent groups‟ perspective (specifically in relation to the use of variable pay and share 
related payments) it was often seen as out of line with the local market conditions and 
employee expectations in the UK financial services labour market.  The research 
extends our understanding of this “intracorporate isomorphism”, or at least its 
application within the financial services sector, given the explanation for its prevalence 
invariably being increased coercive regulatory and political pressure in the home market 
that is then applied across the globally active firms to host countries within which the 
firms operated, often irrespective of host country, industry norm, reward mix 
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conventions.  This was particularly significant in the financial services sector as whilst 
regulators were seen as attempting to introduce similar remuneration regulations across 
national boundaries there were still seen to be material differences in regulations 
reflecting different national approaches to the topic.  
Furthermore, our understanding of parental coercive pressures was further enhanced, 
given the research finding that parental pressures were not just coercive: with head 
office dictating policy as was the case for a number of share-related schemes and bonus 
policies which were mandated from head office, but also mimetic: with the business 
unit mimicking successful business unit or head office practices particularly with 
respect to avoiding extra design costs when a practice within the group was seen as 
being successful, or normative: adoption of a corporate template already available in the 
organisation which was raised with respect to operating reward administration more 
efficiently than would be the case if separate infrastructure was put in place in the 
subsidiary.  The distinction that DiMaggio and Powell made between coercive, mimetic 
and normative isomorphic pressures was not clear-cut for parental isomorphism which 
crossed all three classifications.  This is in line with Mizruchi and Fein‟s (1999) 
contention that there is much overlap in the categories, and many examples of 
isomorphism could be given alternative classifications. 
6.5.1.2.2 Mimetic isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism contends that organisations model their reward mix on that 
adopted by other organisations (Eisenhardt, 1988; Taras, 1997; Segalla et al., 2006).  
The research provides strong support for the existence of mimetic pressures in the 
financial services sector at this time.  The default position, or starting point, in RMD 
was what other firms were doing.   Operating at the industry norm was seen as a „safe‟ 
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operating position, given it meant that the firm‟s reward mix approach was broadly in 
line with the vast majority of firms with whom it was competing.  Although firms 
recognised that this meant they were not gaining competitive advantage through reward 
mix differentiation, they did identify that in turn they were not exposing the 
organisation to potential uncertainty which operating away from the norm was felt to 
present, especially regarding the strong, historically formed, expectations of employees 
seen in the research.  A number of the interviewees saw this as a passive adoption of the 
practice of others, as generally expected in the institutional theory literature (Conlon 
and Parks, 1990; Fernandez-Alles et al., 2006).  However, this was not always the case 
with a judgement of the risks of differentiation often leading to what was felt to be a 
rational decision to adopt the industry norm reward mix position.  This is consistent 
with the findings of Norman et al. (2007), in their research on the airline sector, and 
Arrowsmith and Sisson (1999), in their work on the engineering, printing, health and 
retail sectors, and their contention that organisations look to avoid uncertainty and 
diverging from standard practice introduces a level of uncertainty in comparison to 
other organisations.   The research showed that adoption of the industry norm position 
was not always passive, but rather was often a conscious consideration of the firm‟s risk 
appetite.  Where differentiation from the norm was extensive, the risk appetite was 
higher with the gains expected from this level of differentiation outweighing the 
potential costs with respect to attraction and retention difficulties.  Furthermore, the 
findings showed that there was a range within which differentiation was seen as 
relatively low risk (the position adopted by the cautious leaders) and was therefore the 
stance adopted by more organisations than the more radical mould breaking positions of 
a much smaller number of firms.  This focus on risk was perhaps unsurprising given the 
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importance of risk management activities in the operating models of firms in the 
financial services sector. 
Whilst the mimetic pressures were strong the research did not support a number of 
contentions that others have made with reference to the sources of mimetic behaviour.  
The research did not find that mimetic behaviour was driven by firms looking to model 
themselves on organisations that are seen to be successful, but rather found that 
isomorphic behaviour was more habitual.  The symbolic and practical reliance on 
benchmarking activity was strong evidence of this habitual approach with all the RCs 
and REs interviewed, including the REs from the two mould breaking firms, identifying 
the significance of benchmarking data on shaping their reward strategy in some form.  
In addition, there was only limited evidence of consultants playing a significant role in 
diffusing practice across firms beyond their role in facilitating the sharing of reward 
data through their benchmarking services, which of course was a strong factor 
confirming the conclusions of Eisenhardt (1988) and Crystal (1991).  They were not the 
powerful facilitators of isomorphic reward mix practice portrayed by Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia (1998). 
In addition, the research showed that only limited support can be given to Main et al.‟s 
(2008) and Pfeffer and Salancik‟s (2003) conclusion that larger scale organisations were 
better able to resist mimetic pressures, through influence and financial strength, and 
therefore adopt practices more in line with their strategic goals.  The two mould 
breakers were not large relative to the other firms that were studied, although one was 
exploiting its relative financial strength in adopting a contrarian reward mix stance.  The 
propensity to fall into the cautious leader category did appear to have some relationship 
264 
 
to size, with a number of the REs working at very large banking conglomerates carrying 
out incremental innovation of their mix.  However, as shown in chapter five, this was 
often attributed to size but moderated with caution led by concern over even large firms‟ 
ability to adopt a reward mix significantly away from that generally expected by 
employees.  Size may have given the firm a desire to differentiate, but they were 
generally wary as to their capability to manage the change, especially with regard to 
managing employee relations.  
Finally, the accounts of how both product market and owners‟ beliefs influenced the 
formation of employee expectations historically, as shown in figure 6.3, provides 
support to Tolbert and Zucker‟s (1983) contention that the influence of institutional 
pressure is lower, and other elements will drive decisions, in what they described as the 
pre-institutionalised phase of a sector.  A number of the REs made clear links to the 
historical structure of the financial services industry, the overall profitability which this 
structure had generated and owners‟ beliefs, both with regard to motivating employees 
through relatively high proportions of variable pay and paternalistic tendencies through 
generous benefit packages. However, the sector was now considered firmly 
institutionalised and these historical factors reduced in significance.  This provides 
support to the theoretical work of Wright and McMahan, in the context of all HR 
practices, which noted the possible influence of history, suggesting that “organisation 
practices can be institutionalised through an imprinting process whereby the practices 
adopted at the beginning of the organisation‟s history remain embedded in an 
organisation” (1992: 314). The research extends this theoretical explanation in this 
context, given the discovery that the practices which emerged in the sector many 
decades ago had become embedded, not just in individual organisational practice but 
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also employee expectations and sectoral practice, with new firms adopting the 
institutional position through mimetic practice. 
6.5.1.2.3 Normative isomorphism 
The evidence supporting the presence of normative isomorphism was weaker 
(especially in the accounts of the RCs) but nevertheless did exist.  Normative pressures 
stem from the search for credibility, through professionalising the area of reward 
management which leads to the arrangement of practice into codified principles and 
accepted standards (Barringer and Milkovich, 1998).  These practices are then spread 
through the networks of individuals leading reward decision within firms, i.e. the REs 
interviewed.  Social networks were identified as existing amongst the reward 
practitioners both sectorally, through groups such as the Financial Services Reward 
Group, which has over 20 financial services firms as members, and the local HR 
gatherings in place for all the non London-based firms.  However, these forums were 
less about codifying practice, but rather mimetically establishing what each was doing 
both qualitatively and, in some instances, through the sharing of reward data.  No 
evidence was found to support another element of normative isomorphism – the 
codification of knowledge through qualifications, training programmes etc.  No 
reference was made to the influence that training or qualifications had had on the 
behaviour, recommendations and actions of the REs.  The finding that normative 
pressures were not influential can be explained in the context of the previous discussion 
of mimetic and coercive behaviour within this sector.  The networking that was done 
was carried out with the aim of understanding more fully the practice of others to ensure 
that mimetic legitimacy could be gained with employees.  The interviewees were 
conscious of the information flow that occurred across employees in the sector and 
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therefore the importance of staying fully aware of the practice of others who were 
recruiting from the same employment market. 
6.5.1.2.4 Diverging from the industry norm 
The research clearly finds that institutional pressures are strong – coercive, in 
influencing the industry norm, and mimetic, in explaining why firms adopt similar 
positions.  It also identifies the significance of employee expectations in leading firms 
to follow the industry norm positions and the historical drivers of these expectations.  
However, the RMD model also shows a number of dimensions that influence the desire 
and capability of firms to operate away from the strongly entrenched industry norm 
position.  These explain why the industry norm reward mix, whilst dominant, is not all-
pervasive in determining reward mix practice. 
6.5.1.2.5 Risk appetite 
The research showed that the organisation‟s risk appetite was important in determining 
the extent to which it would diverge from the industry norm position.  A number of 
firms found that they had both the desire and capability to adopt a reward mix away 
from the industry norm position.  Sanders and Tuschke termed these “institutionally 
contested practices”, and defined them specifically as “new organizational practices that 
face stiff opposition from key constituents in potential adopters‟ primary institutional 
environment” (2007: 34).  This research identified one particularly strong „key 
constituent‟: employees and the influence their expectations were having both on the 
norm reward mix in place and the inertia that was present within firms to move away 
from this position.  Sanders and Tuschke (2007) identified four processes that facilitated 
the spread of a non conforming position (and perhaps creating a new norm position): 
exposure to other institutional contexts where the practice is considered legitimate, CEO 
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education, organisational learning and regulatory/legislative change.  The first – 
exposure to other institutional contexts where the practice is considered legitimate – 
was found in one of the mould breakers with its reward mix more aligned with that 
operating in the professional services sector (e.g. legal and accounting professions) than 
the financial advisory sector in which they operated.  This firm‟s RE described how the 
firm prided itself in the way it was willing to look beyond its current setting and draw 
from others.  The role that CEO education and background played in influencing 
divergence from the norm position was not found, neither was organisational learning 
(although the financial crisis was causing some reflection on the appropriate reward 
mix, but in the context of regulatory pressure, rather than an internal learning process).  
However, regulatory legitimisation was identified as one of the key drivers of firm-
specific divergences from the current reward mix norm.  What was not yet clear was 
whether this regulatory pressure would “open the floodgates” (Sanders and Tuschke, 
2007: 207) to what were previously seen as contested practices, such as lower levels of 
variable pay, increased deferment of bonuses and the elimination of bonus guarantees 
for which the regulator was pushing hard. 
The explanation as to why the industry norm reward mix was so pervasive was 
ultimately one of a firm‟s risk appetite for differentiation.  This risk appetite was found 
to be formed through assessment of the gains expected to accrue from the adoption of a 
non standard position, with respect to, say, productivity increases or improved attraction 
of certain staff against the cost accruing from the potential accompanying loss of 
legitimacy with current and future employees.  This supports the conclusions of both 
Meyer and Rowan (1991) and Sanders and Tuschke (2007) that a sustained competitive 
advantage by differentiation of this nature will be dependent on the ratio of benefit to 
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cost.  However, the research extends their work by providing the dimensions against 
which an assessment of these cost and benefits would be made, i.e. the drivers of firm 
desire and capability for differentiation. 
Overall, what the research showed was that small levels of divergence from the 
institutionally established norm were often considered acceptable as they were seen to 
bring higher benefits than costs.  However the interviewees‟ accounts provided evidence 
that firms were nervous about larger deviations from established norms due to the 
perception that this would have negative consequences for attraction and retention of 
employees with strong industry-defined reward mix expectations.  Consequently, firms 
may have some flexibility about their reward mix and be able to differentiate their 
overall reward package, but the extent of differentiation was seen as constrained by the 
institutional pressures that have been discussed.  This adds further support to the 
conclusions of Deephouse (1999) and Norman et al. (2007) that a more rational form of 
institutional behaviour was present with mimetic positions adopted through conscious 
thought, rather than the passive conformity suggested by many. 
6.5.1.2.6 Conclusions 
The research supports the literature in that it shows that institutional pressures do exist, 
and are influential.  However, the study extends the understanding we have of these 
isomorphic tendencies in RMD within the financial services sector.  Isomorphic 
pressures generally were not found to be automatically and uniformly followed, with 
non industry norm positions of different degrees being adopted by firms dependent on 
the extent to which they have both the desire and capability to break from the employee 
expectations that so heavily influence the mix.  The source of the power of these 
employee expectations is explored further in section 6.5.1.3 in the context of the 
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literature on resource dependency.   
Based on the discussion above, the contribution of this research to our understanding of 
RMD from an institutional perspective is presented in Table 6-2.  This shows how the 
findings either support, refine or add to theoretical explanation and summarises how the 
findings achieve this.  
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6.5.1.3 Resource dependency 
A resource dependency approach states that organisational reward mix decisions are 
strongly influenced by those controlling what are termed „critical resources‟, where 
resources are deemed critical if their loss causes the organisation to cease operation or 
face material disruption (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987; Balkin and Bannister, 1993; 
Yanadori and Marler, 2006).  In contrast with most accounts of institutional theory, 
decisions are seen to be taken consciously with a view to actively managing the 
dependency in order to try and reduce it. 
There was strong evidence of employees having significant influence over their reward 
mix, with REs noting that employees‟ expectations were the primary driver of RMD.  
What was less clear was whether this was because all employees or just certain 
employee groups were deemed to be critical.  The literature states that the extent to 
which a resource is deemed critical is influenced by the availability of substitutes for the 
resource.  Both the RCs and REs noted the importance of their organisations attracting 
and retaining talent in order to ensure success.  Furthermore, talent was seen as 
relatively scarce which, in turn, increased the dependence that the interviewees believed 
firms had on this talent.   
Much of the resource dependency-related reward mix literature focuses on identifying 
which groups of employees are deemed as critical and therefore, through the power this 
is perceived to give them, are able to exert a strong influence on the reward mix that 
they receive.  This has led much of the literature to focus on „special‟ groups such as 
executives, salespersons, and research and development staff (Tremblay et al., 2003; 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  This research suggests that, at least within the 
financial services sector, there should be a broader focus on criticality of employees 
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beyond these „special‟ groups and into the wider employee population.  The findings 
showed that firms‟ assessment of which resources are critical, and therefore have power 
over the organisation, was not as specific as the segmentation previously applied in 
reward mix research.  The accounts given suggested that influences on RMD applied 
across large groups of staff.  Differentiating between groups of staff was less noticeable 
than might have been expected, given earlier research findings of the importance of the 
„special‟ groups highlighted above.  A general concern over the attraction and retention 
of all staff pervaded the discussions, with a desire to meet expectations (albeit 
sometimes different) for varying groups of staff.   In addition, a cascading effect was 
noted with policies put in place to secure critical talent, such as relatively large bonuses 
or generous benefit arrangements, cascading through the organisation with, to some 
degree, all employees benefitting from the reward mix approach designed for the 
„critical‟ employees.  This was in line with the predictions of equity theory, with REs 
attempting to ensure the generosity of the packages their firms provided to certain 
groups of employees, both with respect to bonuses and benefit provision, did not 
comprise general perceptions of fairness across the firm. 
The focus on employees as critical resources, given their significance in the revenue 
generating process in the financial services sector, was unsurprising.  In addition, unions 
with their role in bringing together employee voice to greater effect and their influence 
over the supply of labour, were identified as being a dependency that required managing 
with respect to their influence, especially around the role variable pay (Arrowsmith and 
Marginson, 2011) and benefits played in the mix (Budd, 2004; Freeman and Medoff, 
1981).  The study did not support earlier findings that the management of perceived 
resource dependency was a strategically conscious response as opposed to firms simply 
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complying with isomorphic pressures (Oliver, 1991).  Typically RCs and REs did not 
give accounts that showed a depth of analysis over areas determining how dependent a 
firm is on employee groups, such as the autonomy and complexity of roles, but rather 
referred to wider concerns over retaining and recruiting individuals.  This contradicts 
both the findings of Crystal (1991) and Eisenhardt (1988) who contended that what set 
resource dependency apart from institutional theory was how organisations respond to 
coercive pressures.  They reported that a resource dependency perspective was a more 
autonomous or strategically conscious response, compared to the more automatic and 
unconscious response of institutional theory.   As we have seen, for many financial 
services firms, institutionally motivated behaviour was carried out through a conscious 
consideration of the risks implied by differentiation, including consideration of resource 
dependencies.  In this context, this suggests that resource dependency is not a separate 
explanation of RMD but rather a component of the extended institutional theory 
discussed in section 6.5.1.2.  This will be explored further in section 6.5.3. 
Furthermore, evidence was only found to support two of Bartol and Martin‟s (1988) 
seven factors that influence the level of dependence an organisation has on an 
employee, or group of employees.  Whilst concern was raised about the specialist nature 
of financial services roles and the replaceability of employee skills, given skills 
shortages in this sector, no support was provided from the RC nor the RE accounts for 
the other factors raised in their research, namely task uncertainty, ability to clearly 
monitor performance, performance visibility, task centrality and organisational 
connections.  This supports the work of Elvira (2001), also conducted in the financial 
services sector, that reward mix was generally seen as being significant in managing 
attraction and retention, rather than detailed considerations of specific dependency 
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factors.  The research found no evidence that REs acting for their firms applied the 
analytical level of sophistication implied by the seven factors identified in Bartol and 
Locke‟s (2000) work.   
Moreover, the contention of Balkin and Bannister (1993) that „powerful groups‟ would 
be able to determine their own mix, with the organisation overlooking other reward 
issues, such as internal and external equity with other groups of staff on whom the 
organisation is less dependent, was not supported.  As already noted, the interviews 
showed evidence of a cascading effect of reward mix with the overall philosophy 
around fixed and variable pay and the role of benefits being widespread, even if the 
magnitude of reward (i.e. overall level) were less so.   
6.5.1.3.1 Conclusions 
The research shows that whilst dependence on employees was important it was not, as 
envisaged by resource dependency, a discernible focus on critical groups.  Of greater 
concern to the REs was the attraction and retention of employees across the workforce, 
and therefore the need for the reward mix to conform to industry norms in order to meet 
employees‟ expectations. 
Based on the discussion above, the contribution of this research to our understanding of 
RMD from a resource dependency perspective is presented in Table 6-3.  This shows 
how the findings either support, refine or add to the theoretical explanation and 














Refined.  Differentiation between 
employee groups as critical and non 
critical is not as discerning as implied in 
resource dependency theory.  Concern is 









Control of critical 
resources leads to power 
 
Supported.  Rational decision. 
 
Add.  Employees have power with respect 
to the overall importance they have in the 











Refined.  Decision to adopt industry norm 
position generally taken with reference to 







Reward mix will be 
influenced by the relative 
strength of employee 
groups determined by their 
criticality to organisation 
success 
 
Refined.  Attraction and retention issues 
were present across the workforce, 
therefore were not solely influenced by 
relative strengths of employee groups, 
rather the overall strength of employee 
expectations. 
 
Table 6-3 - Research contribution to our understanding of RMD from an resource dependency 
theory perspective 
 
6.5.1.4 Other theoretical perspectives 
The research identified two other aspects of theoretical considerations that are now 
discussed in the light of the empirical research. 
6.5.1.4.1 Path dependency 
The model developed through the research shows that institutional factors are seen to be 
endemic in RMD. In this context it is not surprising that path dependency emerges from 
the accounts provided, given its similarities to institutional theory (Scott, 2008).  The 
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research identified that the initial starting point, i.e. the current organisational reward 
mix, is often key with adjustment of this position, or anchor, the route taken to change 
rather than a „blank sheet of paper‟ review.  This is consistent with a path dependency 
explanation that a policy develops in such a way that it is difficult to change the 
direction the policy has taken (perhaps, for example, the prevalence of high proportions 
of variable pay in financial services reward mix) even when alternatives would, from a 
standing start, produce „better‟ solutions (Scott, 2008).   
Path dependency theory has typically been applied to technological developments, e.g. 
the development of the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985), given the high set-up costs 
which are typically a barrier to change in that sector.  However, North (1990) contends 
that it applies to wider institutional change, given that the conditions supporting path 
dependency (other than high set-up costs) are learning effects (i.e. when time and effort 
are invested in a particular situation then there will be a reluctance to change), adaptive 
expectations (i.e. latecomers see a widely adopted practice and are therefore more likely 
to adopt the practice) and what Scott called the “primacy of early events” (2008: 122), 
namely early decisions creating a defined direction.  At an individual firm level, the 
findings of this research support the existence of learning effects and the primacy of 
early events, with both identified as explanations for the strength of the institutional 
norm and how the norm was established historically.  However, this was not a strong 
influence consistent with the findings of Arrowsmith et al. (2010) who noted that, 
although still present, path dependency was a fading influence. 
6.5.1.4.2 Strategic compensation 
The findings did find evidence to support Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) and Baker et al. 
(1988) in their conclusion that industry characteristics such as product demand will 
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influence reward mix.  This was not operating at an individual firm level, but in concert 
across the sector via the role these factors played in forming the industry norm through 
their effect on employee expectations. In addition, the extent to which firms then follow 
that norm was in a number of cases seen to be influenced by the firm‟s specific business 
strategy as predicted by Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) and Rajagopalan (1997). 
What was not apparent was a direct association, by those interviewed, to the specific 
factors that earlier research had shown were directly related to reward mix, such as 
product diversification (Gomez-Mejia, 1992; Kerr, 1985) and company life stage (Chen 
and Hsieh, 2005).  Relationships between these variables and reward mix may have 
been proven by earlier statistical work, but dialogue with those involved showed these 
were generally not conscious relationships that they raised. 
Furthermore, at an individual firm level the results provided support and further 
explanation on Stroh et al.‟s (1996) conclusion that the level of turbulence an 
organisation is facing, perhaps brought about by restructuring or downsizing, would 
also influence reward mix.  The interviews showed that this turbulence was used 
opportunistically by firms to create both the desire and improved capability of the firm 
to move, albeit often marginally, away from the defined industry norm position.   
In addition, Stroh et al. (1996) speculated that the use of variable pay was about 
transferring risk to employees using variable reward strategies to manage the additional 
variability in revenue and profitability that they are facing at this point in their history.  
However, what was seen in the research through taking a wider conceptualisation of 
mix, was that the transfer of risk was much more prevalent in benefit packages, with the 
shift from defined benefit to defined contribution benefits, than in management of the 
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narrow agency-based definitions of reward mix in cash compensation.  
6.5.2 The significance of the context 
6.5.2.1 Sectoral 
The research was conducted in the financial services sector in the UK during 2009-
2010.  This was a turbulent time for this sector with the period seeing significant 
government intervention in the banking sector to ensure its ongoing stability, substantial 
media and political interest in reward structures across the financial services industry as 
a result of this crisis, and the perception that reward structures contributed to the crisis 
through the proliferation of reward mixes which encouraged „excessive‟ risk taking. 
As we have seen in the previous discussion the importance of the sectoral context and 
the historical environmental conditions that had been seen in the financial services 
industry appear to have been significant in explaining some of the findings.  This is 
particularly apparent in three areas – the overall profitability of the industry, the 
influence of regulation and how it was changing during the research, and the impact of 
the financial crisis.  Each of these is now briefly discussed. 
The REs characterised the industry pre-financial crisis as a sector of relatively high 
profitability which was identified as a significant dimension in understanding why the 
industry‟s norm reward mix had developed as it had.  The relatively long period of 
success that had occurred before the financial crisis had led to an ever-increasing 
demand for labour, seen as being a major contributor to the overall strength of employee 
expectations on overall reward mix. This was believed to explain why employees were 
perceived as such significant stakeholders and, through this, why their expectations 
exerted such a strong influence over RMD.  This influence, aligned with the historically 
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perceived high profitability generally of the sector, had led to relatively high 
proportions of „variable‟ pay as firms looked to share the success that had been achieved 
with employees, and the creation of relatively generous benefits packages as employees 
looked to secure as favourable a reward package as possible.   
In addition, the regulated nature of the sector was clearly playing a role but will 
potentially limit the extent to which the research findings are more widely generalisable 
outside of this sector.  All the REs interviewed worked for firms that were regulated by 
the FSA.  Before the financial crisis this may have been of little consequence to the REs 
as the regulator‟s interest in their remuneration structures had been relatively limited.  
However, the crisis meant there was significant focus by the regulator in the UK, and its 
equivalent authorities around the world, on RMD and the implementation of constraints 
on this process.  This is seen in Figure 6-4 as a moderating influence on the industry 
norm position derived from the historically formed employee expectations. 
Finally, the financial crisis that was underway both preceding and during the research 
had caused some serious reflections by practitioners, both RCs and REs, on RMD and 
amongst REs had triggered an increase in the desire to make changes to rectify 
perceived problems that were present.  However, overall capability to make changes 
remained a serious concern. 
6.5.2.2 Firm context 
The analysis of the data collected included clustering the findings with respect to 
looking for any trends and relationships between the type of financial firm of which the 
RE was speaking (e.g. investment bank, wealth management firm, financial advisor, 
insurance etc.) and the RMD approach adopted.  What emerged was that the 
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prominence of the industry norm and the influence of employee expectations on this 
norm applied across all these groups.  „Sub sector‟ was not seen as an influence on the 
significance of the concepts identified and discussed above.  A difference was found 
with respect to the conceptualisation of reward mix, as discussed in section 5.2, where 
REs speaking of the investment banks were generally seen to have a narrower 
interpretation of reward mix than REs from the remaining firms.  This was attributed to 
the relatively extreme mix taken in this sector with respect to high proportions of 
variable pay relative to fixed pay (including benefits) which meant that wider 
definitions were relatively insignificant. 
6.5.2.3 Individual context 
In addition the data were examined, again through clustering, in relation to the 
characteristics of the REs themselves, based on whether they were largely from reward 
or non reward backgrounds and also whether their experience was more generally from 
financial services or other sectors.  Again no discernible relationships between the 
accounts provided and these characteristics were identified.  The one exception to this 
was with respect to the conceptualisation of reward mix discussed in section 5.2 where 
the two REs with relatively limited reward backgrounds (their experience was 
predominantly in recruitment and development) provided a more holistic 
conceptualisation of reward mix, capturing not just financial but also non financial 
reward.  However, whilst interesting, it is not possible to draw further conclusions from 
this, given the limited data from which this finding was made. 
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6.5.3 Combining theoretical perspectives – An integrated theory of 
RMD 
6.5.3.1 Revisiting inputs to RMD 
One of the criticisms made of the reward mix research to date is that despite the large 
amount of research carried out, we know little about RMD as there is no dominating 
paradigm explaining the process (Gerhart and Rynes 2003).  This research set out with 
the aim of providing greater clarity of how reward mix is determined.  We saw in 
chapter 2, Table 2-5, how a „shopping list‟ of inputs to RMD had been suggested by the 
largely deductive research carried out to date.  In Table 6-4 I repeat these „shopping list‟ 




Decision driver Significance in this research 
Agency Alignment of 
employee effort 
 
Not as perceived by agency theory as solely a means to 
reduce or manage employee shirking.  Alignment of 
effort was also about looking for ways to build reward 
packages that both meet the desires of employees 
whilst managing costs for employers. 
 Managing 
monitoring costs 
(spans of control 
and contract type) 
 
Not as perceived by agency theory in an analytical 
approach to RMD.  Cost control was important, but 
was not seen as a trade-off between monitoring and 
spans of control, but rather optimising reward such that 
it met employee desires whilst keeping costs as low as 
possible for the employer. 




A moderating influence on the transmission of 
employee expectations as to their reward mix through 
to the industry norm position. 
 Political and 
societal pressure 
 
Was an influence over the regulatory change that was 
occurring in reward in the sector.  This exhibited itself 
as a moderating influence on the transmission of 
employee expectations to the industry norm position. 
 Taxation and 
other regulations  
A moderating influence on the transmission of 
employee expectations to the industry norm position. 
 For subsidiaries 
of multi nationals, 
parent group 
An influence on firms‟ desire to differentiate their 





Decision driver Significance in this research 
policies 
 Union pressures 
 
An influence on the transmission of employee 




Strong influence on both the employee expectations of 
an appropriate reward mix, but also individual firm‟s 




Strong element.  Central construct in RMD being the 
industry norm mix which is ascertained largely 
through separate benchmarking of the components 




Less prevalent than suggested in the literature although 
they perform a key role in collation and provision of 




Play an important role in the communication of the 
industry norm reward mix to REs across the sector 
through groups and conferences. 
 Codification of 













Not raised as an influence although the CEO was seen 
as significant in influencing the firm‟s risk appetite for 
differentiation from the industry norm mix. 




An influence in the firm‟s decision as to whether to 
differentiate its reward mix from the industry norm or 








Employee expectations were significant.  However not 
solely about key groups but wider understanding of the 
generality of expectations and through this a strong 
influence on the industry norm reward mix developed. 
 Union dominance 
 
An influence on the transmission of employee 
expectations to the overall industry reward mix norm. 
 Task complexity 
and the need for 
specialist skills 
Not raised. 








Decision driver Significance in this research 
visibility 
 Substitutability of 
skills 
Not raised. 




Table 6-4 - Significance of ‘shopping list’ factors in this research 
As the detail in this table shows, a number of these inputs have been found in this 
research and therefore appear in the descriptive RMD model shown in Figure 6-7.  The 
model provides order to the variables that were raised by the interviewees.  The 
„shopping list‟ has been rationalised and ordered through the RMD model.  The next 
section now pulls the explanations gathered into an integrated theory of RMD.  
6.5.3.2 An integrated theory 
We saw in chapter two that the three theoretical approaches used to examine RMD – 
agency, institutional and resource dependency – appeared similar in that they all 
examine managerial decisions from a perspective of those decisions being influenced by 
external factors, i.e. ownership structure, critical resource holders, institutional norms.  
Each of the approaches also operates with similar dependent and independent variables.  
Where the differences between the theoretical approaches lie is in the assumptions they 
make about both firms‟ and employees‟ behaviour and the outcome of this behaviour on 
final RMD.  These differing assumptions are shown in Table 2-4.  This research, 
through taking multiple perspectives in assessing the problem, has been able to review 
and challenge those assumptions and from this develop a unified and practitioner-led 
theory of RMD coming through the RCs‟ and REs‟ voices on the issue, rather than 
abstract assessment through reviewing statistical data.  Adopting the same format as 
Table 2-4 this unified theory is shown in Table 6-5 which presents the main premises, 
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assumptions, organisational reactions and their implications for reward mix from this 
research.  This meets the call by Gerhart & Milkovich (1992) for reward scholars to 
refine existing theories as a productive direction for reward research generally.  






Conformity with market practice in order to gain legitimacy with 





Strong employee expectations of receiving the industry norm 
reward mix. 
 
Goal alignment often exists between employee needs and firms‟ 
requirements. 
 
Employees are not always acting rationally, often resisting change 
to a potentially non optimal historical norm. 
 
Firms are typically risk averse, seeking out the safe harbour position 
of the industry norm. 
 
Process of satisfycing behaviour by employers. 
 
Firms follow the industry norm unless both the desire and capability 







Both rational legitimacy seeking, with respect to employees, and 
passively conforming to industry norm position, depending on 




for reward mix 
 
Reward mix will be influenced by institutional norms and the extent 
to which operating within these norms confers legitimacy with 
current and prospective employees. 
 
Table 6-5 - Summary unified theory of reward mix determination 
As the table shows, this unified explanation identifies the strength of institutional 
pressures on firms to conform to an agreed norm with the aim of gaining legitimacy 
with both current and prospective employees.  Firms still have room for manoeuvre in 
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the form of strategic choice influenced by the strength of their desire and capability to 
differentiate their mix from this strong, institutionally reinforced position as they look to 
reach a satisfycing position.  This, alongside employees potentially irrationally resisting 
change, can mean that a suboptimal reward mix may be in place for both employer and 
employee. 
This is only, to the best of my knowledge, the second study (the first being Barringer 
and Milkovich‟s (1998) theoretical assessment of these three areas plus transaction cost 
theory) that has combined these three perspectives and the first that has involved 
empirical research with practitioners in developing our knowledge of RMD. 
6.6 Conclusion to chapter six 
In this chapter I discussed the findings of the research in relation to the research 
question and the context of previous research findings.  This discussion leads to the 
development of a descriptive model and a unified theory of RMD. 
The discussion identified that the most prevalent theoretical perspective from the 
literature – agency theory – was found to be limited in its explanation of how RCs and 
REs viewed the RMD process, with institutional pressures, including resource 
dependencies, being more significant.  This contradicts the overall premise of the 
literature, outside an institutional theory perspective, that given that reward mix can be 
changed without increasing costs (Lazear, 1998), then organisations may face less 
difficulty in differentiating themselves in this area.  Generally, the contention that 
“[P]ay mix is where the action is in differentiating organisations” (Gerhart and 
Milkovich, 1992: 669) was not well supported, with the exception of the two mould 
breaking firms.  Organisations still felt significant difficulty in differentiating through 
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reward mix.  The „safe harbour‟ of industry practice is sought, with the industry norm 
being seen as the rational place to be, given firms‟ lack of desire and capability to make 
changes and consequent risk assessment of the consequences of making such a shift 
having taken place.   
In summary, my findings suggest that reward mix is determined by institutional norms 
and the extent to which operating within these norms confers legitimacy with current 
and prospective employees.  The extent to which these norms then determine the reward 
mix for individual firms is determined by a combination of both the firm‟s desire and its 
capability to differentiate its position from the prevailing position in the sector. 
The final chapter summarises these results and identifies the contribution of the research 
before reviewing the implications for practitioners and, having acknowledged the 





7 Chapter seven:  Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis set out to understand what influences RMD in financial services 
organisations and why these influences are significant.  This work is positioned in the 
reward mix literature and the explanations provided to date through the lenses of 
agency, institutional and resource dependency theories.  To situate the work, I first 
developed a conceptual framework of RMD from the reward literature in chapter two 
and developed a series of research questions.  After outlining the research design in 
chapter three, I then developed and assessed this framework through interviews with 
RCs as acknowledged experts in the reward field with relationships with REs and 
management in organisations and, in addition playing an important role in RMD.  These 
interviews identified the existence of a strong industry norm influenced by labour 
market forces and the existence of various moderating influences on how this norm is 
transmitted to actual organisational practice.  In chapter five I reported the findings of 
interviews with 30 REs from financial services firms.  These interviews identified the 
significance of employee expectations in influencing the industry norm reward mix, 
alongside seven dimensions which influence an organisation‟s propensity to follow the 
industry norm position.  This chapter then examine these seven dimensions further in 
the context of each of the accounts of firms provided by the REs involved in the 
research.  This analysis identified three categories of firms dependent on the extent to 
which they had both the desire and the capability to resist the industry norm position in 
order to gain advantage through differentiating their reward mix.  „Market followers‟ 
had both low desire and capability to move away from the perceived safety of the 
industry norm reward mix position, whilst „cautious leaders‟ saw some benefits from 
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differentiation, whilst still ensuring that they did not diverge dramatically from the 
norm.  These positions were in contrast to the accounts of two „mould breaking‟ firms 
found in the research.  These firms had adopted radically different reward mixes from 
the industry norm in order to align the reward mix more clearly with their distinctive 
business strategies.  Chapter six then uses the findings to extend the conceptual 
framework developed from the literature into a descriptive model of RMD in the 
financial services sector.  It concludes by positioning the research within previous work 
on RMD.  This argues the need for a broader focus on institutional and resource 
dependency influences on reward mix, and a revised consideration of a number of the 
assumptions of agency theory. 
In this chapter, section 7.2 provides a summary of the research project, before section 
7.3 addresses the research question developed at the beginning of the thesis.  Section 7.4 
presents the contribution of the research to both academia and practice.  Finally, section 
7.5 acknowledges the various limitations of the research, whilst section 7.6 suggests 
potential routes for further investigation before the thesis concludes with my closing 
reflections. 
7.2 Research approach 
In order to address the research question – What influences RMD in financial services 
organisations? – the research adopted a qualitative approach through interviews with 
people advising reward decision makers, RCs, and actual reward decision makers 
themselves, REs, as people well placed to discuss RMD.  The research followed three 
stages – conceptualisation and identification of research question, data collection and 
theory building (see Figure 1-1).  
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7.3 Addressing the research questions 
The main research question examined was: What influences RMD in financial services 
organisations?   
Following analysis of the data, the simple „answer‟ to this question is, in line with 
Eisenhardt‟s (1988) earlier conclusion, the need to conform with market practice in 
order to gain legitimacy.  However, legitimacy is found to be with respect to 
employees‟ expectations of the reward mix that should be provided in the financial 
services sector.  This conformity is both a position of passive conformity for some 
firms, as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1991), but for others it is much more a 
rational assessment of the risks associated with differentiation, in line with the work of 
Norman et al. (2007).  Beyond this simple explanation, the findings show that the REs 
identify that a small number of firms have adopted a differentiated position (10 REs 
spoke of their firms in this way).  These firms had either moderately moved their reward 
mix away from the industry norm position (cautious leaders) or in more limited cases 
radically adopted a significantly different reward mix position from the industry norm 
practice (mould breakers).   
The propensity of firms to differentiate their reward mix from the dominant industry 
norm was a function of both their desire to differentiate and their capability to make 
desired change happen.  The desire to change was seen to be influenced by coercive 
pressures from their parent organisation, government intervention in their operation and 
strategic reasons with respect to leadership beliefs, customers or suppliers, whereas the 
capability to move away from the industry norm, where change is considered desirable, 
was seen to be a function of both HR and management capabilities.  Additionally, both 
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the desire and capability to differentiate the reward mix were influenced by 
opportunities for change being presented in the form of mergers or acquisitions, or firm-
specific financial crises which provided the „excuse‟ to make the change happen.  
A number of sub research questions were also posed.  These are repeated below. 
RQ2a To what extent is the alignment of principal and agents‟ interests and the 
issues of monitoring and control an influence in RMD? 
RQ2b Why are they / Why are they not an influence? 
RQ3a To what extent are coercive, mimetic and normative institutional pressures 
an influence on RMD? 
RQ3b Why are they / Why are they not a influence? 
RQ4a To what extent do the reward mix preferences of critical groups of 
employees influence RMD? 
RQ4b Why are they / Why are they not an influence? 
The answers to these questions are heavily weighted towards the coercive and mimetic 
pressures introduced in question RQ3a.  The descriptive model developed in chapter six 
shows the powerful influence of the industry norm in determining individual firms‟ 
reward mix positions.  This is attributed to the strength of employee expectations in 
forming that mix, reinforced by a general position of risk aversion to adopting non 
conforming mixes for fear of not meeting those employee expectations and the 




Generally, consideration of alignment of principal and agents‟ interests (question RQ2a) 
was not a factor in decision making, or at least not as prescribed by the agency theorists.  
Alignment was considered, but with regard to looking for ways to build reward mixes 
that met the needs of employees, in areas such as long-term saving, security and their 
health and well-being, which meant they were productive in their work.  The use of 
incentives, as proxies for monitoring and to exercise control, was not generally 
supported.  A more holistic interpretation of human nature and its interest and 
commitment to work was provided, rather than an account built of the need to control 
workers‟ behaviour through financial incentives.   
Finally, RQ4A proposed that resource dependent effects would be significant.  Whilst 
dependence on employees was important this was not, as envisaged by resource 
dependency, a discernible focus on critical groups, but rather a general awareness of the 
importance of attraction and retention across the workforce and the need for the reward 
mix to work with this by conforming to industry norms and, through this, meet 
employees‟ expectations. 
7.4 Contribution 
7.4.1 Academic – Theoretical, empirical and methodological 
knowledge 
The contribution of the research to scholarly knowledge is both with respect to the 
findings of the research, but also, in a more limited way, with regard to the method by 
which the research conclusions were drawn.  The study reviews and challenges the 
assumptions of previous research on RMD and from this develops an integrated theory 
through the eyes of a pivotal player, the RE, as called for by Gerhart and Rynes (2003) 
and Taras (1997).  Further, these individuals were recruited personally, rather than as 
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representatives of their organisations, allowing them to speak of, rather than as 
representatives speaking for, their firms, so that they could speak freely of the practices 
and problems that their firm faced in determining its reward mix.  In addition, the 
insights of RCs were also used as suggested by Rynes and Bono (2000). 
The research examined three theoretical perspectives that have largely been used 
deductively to examine RMD.  The results support a number of the findings of earlier 
literature, particularly with respect to the significance of institutional pressures on 
reward decision making firms (Eisenhardt, 1988; Conlon and Parks, 1990; Crystal, 
1991).  However, they also challenge, refine and add to the assumptions, and 
conclusions of the theoretical perspectives examined. 
For agency theory, the research challenges the narrow conceptualisation of reward mix 
that agency studies typically take (e.g. Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; Boyd and Salamin, 
2001; Werner and Tosi, 1995; Gerhart and Trevor, 1996; Bloom and Milkovich, 1998), 
and a number of the underlying assumptions held with regard to employee behaviour 
and the way in which this behaviour can best be managed.   The results extend agency 
theory into considerations of employee alignment beyond monitoring and control, 
suggesting that a wider interpretation should be taken.  Alignment can both fulfil a 
variety of employee desires, whilst at the same time lead to increased commitment and 
performance.   
With respect to institutional theory, the need for legitimacy is identified as critical in 
firms‟ activities (supporting the conclusions of other authors such as DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991; Carpenter and Wade, 2002).   However, this legitimacy is identified as 
being primarily focused on practices that are legitimate in the eyes of employees (and 
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where present their unions as representatives of employees) rather than wider social and 
economic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  Further, the research findings extend the 
conclusions of Norman et al. (2007), from their examination of the airline industry, that 
adopting institutionally legitimate positions can in fact be a fully rational activity and 
not, as others have argued, passive (Eisenhardt 1988, Conlon and Parks 1990 and Van 
der Stede (2003)).  Assessment of the additional risk that moving away from the „safe 
harbour‟ of the market benchmark would imply was carried out by REs acting for their 
firms.  A large proportion concluded that the risk of differentiation outweighed the 
potential benefits which could be gained and, therefore, concluded that the safe harbour 
position should be adopted.   
Finally, the findings show that specific resource dependencies are not the main focus of 
practitioners.  Resource dependencies are significant but not, as suggested in previous 
research, through a focus on „special‟ groups but rather a wider concern about attraction 
and retention across the workforce.   
The combination of these three theoretical explanations and the integrated theory that 
this approach has developed is unusual but is part of an increasing trend towards using 
complementary theoretical perspectives to deepen our knowledge of reward mix, 
particularly to counter some of the criticisms that have been made of agency theory 
alone in explaining the phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Fernandez-Alles et al., 2006; 
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009).  This combination has led to a more complete 
understanding of institutionally driven behaviour in this sector.   
From these insights, an integrated theory of RMD is presented along with a model of 
this theory and typology of firms‟ propensity to follow the industry norm.  This theory 
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and model has provided greater order to the „shopping list‟ of variables that have 
previously been shown to be related to RMD.  Whilst institutional pressures are the 
main driver of determination behaviour, our understanding of these pressures has been 
enhanced by incorporating insights from the agency and resource dependency 
perspectives.  
The work also makes an empirical contribution providing evidence on the practices and 
responses of financial services firms in the post crises environment and how they are 
reacting to regulatory and market based pressures at this time.  Specifically we now 
have understanding about how the combination of both a firm‟s desire and capability to 
differentiate their reward mix informs their judgement of whether to „break free‟ from 
the established institutional norms.  These factors were not, as agency theory suggests, a 
rational assessment of control and monitoring of employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 
1992; Wiseman et al., 2000; Delvey, 1999), but rather consideration of parent and 
government intervention where relevant, strategic examination of customers and 
product market, alongside the existence of opportunity to change and HR and line 
management ability to make the desired differentiation occur.  The empirical 
identification of these two key factors which supported firms adopting non industry 
norm positions – desire and capability – may also be applicable to other non reward 
settings.  This suggests further exploration of these dimensions may provide additional 
insight into divergent firm behaviour in other institutionally influenced settings. 
Finally, much of what we know about RMD is known through a positivist research 
approach.  However, an emerging body of work has developed, taking a more 
constructionist approach to reward determination, albeit largely at an Executive level,  
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as a potential means to establish not only what is driving reward decisions but 
significantly why (e.g. Bender, 2004; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; Bender and Moir 
2006).   Methodologically, the approach taken in this research adds further weight to 
this emerging body of work being qualitative in a largely quantitative field.  The 
findings and analysis developed from the interviews demonstrate that rich data can be 
established through qualitative work, as suggested by the call from deductive statistical 
reward researchers that we should also be entering the field as well as surveying it 
(Gerhart and Rynes, 2003). 
7.4.2 Implications for practice and policy 
The research is intended to act as a prompt to REs to think more consciously about the 
influences on their firms‟ reward mix, to ensure that these influences are genuinely in 
line with business need, however this may be defined.  The findings showed that many 
REs felt their firms were not passively conforming to industry norm practice, but 
consciously assessing the risk with regard to whether their organisation should adopt 
this position.  Others were not consciously assessing this position for their firm.  If 
Gerhart and Rynes‟ (2003) conclusion that, with respect to strategic reward decision 
making, “pay mix is where the action is” then practitioners need to be consciously 
assessing the risks rather than passively conforming.  The theory and models presented 
are a means by which this active consideration can begin.   
This process of greater proactive consideration of RMD has already begun as a result of 
the research.  The interviews themselves caused participants to reflect on what was 
influencing reward mix and, from that, what they believed should be driving reward mix 
decisions.  The descriptive model developed also allows REs to consider how the 
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combination of factors influencing their reward mix compares with others 
(unsurprisingly something they are keen on!) and, in particular, how the eight 
moderating dimensions to the dominant mimetic pressure faced could be manipulated 
for their firm to allow more strategic changes to reward mix to be implemented.  
Contact with interviewees, post the research, has seen them begin to manage the 
identified moderating factors proactively as they look to move their organisation away 
from the industry norm position currently pursued, to better differentiate themselves 
from others.   
The development of a stronger theoretical base for understanding the determinants of 
reward mix choices will also assist policy makers in furthering their understanding of 
the extent to which organisational free choice and institutionally determined choice 
influence final reward choices when discussing policy options and, consequently, the 
level at which any regulatory intervention should occur.  If labour markets and 
institutional factors dominate, as the research proposes, and therefore operate as a 
significant constraint on firm choice, this may suggest the need for macro level 
regulatory policy intervention to change reward practice (if this is felt desirable for 
social or political reasons).  Discussions have already been held to this effect with 
regulatory agencies and trade associations to input the findings to their longer term 
research plans on financial services reward policy making. 
7.5 Limitations 
Despite the interesting findings of this study, a number of limitations must be 
acknowledged arising out of its method, context and sampling.  I have from the start of 
the research continually reflected on the research approach and significantly my role 
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and influence as the researcher on the process and, through that, the results of the 
research.  Through this limitations section whilst I acknowledge this influence, this 
reflection has not led me to conclude that I would have changed the design with the 
power of hindsight that such reflections allow.   
The research is a UK-based study of the RMD process through the eyes of direct 
protagonists in that process.  Interpretation needs to consider that participation was at 
the discretion of those protagonists.  No individual who was approached openly turned 
down the interview, but a small number did not return e-mail requests which were made 
after previous „warming up‟ of the contact, i.e. at a conference or through a mutual 
acquaintance etc.  This may have been due to time constraints of the potential 
interviewee, but could have been due to wariness of discussing the subject.  Although 
within this context the sampling carried out was both pragmatic and opportunistic, 
whilst attempting to be purposeful, seeking out variation and challenge to the emerging 
theory where possible.   Nevertheless, there may be some element of bias in the findings 
due to voluntary nature of participation and the self selection that this required.    
Of those that did participate, it is fair to assume that where they were uncomfortable 
with how they saw RMD, given the topicality and regulatory and press coverage at the 
time of the fieldwork, they may have been concerned about airing views, despite 
reassurances made around confidentiality.  The use of personal rather than 
representative recruitment was intended to reduce this risk and reflections after each 
interview did not indicate that the interviewees „held back‟ with a range of forthright 
views being presented.   
A further limitation is the use of the REs and RCs to provide a perspective on RMD.  
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Other qualitative studies have looked to triangulate individual perspectives with views 
from others within a firm involved in reward decision making (e.g. Bender 2004).  
However, the intention of this research was always to take the RE‟s perspective as a 
valid one in its own right, given that the frames that the RE holds will be a strong 
influence on future behaviour (Chell, 2004) and the significant role they were found to 
play.  Their recruitment personally, as opposed to as organisational representatives, in 
line with Buchanan‟s (1993) articulation of this approach as a means to gain franker 
accounts, was intended to increase the freedom with which they felt able to speak.   
Whilst there is, of course, no way of knowing whether a different design taking the 
views of other individuals who are involved in the reward mix decision making process, 
such as the CEO or Finance Director, would provide different conclusions, the general 
uniformity of accounts given to date, by both RCs and REs, gives some comfort that the 
results achieved were a reasonable reflection of RMD within the firms examined.  
Furthermore, additional sense-making activities carried out, individual and group 
meetings with others involved in the process alongside review meetings with trade 
bodies, provided further corroboration that the ideas developed were reasonable. 
Next, concerns could arise over the interviews themselves, on whether the accounts I 
heard were what was said or that my questions somehow led the interviewees to 
construct an inaccurate account of how they see RMD.  One potential way of managing 
the impact of this limitation would have been to engage in observing the practice of the 
interviewees.  I would have then been able to observe them in the practice of carrying 
out RMD.  However, the lack of a defined moment of RMD and potential access 
constraints meant this was not possible.  Whilst controls were put in place to manage 
this risk (as outlined in chapter three), the interpretation and resulting theory developed 
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is based on my interpretation of these accounts.  However, the extensive use of quotes 
in presentation of the findings is intended to give the reader some form of direct access 
to what was said and from that reassurance that my interpretation is rigorous. 
Finally, the research is clearly positioned to examine reward mix in the UK financial 
services sector in 2009-2010.  Certain elements of the findings are likely to be context-
specific, given the regulatory activity and the specific nature of the financial crisis 
which was influencing the sector at the time of the research.  REs from other sectors 
may have had different interpretations of RMD.    If it was the purpose of the research 
to generalise to a wider population, or to provide some claim to a universal position for 
RMD then this would be an issue.  No such claim is made.  So whilst the sectoral focus 
limits the extent to which the findings may be useful in other contexts, it also provides 
richness to the contribution, given the significance of understanding behaviour in the 
area of RMD in the financial services industry at this time. 
7.6 Further research 
The findings suggest a number of areas for further research both within the context of 
RMD but also other aspects of Human Resource Management.   
The descriptive model presented was not developed in order to test or prove specific 
hypotheses, rather to present a scholarly account of the relationships that practitioners 
and those who closely advise them felt existed in the area of RMD.  The overall aim of 
this approach being one of building on the deductive research carried out in the reward 
field to date through adoption of a different research stance.  This is in line with Guba 
and Lincoln‟s assertion that research should be undertaken under different research 
paradigms to assist in “informing one another‟s argument” (2005: 192).   In this spirit of 
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epistological harmony it is suggested that the findings and conclusions of this work 
could lead to further deductive testing.  The descriptive model does present a series of 
potential hypotheses that would lend themselves to future testing.  For example, 
constructs could be developed for the seven dimensions that were found to influence a 
firm‟s propensity to diverge from the norm to examine the contexts in which these may 
be influential.  Further analysis of how reward mix has statistically changed over time 
would also be useful in examining how historical reward mix patterns are influencing 
employee expectations over time. 
The research also challenged the definition of reward mix used in research to date.  A 
narrow definition considering fixed and variable pay has historically been applied (see 
section 2.2.2).  The insights provided by both the RCs and REs identified that research 
in the future should look where possible to widen the definition used to at least consider 
employee benefits in any testing that is carried out, but ideally also look for ways to 
measure the relational elements that were seen by a number of the participants as an 
important part of the reward mix.   
Furthermore a challenge is presented to agency theorists.  The research suggests that we 
should look to develop the analytical rational economic perspective of agency theory 
through adopting a wider perspective on employee alignment taking into account the 
need through all the elements of reward mix to align employees‟ behaviour to that of the 
principal through building commitment and engagement not just by controlling and 
managing shirking.  Extension of agency research to consider wider type of principal - 
agent alignment would be useful in taking forward the findings of this research 
As noted above, the research was set in a specific context, financial services, at a 
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specific time, post financial crisis, with significant media, political and regulatory 
interest focused on reward practices at that time.  Although rich insights were found and 
developed, it is not possible to contend that the results can be more widely generalised.  
Further research into RMD in other sectors would be productive in understanding 
whether the conclusions are specific to the financial services sector, or if some of the 
findings apply more widely across other sectors.  Consideration could be given in this 
research to the extent to which the regulatory environment may play a significant role 
through examination of sectors that are also subject to some form of regulatory control 
(such as the oil and pharmaceutical sectors) and those that are not.  Examining different 
sectors in this way would also further explore the extent to which product market forces 
may be the driving force behind labour market pressures given the earlier conclusions of 
Brown (2008) on their significance.  Furthermore given the heighted regulatory, 
political and media focus on reward mix in this sector at the time of the research a 
further potentially useful variation would be to repeat the research during a time when 
this interest had ended to see how this changed the findings.   
Moreover, the identification of the two key factors which supported firms adopting non 
industry norm positions – desire and capability – may be applicable to other HR 
practices other than reward. Examination of how the desire and capability of firms 
relates to their propensity to break from norms in other HR practices would be worthy 
of examination to see if there is consistency across HR disciplines. 
The interviews have provided an insight into organisational practice, through discussion 
with those involved in the process, i.e. RCs and REs.  Both these groups highlighted the 
significance of employee expectations as a substantial influence in RMD.  
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Consequently, it would be interesting to assess the employee perspective on reward mix 
(both directly and through their Unions) to understand these expectations, how they 
influence the employee‟s behaviour and the extent to which, where firms are looking to 
diverge from the industry norm, it may cause changes to this behaviour.  Whilst not 
widespread this could be examined both qualitatively through research with employees, 
but consideration could also be given to an experimental approach examining the 
dissonance potentially caused by changing reward mix relative to some defined 
historical and expected pattern.   
Two aspects of the method adopted in the research are also considered worthy of further 
exploration.  Despite Rynes and Bono‟s (2000) observation that alliances with RCs may 
be productive in furthering reward research, collaborations have been relatively limited.  
Given the insights gained in this work through one such collaboration, further research 
ascertaining consultants‟ perspectives on this and other reward-related research areas 
would appear to be potentially fruitful.  The experience from this research is that RCs 
were keen to collaborate further in academic work.  Finally, the use of personal rather 
than organisational recruitment is worthy of wider adoption, especially in areas seen as 
organisationally sensitive, where the opportunity to talk of the organisation rather than 
for the organisation may lead to more open conversations.  I believe that this form of 
recruitment provided deeper insights into RMD in this sector at the time of the research. 
7.7 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has addressed the research question – What influences reward mix 
determination in financial services organisations?  In doing this it has developed an 
understanding of the complexity of RMD in the sector and provided a contribution to 
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both the research literature and practice in this area, not just through this document, but 
through the engagement I have had with academics, practitioners and consultants during 
the research.  It has given me great pleasure when I have been asked to return to meet 
the academics, practitioners and consultants who have contributed to the research to 
present my findings and continue our discussions.  Understanding and explanation has 
been presented which should provide value to both the academic debate and to those 
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Appendix 2 - Specified activities as defined in part II of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 
 
 
 accepting deposits;  
 issuing e-money;  
 effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance as principal;  
 dealing in investments (as principal or agent);  
 arranging deals in investments;  
 arranging home finance activities;  
 operating a multilateral trading facility;  
 managing investments;  
 assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance;  
 safeguarding and administering investments;  
 sending dematerialised instructions;  
 establishing etc. collective investment schemes;  
 establishing etc. stakeholder pension schemes;  
 providing basic advice on stakeholder products;  
 advising on investments;  
 advising on home finance activities;  
 Lloyd's market activities;  
 entering funeral plan contracts;  
 entering into a home finance activity;  
 administering a home finance activity;  




Appendix 3 - The significance of the research context 
The financial services sector contributes a significant proportion of overall UK gross 
domestic product (chart 1).  In 2007 it contributed 8.3%, up from its low of 5.2% in 
2000.  This growth is in direct contrast to the reduction in the prominence of the 
manufacturing sector in the UK which since 1995 has fallen from 20.3% to 12.4% 
(Office For National Statistics, 2010a). 
 
 
Chart 1 – Financial services sector’s share of UK GDP 
 
This is higher than a number of other major financial centres – US, Japan, France and 


























Chart 2 – Financial services’ share of GDP in major economies 
The importance of the sector is further illustrated with reference to the contribution it 
makes to UK taxation receipts both through corporation and income tax.   Official data 
from HRMC (McKenzie, 2009) identify corporation tax receipts of £11.6bn (26% of 
overall corporation tax) and income tax of £18.7bn (15% of all income tax) in 2007 the 
































Chart 3 – Tax contribution of UK financial services 
In addition the sector employed over one million people in June 2009, accounting for 
3.5% of overall UK employment, which stood at 28.9 million at the same date (Office 
For National Statistics, 2010a).  This illustrates the significant value add of the sector 
given that employment share is less than half the contribution made to GDP of 8.3%.  
This employment was largely concentrated in the London region with around one third 
of employment being centred in that area.  However as Chart 4 shows the sector did 
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Lüders (2004) identified the particular difficulties faced from participant observation with respect to entering the field, 
establishing and maintaining a role and building a relationship.  The issue of observation was floated with the reward 
consultants and practitioners interviewed during the exploratory research.  What emerged was immediate rejection of such a 
possibility due to reasons of sensitivity of the data that is discussed (i.e. people‟s reward) and the level at which discussions are 
generally held (Executive Committee and RemCo meetings).  This is in line with findings from previous qualitative studies of 
reward, albeit at executive level, where access has been problematic for interviews (Bender, 2004; Main et al., 2008). In 
addition, the lack of one focal point or „moment‟ where a reward mix decision was taken was raised, where the actual mix 
tending to emerge over time rather than as a result of some set piece decisions was identified.  It was not clear what would 









This approach has been adopted in previous reward research at the executive level with researchers noting how they review 
Director Remuneration reports ahead of interviewing REMCO chairs, members or HR professionals (Bender, 2004; Ogden and 
Watson, 2008; Main et al., 2008).  Clearly data are available for publicly listed organisations on their Executive remuneration 
as required by the Companies Act 2006.  Public disclosure of remuneration detail for levels below executives is more 
restricted.  There is no legal requirement for disclosure of details on employee reward mix beyond showing overall 
employment accounting costs.  However, companies do typically include some further detail on their employee reward 
structures in their annual reports and on their website.  A sample (15) of financial services organisations‟ annual reports and 
websites were reviewed for details on reward policy.  Overall, the texts were very basic and provided no insight into the 
rationale for reward mix policies beyond general statements on attracting and retaining employees.  Consequently, content 
analysis of these texts was not used although public data available were reviewed ahead of interviews with reward executives 
to contextualise the researcher into the overall reward structure in place at the reward executive‟s organisation.  
Analysis of 
publicly 
A number of bodies prepare and publish case studies on organisations.  The outputs of three such organisations were reviewed.  
E-Reward
20
 produces case studies on a range of organisations‟ reward practices.  Since E-Reward was created in 1999 it has 
                                                          
20 





written texts / 
case studies 
 
published 62 case reports (as at 17 February 2009).  These are generally in depth and provide detailed assessment of the 
organisation and their stated motives for the reward structures, often including reward mix, being discussed.  However, only 
five of the case studies produced were on financial services firms.  For this reason they were not used in the research although I 
have read each report and they form part of my general base of knowledge in the area.  CIPD resources were also reviewed.  
Detailed accounts of organisational practices are relatively limited.  CIPD reward-related outputs are typically research reports 
and survey results.  Cases are sometimes reported within these studies but they are short form (around one to two pages).  
Given their lack of depth they were not considered appropriate for the research.  Finally, Incomes Data Services (IDS)
21
 pay 
report research was considered. Although reports could not be reviewed first-hand as this required a prohibitively expensive 
subscription, a review of the titles and summaries of recent reports issues was carried out supplemented by my knowledge of 
the reports pre June 2008 when I had access to these data.   The general purpose of the IDS reports is to provide data and 
commentary on pay settlement trends across the economy and on particular sectors.  It also provides wider reporting on 
changes in terms and conditions of employment.  Whilst some summary reports have been written on financial services, 
particularly on bonus settlements, these are typically data-led macro level reporting rather than analytical assessment of 
motives.  Again this lack of depth of assessment and focus on data rather than motives and processes means that this data 





A number of reward researchers have used internal documents as a means of gathering data on organisations (Trevor, 2008; 
Bender, 2004).  Where access is granted these have been found to provide a further insight and means of assessing the data 
provided in interviews.  However, they have noted the general reluctance of organisations to supply these data as they are 
generally confidential and commercially sensitive in nature.  To rely on internal documents as the primary source of data 
would be risky.   However, during interviews where the issue of documents was raised, interviewees were asked if they would 
be willing to supply them.   
 
 
                                                          
21 
IDS is an independent research organisation providing information and analysis on employment law, diversity, pay and reward, HR and pensions.  
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Appendix 5 - Reward consultant interview protocol 
 
Background 
 Outline of role and background. 
 
Concept 
 What do you understand by the term reward mix?  
 
Process / Factors 
 What factors do organisations take into account in determining their reward mix? 
 Why do you think those factors are important to organisations? 
 What in your experience causes organisations to change their reward mix? 
 
Examples 
 Without breaking any confidences can you talk me through specific assignments 
where determination of reward mix has been the main or an important issue? 
 
Close 
 Are there any elements of reward mix determination which you see in the 






Appendix 6 - Reward executive interviewees 
Firm  Role Sector Employees Location 
RE1 Head UK Reward Insurance   5000 London 
RE2 HR Director Wealth management and advice 650 Berkshire 
RE3 Reward Director Retail Banking 500 Berkshire 
RE4 Reward Director Conglomerate Banking 120000 London 
RE5 Head of Reward Retail Banking 120000 London 
RE6 
Director Compensation & Benefits 
Europe Retail Banking 66000 Sussex 
RE7 Senior Reward Analyst Credit Cards 3000 London 
RE8 HR Director Pensions administration and advice 200 Suffolk 
RE9 COO - Main Board Pensions administration and advice 150 Sussex 
RE10 Head of Reward Investment Banking 1200 London 
RE11 HR Director Credit cards 350 London 
RE12 HR Director Long term savings 4500 Edinburgh 
RE13 Head of Compensation and Benefits Wealth management 135 London 
RE14 HR Director Wealth management and advice 100 Kent 
RE15 UK Head of Reward Long term savings 26000 London 
RE16 Head of Reward Investment Banking 750 London 
RE17 Head of Reward Retail banking 18000 London 
RE18 Head of HR UK Investment Banking 26000 London 
RE19 Head of Reward Insurance   2150 Cambridgeshire 
RE20 Head of Compensation and Benefits Conglomerate Banking 60000 London 
RE21 Head of Reward UK Retail Banking 75000 Edinburgh 
RE22 Global Head of Reward Insurance   5000 London 
RE23 Global Reward Director Insurance   22000 London 
RE24 Reward Director Investment Banking 2800 London 
RE25 Head of Reward Wealth management 10000 London 
RE26 Reward Director Conglomerate Banking 135000 Edinburgh 
RE27 Head of Reward Retail banking 26000 London 
RE28 Head of Reward Retail banking 10000 London 
RE29 HR Director Hedge Fund 150 London 
RE30 Head of Reward Banking conglomerate 15000 London 
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Appendix 7 - Reward executive interview protocol 
Background 
 Title, role, reporting lines, responsibilities, previous roles 
 Organisation – Business, products etc. 
 
Concept 
 What do you understand by the term reward mix? Is this the same as that adopted by your current 
organisation? 
 
Section 1  
Determination 
 What is the current reward mix at the organisation? 
 How did you arrive at that mix?  What drives the choices?  (laddering for reasoning) 
 Do you know what reward mix other firms in your sector operate?  Does your mix differ from theirs?  
If yes why?  If not why don‟t you differentiate? 
 
Change 
If a change event is identified use to probe 
 Tell me what happened to cause the change?  Why did it happen? 
 How did the change happen?  Who was involved? 
 What role did you play?  Did you initiate the change? If yes why?  If not who did?  Why did they do 
this? 
 What approval was required?  Why was this approval felt necessary? 
 How did you feel about the change?   
 What were the consequences of the change? 
 
Process 
 Who is involved in decisions on the reward mix? 
 What interests and perspectives do the different parties bring? 
 Who is dominant in the decision? 
 Where are the final decisions on reward mix policy made? 
 
Section 2 
Depending on the initial answers, potential probes 
 Are there any legal or regulatory constraints on the reward mix policy you adopt?  If yes which 
aspects of legal / regulation? 
 Are there any tax regulations that have an influence on your reward mix choices? 
 Do you consider employees‟ preferences for different mixes?  If you do, what has this shown you and 
how has this influenced your mix policy?  
 Has the recent turbulence in the financial services industry caused you to review your reward mix?  If 
yes, how and why?  
 Do you receive external consultancy advice on your reward mix?  If yes, what support do you 
receive? 
 Do you benchmark the overall reward mix?  How do you go about this benchmarking? 
 
Close  
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Prompted influences   
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Pre interview email sent with background and 
protocol 
 
Thank you email sent and any actions followed 
through 
 
Contextual notes written up  
Action points actioned  
Recording transcribed  
Recording saved in folder  
Transcript checked  
Transcript saved in folder  
 
 
 Appendix 9 – Coding structure 
1 Approach           
  1.1 Process         
 
  1.1.1 (In)Formality       
   1.1.2 Authority       
   1.1.3 Committees       
   1.1.4 Decision taking       
  1.2 Roles         
   1.2.1 Consultants       
   1.2.2 Employees       
   1.2.3 Executives       
   1.2.4 Finance Director       
   1.2.5 HR Director       
   1.2.6 Parent       
   1.2.7 REMCO       
   1.2.8 Reward Executive       
   1.2.9 Risk       
      
2 Background           
  2.1 
Interviewees 
        
 
  2.1.1 Interviewee 
background 
      
   2.2.2 Interviewee role       
 
  2.2.3 Organisation 
business 
      
  2.2 Mix 
definitions 
        
   2.2.1 Conceptualisation       
    2.2.1.1 Fixed-variable     
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    2.2.1.2 Holistic total reward     
    2.2.1.3 Total compensation     
   2.2.2 Hierarchy       
    2.2.2.1 Strong role     
    2.2.2.2 Weak role     
 
  2.2.3 Organisational 
package 
      
      
3 Explanations           
  3.1 Change         
   3.1.1 Competence       
    3.1.1.1 HR Capability     
    3.1.1.2 HR Capacity     
    3.1.1.3 Management capability     
   3.1.2 Leadership       
    3.1.2.1 CEO leadership     
    3.1.2.2 Executive leadership     
    3.1.2.3 HR Leadership     
   3.1.2 Opportunity       
    3.1.2.1 Company financial crises     
    3.1.2.2 Financial crises     
    3.1.2.3 Merger     
    3.1.2.4 New leadership     
    3.1.2.5 Strategic change     
   3.1.3 Pragmatism       
    3.1.3.1 Administrative ease     
    3.1.3.2 Opportunism     
   3.1.4 Risk appetite       
    3.1.4.1 Risk aversion     
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    3.1.4.2 Risk loving     
  3.2 Economic         
   3.2.1 Agency       
    3.2.1.2.Principals perspective     
     3.2.1.2.1 Behavioural   
    
  3.2.1.2.1.1 Aligning employee 
effort 
    
  3.2.1.2.1.2 Managing 
monitoring costs 
     3.2.1.2.2 Business risk   
      3.2.1.2.2.1 Company lifestage 
      3.2.1.2.2.2 Cost management 
    
  3.2.1.2.2.3 Risk sharing with 
employees 
     3.2.1.2.3 Paternalism   
    
  3.2.1.2.3.1 Employee personal 
responsibility 
      3.2.1.2.3.2 Employee security 
      3.2.1.2.3.3 Employee well-being 
  3.3 
Organisational 
        
   3.3.1 Institutional       
    3.3.1.1 Coercive     
     3.3.1.1.1 Legal   
     3.3.1.1.2 Parent group   
     3.3.1.1.3 Political   
     3.3.1.1.4 Regulatory   
     3.3.1.1.5 Societal   
     3.3.1.1.6 Tax   
     3.3.1.1.7 Union   
    3.3.1.2 Mimetic     
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     3.3.1.2.1 Benchmarking   
      3.3.1.2.1.1 Analytical 
      3.3.1.2.1.2 Informal 
     3.3.1.2.2 Employee expectation   
     3.3.1.2.3 Geography   
      
    3.3.1.3 Normative     
   
  3.3.1.3.1 CEO- Leadership 
background 
  
     3.3.1.3.2 Codified practices   
     3.3.1.3.3 Consultants advice   
     3.3.1.3.4 Networks   
   
  3.3.1.3.5 Organisational 
exposure to other settings 
  
     3.3.1.3.6 Reward Education   
    3.3.1.4 Path dependency     
     3.3.1.4.1 Cost-Benefit   
     3.3.1.4.2 Historical precedence   
 
  3.3.2 Resource 
dependence 
      
    3.3.2.1 Acquisition critical resources     
    3.3.2.2 Critical partners     
     3.3.2.2.1 Customers   
     3.3.2.2.2 Shareholders   
     3.3.2.2.3 Suppliers   
  
  3.3.2.3 Ease of employee 
substitution of critical employees 
    
    3.3.2.4 High value generation     
    3.3.2.5 Unions     
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Appendix 10 - Assessment of firm’s desire and ability for differentiation 
The table below shows for each firm discussed by the REs in the research, the extent to which each of seven moderating dimensions was found 
to be present in the accounts provided of how they determined their reward mix.  A plus (+) shows that the dimension  was raised as an 
influence, with more than one plus (++) indicating it was raised on several occasions as a key driver of changes to the reward mix away from the 
industry norm position.   
Representative quotes from each of the interviews against these categories are also provided in Appendix 11 to further aid transparency to the 
assessment made in the table.  In addition, the table below shows whether the RE was able to provide examples of changes that had been made to 
the firm‟s reward mix that took it away from the industry norm. 
 Desire  Capability  
Firm Leadership Business 
Strategy 












Type of change 
1    +     Minimal Merger harmonisation leading to minimal 
adjustment to benefits. 
2 ++ ++  n/a  + ++ + Radical Radical shift in proportion of fixed to 
variable pay and uplifting of benefits.  
Change focus of employees from sales to 
advice in line with business strategy. 
3   + +  + +  Moderate Reaction to financial crisis by parent 
Moderate adjustment of bonus and share 
schemes in line with parental guidelines. 
4   + n/a  +   Minimal Merger harmonisation. Minimal 
adjustment to incentive schemes. 
5  + ++ n/a  ++   Moderate Political pressure - Moderate shift of fixed 
: variable proportions. 
6   + +  ++   Moderate Parental pressure for cost savings driven 
by firm‟s financial position and State 
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 Desire  Capability  
Firm Leadership Business 
Strategy 












Type of change 
support required due to the financial crisis.  
Moderate changes to pension scheme and 
share schemes. 
7  +       None N/A 
8 + +  n/a  +   Minimal Merger harmonisation.  Minimal changes 
to bonus scheme and benefits package. 
9    n/a +    None N/A 
10    +  +   Minimal Changes to bonus and share scheme 
mandated from head office. 
11    +     None N/A 
12      + +  Minimal Gradual change to benefit package to 
move away from historical anomalies 
relative to the market position. 
13         None N/A 
14 +   n/a     None N/A 
15    n/a     None N/A 
16    n/a     None N/A 
17    n/a + +   Minimal Merger. Minimal changes to benefits 
packages, some incentive schemes and 
share plans. 
18 + ++    ++  + Radical Resisting market norm (driven by 
regulatory changes) shifts into fixed pay, 
deferment and guarantees. 
19  ++  n/a +  + + Moderate Developing and promoting relational and 
low cost benefits options in order to 
differentiate offering and compensate from 
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 Desire  Capability  
Firm Leadership Business 
Strategy 












Type of change 
lower levels of salary and bonus. 
20    +  +   None N/A 
21  + + n/a  +   Moderate Regular refresh and addition to benefit 
scheme for attraction purposes.  Shift of 
some variable reward into fixed due to 
political pressure. 
22    n/a     None N/A 
23    n/a     None N/A 
24  +  n/a +    Minimal Some limited changes to certain entities 
due to supplier / joint venture partner 
requirements. 
25  +  n/a  +   None N/A 
26   + n/a  + +  Moderate Regular refresh and addition to benefit 
scheme for attraction purposes.  Shift of 
some variable reward into fixed due to 
political pressure. 
27   + n/a - + +  Moderate Regular refresh of benefits for attraction 
purposes.  Also innovating on incentives 
and performance measures used. 
28    n/a + + +  Minimal Harmonisation post merger, particularly 
around some incentives schemes for non 
sales staff.  
29    n/a     None N/A 
30   ++ n/a  +   Moderate Political pressure - Moderate shift of fixed 




Appendix 11 – Table of illustrative quotes from interviewees 
 
Desire to differentiate 
Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
1 We appear to be risk 
averse when it comes to 
decisions of reward and 
reward mix but risk loving 
with respect to strategy, 
and marketing.  The same 
leaders influence but very 
different risk perspectives.  
This is a challenge for all 
reward professionals in 
managing leaders‟ 
expectations while looking 
to innovate and 
differentiate the offering. 
  Now actually the role has got more 
complex because as one of the things 
the US are saying is that they are 
actually going take over more of the 
reward strategy which is going to be an 
interesting challenge for them because 
of course, I am not sure whether they 
entirely understand the nature of the 
marketplace here and the tax issues and 
the rest of it. 
 
2 But [name] is just a 
fantastic CEO.   He is very 
open, he is very honest and 
I knew where we were 
heading, where he wanted 
to take the organisation, 
which is really a 
professional services type 
so it‟s kind of what I was 
The way we reward our 
people says something 
about what we really stand 
for as a company and the 
way we want to do 
business.  We don‟t want 
to be one of those firms 
saying the customer really 
matters and then having 
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Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
used to.  (RE2) 
 
bonus plans that encourage 
selling at any cost.  The 
sector has got a really bad 
name there we want are 
changing to break away 
from this image and that 
type of behaviour as we 
feel what is right for the 
customer will in the long 
term be right for the profit 
and success of the 
company. 
3   In 2008 all of our bonuses were 
obviously subject to quite a lot 
of media attention in [Firm 
name] and our CEO only two 
weeks ago, three weeks ago 
asked people to consider 
voluntarily giving them back at 
the senior levels.   In our 
business that was pitched at 
probably no more than a dozen 
people.   But anticipating where 
the shift and then where 
everything was at we have 
actually already written into our 
rules something that says even if 
everything is achieved we still 
have override that says we can 
reduce it or remove it entirely at 
When we first set up as an organisation 
five years ago there really wasn‟t a 
huge level of interest in what we did, 
they didn‟t actually really know what 
people were paid and as long as we 
were doing great business, then they 
were really happy.   Increasingly over 
time that has changed, there is now a 




Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
our complete discretion. 
4   Overlaying that however, was as 
part of the TARP negotiations 
with the government, we were 
required for a 100% deferral not 
a sort of third, two thirds. 
  
5  You know at the end of the 
day we are now we are by 
far the biggest [firm type].   
So part of you says well 
lets be the leaders rather 
than the followers, which 
is OK. 
I think in this environment, a 
company like this wants to meet 
its obligations under the FSA, 
clearly it does. 
  
6   So that is not really clear yet, 
but I can feel the appetite in the 
organisation to get out from 
under that restriction. 
So on paper it can look decentralized, 
but in terms of where things and how 
things are approved, it‟s absolutely 
centralized company. 
 
7  Often people will say well 
what do other people do?   
What do [firm name] do, 
or what do [firm name] 
do? … What do our big 
competitors do?  And I 
say, I don‟t really care 
very much what they do 
because we are big enough 
that we should do what we 
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Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
want to do 
8 I think it‟s part of their 
make up anyway.  Let‟s 
not just listen to what our 
internal people are saying 
but … I guess it‟s just seen 
a bit as, well that‟s what 
they‟re paid to do totally 
out there in the 
marketplace, so there must 
be some substantiating 
evidence that they‟re 
bringing to the table. 
We never wanted to be just 
another insurance 
company, and in our very 
early literature for 
investors, we actually 
make the statement that we 
set out to be different and I 
suppose it was a way of 
being different and not 
being like everybody else. 
   
9     There‟s some smaller 
things in the reward mix 
that [firm name] do 
because we‟ve always 
done them for a long time 
and it‟s part of our culture 
and heritage and it‟s a bit 
old fashioned, maybe, but 
we would want to do it to 
retain that commitment 
and buy in. 
10    But the big exception is going to be we 
are bringing in a new bonus scheme to 
be in line with the FSA and regulations 




Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
Frankfurt.   I actually have a bit of an 
issue with that because I am just 
hoping that they do take into account 
the particular type of market that we 
have in London, which is not the same 
as the investment banking market in 
Frankfurt. 
11    The style of the package is about 
reward mix actually determined by the 
parent company.   So we would piggy 
back on their arrangements.  
 
12      
13      
14 I think it tends to be the 
people who have worked 
in bigger organisations, so 
they come very much from 
benchmarking culture and 
they come from a culture 
where you‟re not just 
maybe benchmarking your 
benefits and your salaries, 
where you‟re constantly 
benchmarking your 
performance, and 
particularly on our 
investment side, your 
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Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
performance against your 
peers.  So they come from 
that sort of culture. (RE14) 
15      
16      
17     There were a lot of legacy 
arrangements, and as you 
try to understand how did 
we get to where we are 
now, there were variable 
elements in the old, shall I 
say, [firm name] package, 
but not very much, and it 
really went through a 
phase where cash was 
king, so everything was 
consolidated into base pay.  
Benefits was very, very 
meagre.   
18 Success is everything for 
the firm‟s management.  
They will look for every 
way possible to steal an 
edge on the competition. 
The second is anything 
they do to make it more 
difficult for any other 
investment banks to 
compete is also fantastic. I 
mean it strikes us that 
we‟re all in a little walled 
garden and they‟re 
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Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
slamming the door shut, 
and if you‟re a survivor 
you‟re in a group of five or 
six now, whereas before 
there was thirty or forty. 
It‟s fantastic. Fortunately, 
[Firm name] is inside that 
garden so we think it‟s 
great. 
19  And this feeds in to 
something that we‟re 
starting to have … a 
discussion that we‟re 
starting to have with the 
board now, which is going 
back to where I started on 
the [firm name] offer, in, 
okay, so what does [firm 
name] as an employer 
mean to you as a board?  
  I think that goes back to 
being a much smaller 
company, quite 
paternalistic, and as we‟ve 
grown there are elements 
of that paternalism that 
have remained, which now 
are not necessarily 
beneficial to the 
organisation as a whole, 
but the same people are in 
situ, and so that same 
mentality is still there.   
20    And they feel they've been proved 
right, that the Anglo Saxon approach 
did not work, and the Americanisation 
of the bonus culture, which really came 
over from the US, an even if it would 
have happened in the UK, you know 




Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
American banks moved in, and all 
these structures fell away.  So the 
attitude in the [country]  is... this has to 
change, and so there's a very, very 
strong sense of that. 
21  So it‟s actually the 
business driver thing.  I 
suppose more commonly 
what you get is ensuring 
that the misalignment is 
not too bad between 
business strategy and 
reward programmes. 
The crisis has had some effect 
on our reward with Government 
exerting pressure on what we 
do. 
  
22      
23      
24  What a joint venture looks 
like is a business, and one 
of the business partners 
runs the business and the 
others are partners, not 
running the business but 
they‟re sharing the costs. If 
[firm name] is the partner 
that‟s running the business, 
it may want to apply all its 
systems and processes to 
all the people who work in 
  Where we have come from 
as a company is really 
important.  If it is right for 
us then we will use this to 
resist the benchmark 
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that joint venture, but the 
partners may be unhappy 
about that because some of 
[firm name]‟s systems and 
processes carry cost 
beyond what they might 
find acceptable, so we‟ve 
got that other little bit of 
complexity around the 
place with these joint 
venture arrangements that 
we have. 
25  Historically it must have 
come about because we-, 
we felt that we needed to 
provide some level of 
protection for employees 
and support them when 
times are bad sort of thing. 
So I guess that‟s what we 
do for our customers in 
terms of the financial 
services institution, 
looking after people who 
find themselves in 
unfortunate situations 
   
26   We are clearly under huge 
pressure from the authorities 




Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
that. 
27   But treating the customer fairly, 
we work very hard with the 
FSA to ensure that we are fully 
compliant with that.   It‟s really 
embedded in our culture, it‟s 
part of our main business 
strategy aligned to it.   So again 
I think that does keep you 
honest, we haven‟t had any 
problems, but we would always 
ensure that what we were doing 
takes into account those 
regulations. 
  
28     It has taken us a lot of 
effort to get to the mix that 
we have now and Id be 
reluctant to overhaul this 
given the amount of 
investment that has 
occurred.  The benefits of 
changing would not 
outweigh the cost of 
making the change so why 
would we throw away all 
that we have done.  
29      
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Firm Leadership Business Strategy Political pressure Parental influence Firm history 
30   The regulatory punch and slap 
has created a reaction, a 
significant influence on how we 
organise the variable component 






Capability and opportunity to differentiate 
  Capability 
Firm Opportunity HR Capability / Capacity Line Management Capability 
1 Opportunities have presented themselves and we have 
used them. 
  
2 The establishment of the new [firm name] when we 
merged with [firm name] was the original catalyst for 
change. 
We focused a lot of time and energy in to getting 
the change right.  I had the full confidence of 
[CEO‟s name] to make it really work. 
We had to get line management on board as they had 
to sell the change to their people.  This was where the 
change was really successful. 
3 Now after everything that we went through last year we 
have got a number of overrides, a number of gates. 
We had to gear up to meet the regulatory 
challenge but we are pleased with how we have 
handled that. 
 
4 Well we have got a point in time to do it … whenever 
you do any sort of take over integration it is an 
opportunity that you don‟t want to lose.   So number one 
now is a great time to do it. 
  
5 It‟s an opportunity to take a step back and think about 
what we really want to do as an employer and what sort 
of employer do we want to be. 
  
6 But this year, because the economy is so bad and it 
affects our business so much. 
  
7    





  Capability 
Firm Opportunity HR Capability / Capacity Line Management Capability 
9    
10 I think we are pretty close to the level of tax that people 
see as reasonable, any increase on where we are now is 
going to start people saying ok, actually we are going to 
start doing something about it. 
  
11    
12 We have quite a unique culture, and what we‟ve tried to 
do is not take advantage of the current crisis just to push 
through changes that would have materially affected the 
fabric of the organisation, so we‟ve been able to keep 
things that other organisations may well have thought 
about just removing. 
I think I‟ll always look for an angle on which we 
can be different. 
 
13    
14    
15    
16    
17 Now, it may be that through the recession we‟ve been 
through and the turmoil that some of those things will 
change. 
  
18 Again, in the broader context it‟s fantastic that the 
government and the regulators are involved in all this for 
a number of reasons. I mean the first is that it… I mean 
 The key is the management team are driving our 
aggressive stance.  They are in the lead in 
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  Capability 
Firm Opportunity HR Capability / Capacity Line Management Capability 
we don‟t want to pay a penny more to our people than 
we have to, full stop. I mean if they can drive the whole 
market down that‟s great. I‟m not sure they‟ll be able to 
but, you know, we‟re happy to stand by as passive 
observers and watch them try and do it. 
confronting the market changes that are occurring. 
19  We spend a lot of time seeking employee views 
and input on the whole reward package.  We 
analyse it all and use this along with the exit and 
retention data to mould the offering 
The business owns it, because essentially any staff 
costs come out of the business budget, so we have to 
have the buy in from the business for it. 
20 Our parent it acquires, often keeps the local name, and 
then over a period of time, usually through parachuting 
[name of nationality] guys in there, [firm name] them. 
  
21 They gave us stuff to hang our hat on that we think we 
needed to change anyway.  It was a good excuse.  
Certainly TCF was.  RDR, you know, it‟s yet to impact, 
but TCF was definitely a case of saying, hey, there‟s 
some stuff here that provides a good excuse to insert 
some of the controls that we want. 
  
22    
23    
24    
25 And I think it was-, in part, it was a case of looking at 




  Capability 
Firm Opportunity HR Capability / Capacity Line Management Capability 
receiving in terms of a benefits package and trying to 
deal with any transitional arrangements basically to try to 
harmonise terms and conditions. 
26 I believe you say opportunistically.  That is way you 
build it. 
We have had a very good track record of evolving 
our reward package, especially the benefits where 
I believe we are a market leader. 
 
27 We haven‟t made any drastic changes based on 
economic conditions but we may have to in the future.   
So we would always monitor the market and the 
economic conditions. 
So [firm name] has a lot schemes and initiatives 
across the HR piece rather than just reward and 
performance management.   So it‟s integrating 
those, and I think that is the biggest challenge, but 
we are achieving a lot not only aligning the 
initiatives within HR, but also relaying the 
message, communicating the message to 
employees that it is the whole package. 
 
28 The merger gave us a great opportunity to simplify 
everything. 
It was driven out of the HR function, looking at 
external practice, where we wanted to drive 
performance more effectively. 
 
29    
30 There was some element of first move advantage as well.  
By doubling your base pay salary you were getting 
advantage in the hiring market.   
  
 
